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This review aims to evaluate the empirical literature relating to the affect 
recognition and social cognition of patients who have lesions to areas of the 
frontal lobes of the brain. Following a thorough search, 39 papers were included 
in this systematic review. The majority of these papers reveal that most patients 
with lesions in the orbitofrontal and ventromedial areas of the frontal lobe have 
difficulties recognising emotion from faces or prosody, as well as impairments in 
some aspects of social cognition ("hot" social cognition: e.g. reduced cognitive 
and affective empathy, significant difficulties with processing of complex social 
emotions such as guilt). Impairments in theory of mind (or "cold" social cognition 
skills) are also widely reported in patients with damage to the ventromedial and 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. This pattern of impairment is not only present in 
patients with focal damage (e.g. stroke, tumours, surgical lesions, some forms 
of TBI) but also in patients with diffuse damage to the frontal areas such as MS 
probably due to with lesions of fibre tracts in the white matter interconnecting 
cortical regions related to emotion processing and social cognition. The 
relationship between basic emotion recognition and social cognition is also 
discussed in the light of these findings, and recommendations are made for the 






Damage to the frontal lobes of the brain usually leads to neuropsychological, 
behavioural and emotional deficits which may affect, among other things, the 
individual's ability to function effectively a social environment. Emotional and 
cognitive skills are necessary to understand others' mental states, predict their 
intentions and behaviours and to respond adequately to various social 
exchanges. Consequently, these emotional and cognitive skills are essential for 
successful functioning.  
Most patients who have damage to areas of the frontal lobes experience 
behaviour and personality changes. This may include increased risk-taking 
behaviour (e.g. Bechara, Damasio, Damasio et al.,1994), impulsiveness 
(Winstanley, Theobald, Cardinal and Robins, 2004), antisocial personality traits 
(Meyer, Berman, Scheibel and Hayman, 1992),  poor socio-moral judgment 
(e.g. Blair and Cipolotti, 2000) and difficulties in maintaining interpersonal 
relationships (e.g. Blais and Boisvert, 2005). Most of those deficits have been 
linked in the past to impairments in executive functioning. For example, it has 
been proposed that poor decision making, self-monitoring and self-regulating 
behaviours lead to breakdowns in social relationships (e.g. Tanji, Shima and 
Mushitake, 2007; Ganesalingam, Sanson, Anderson and Yeates, 2007). 
However, several researchers have also suggested that a wide range of 
interpersonal difficulties can occur in this patient population in the absence of 
clear executive difficulties (e.g. Cicerone and Tanenbaum, 1997; Blair and 
Cipolotti, 2000; Tranel, Bechara and Denburg, 2002; Stuss, 2011). In addition to 
their role in executive functioning, the frontal lobes also have important roles in 
emotional recognition (e.g. Kucharska-Pietura, Phillips, Gernand et al, 2003; 
Hornak, Bramham, Rolls, Morris et al, 2003). Emotion recognition is the ability 
to accurately recognise the emotion being expressed, either through a person's 
facial expression or vocalisations. 
Successful social exchanges are based on the ability to accurately perceive and 
interpret social cues such as emotional expressions (facial, vocal or general 
body language), as well as correctly infer others' perspectives, intents, beliefs, 
emotional states (social cognition). The purpose of this review is to 
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systematically examine the literature regarding how damage to the frontal lobes 
affects an individual's emotion recognition and social cognition abilities. 
Cross cultural research on the expression and recognition of facial emotion 
showed that there are six “basic” emotions which are universal: anger, disgust, 
fear, happiness, sadness and surprise (e.g. Ekman, Sorenson and Friesen, 
1969; Izard 1968; 1971). There is considerable evidence showing that in non-
clinical populations happiness is recognised with far greater accuracy (87-97%) 
than negative emotions, particularly fear (68-88%; Ekman et al., 1969). It has 
been suggested that this is due to there being only one clearly defined positive 
emotion (happiness) whereas there are four or five different negative emotions 
(e.g. Calvo and Lundqvist, 2008). Consequently, people may get confused 
between negative emotions and mislabel them, whereas they are less likely to 
confuse happiness with one of the negative emotions. This performance bias is 
relevant when discussing the findings on clinical populations.  
Social cognition is an umbrella term for several cognitive skills that allow one to 
form a representation of another's mental states (e.g., beliefs, emotions and 
intentions). Several authors distinguish between "hot" (mainly emotion based) 
and "cold" (mainly cognitive based) social cognition. "Hot social cognition" 
comprises the abilities to accurately detect a wide range of emotions in others 
(e.g., basic emotions and more complex emotions such as jealousy) and 
empathising with them (e.g., experiencing a similar emotion in the absence of 
the original stimulation, triggered solely by the perceived emotion in others). 
"Cold social cognition" refers to the ability think from another person's 
perspective (also known as forming a Theory of Mind - ToM; Frith and Frith, 
2010). Hot and cold social cognitions form the basis of understanding others' 
mental states and help predict their actions, which together with knowledge of 
social and moral norms help adjust own behaviours towards others in an 
appropriate way. Since social cognition is a complex concept with multiple 
components (which are assessed separately using a wide range of 
instruments), no clear pattern of functioning is consistently reported in non-
clinical populations. However, clear differences between clinical and non-clinical 
populations are often reported (e.g. Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight, 1998). 
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There have been a small number of reviews looking at either emotion 
recognition or social cognition (or both) in people with traumatic brain injury. 
However, those where not systematic reviews and have a number of limitations. 
For example, Radice-Neumann, Zupan, Babbage and Willer (2007) reviewed 
several papers reporting on basic facial emotion recognition in patients with 
traumatic brain injury (TBI) and concluded that impaired facial affect recognition 
appears to be a ubiquitous consequence of frontal brain damage in most 
individuals with TBI. Notably, social cognition was not explicitly addressed. It is 
also unclear whether this was an exhaustive review of the literature or just an 
illustrative sample which was sufficient to enable the authors to propose that 
rehabilitation strategies should include emotion retraining.   
Another recent review (Mc Donald, 2013) focused on the literature reporting 
mainly changes in social cognition following traumatic brain injury (TBI), 
although changes in facial and vocal emotion perception are also briefly 
covered. The author concluded that, despite small heterogeneous samples 
presented, there is convincing evidence that impairments in social cognition and 
basic emotion recognition are fairly frequent in individuals with TBI. Similar to 
Radice-Neumann et al, (2007) this review is not a systematic review, and 
therefore it is difficult to assess the quality of studies reviewed, or whether it 
covers all the available literature. The lack of a systematic overview of the tasks 
used in to assess social cognition and emotion recognition in the reviewed 
papers makes the interpretation of results difficult. Additionally, the review is 
focused solely on papers presenting TBI samples and does not include other 
types of brain lesions that may produce a similar pattern of impairment. Other 
reviews (e.g., Ochsner et al., 2012) have focused on fMRI literature which 
investigated brain mechanisms underlying emotion regulation. They discuss 
fMRI data relating to emotional regulation but do not review lesion studies. 
Despite an increasing number of studies published since 1998 reporting 
changes in emotion recognition in patients with frontal brain injury, a 
considerable number of studies discussing rehabilitation interventions after 
frontal lobe damage, do not discuss emotion perception/complex emotional 
inference retraining. For example, the most recent review (Hunt, Turner, 
Polatajko, Bottari & Dawson, 2013) focused on understanding the relationship 
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between executive function, self-regulation and attribution in relation to goal-
directed behaviour in adults. This is consistent with the  idea that most of the 
deficits seen in patients with frontal injury are linked to impairments in executive 
functioning, and thus emotional recognition or complex social cognition have not 
been covered despite a plethora of studies which reported changes in these 
cognitive domains.  
In conclusion, there appears to be no systematic review of the literature looking 
specifically at changes in emotional perception and social cognition in patients 
with a wide range of frontal lobe lesions (e.g. TBI, stroke, surgery, etc). Thus, by 
reviewing the frontal lobe lesion literature specifically for studies which looked at 
changes in emotional perception and social cognition, we aim to bridge the 
current gap in the literature left by the previous reviews. Secondly, this may also 
contribute to our understanding of the changes in personality, socio-moral 
judgments and social interaction in patients with frontal lobe lesions. Finally, this 
may help inform rehabilitation interventions following frontal lobe lesions. 
 
3. Methods 
A systematic search was conducted on Web of Science databases (all 
databases included) using the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic 
Reviews and Meta-analyses (PRISMA, Mohr at al., 2009) guidelines to identify 
relevant studies published prior to 2015.  
 
3. 1. Study eligibility criteria 
Experimental studies conducted on adult human participants with frontal brain 
lesions which investigated facial emotion perception and/or social cognition 
were included in this systematic review. This included single case studies. 
However, studies on children and adolescents were not included since 
developmental issues may induce additional variability to emotion recognition 
and more importantly on social cognition. Studies describing changes in 
emotion processing conducted on participants with diagnosed psychiatric 
conditions were also excluded due to possible confounds for emotion 
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recognition difficulties. Only research articles presenting empirical studies (e.g. 
not reviews), peer reviewed and published in the English language were 
included. Published studies from the year 1980 to 2015 were included in the 
search since full text articles published before 1980 would have been difficult to 
obtain in the time frame of this study. 
 
3. 2. Search Strategy 
The search terms used were: (Acquired OR Trauma*) AND (Frontal AND 
(Damage OR Lesion OR Injury) AND ((Emotion* OR Affect* OR (Complex OR 
Social AND Emotion* OR Affect*) OR (Sad* OR Happ* OR Disgust OR Anger 
OR Angry OR Fear* OR Surprise)) AND (Perception OR Perceive OR Detection 
OR Processing OR Recog*).  
 
3. 3. Methodological quality 
This review employed the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (CASP) checklist 
for case-control studies (presented in the Appendix). CASP contains a list of 
eleven quality items that are judged to be either present, absent or unclear for 
each paper assessed. The NICE rating system for methodological quality of 
studies (NICE, 2007, see Table 1 below) was then used to rate the studies from 
good quality (when all or most of the CASP criteria have been fulfilled "++"), to 
reasonable quality (when the most important criteria have been fulfilled "+") and 
poor quality (when few or no criteria have been fulfilled "−"). Five papers 
(12.8%) included in this review were randomly selected and rated independently 
by another researcher who had experience with the literature. The checklist and 
rating procedure was discussed prior to ratings being made to minimise 
different interpretations of the checklist items. Inter-rater reliability (IRR) was 
calculated using Cohen Kappa (Cohen, 1960), and was found to be 0.7 (good 




++ All or most of the criteria have been fulfilled. Where they have not 
been fulfilled the conclusions of the study or review are thought very 
unlikely to alter 
+ Some of the criteria have been fulfilled. Those criteria that have not 
been fulfilled or not adequately described are thought unlikely to alter 
the conclusions. 
- Few or no criteria fulfilled. The conclusions of the study are thought 
likely or very likely to alter. 
Table 1: Nice (2007) rating system for methodological quality of the studies. 
 
3. 4. Risk of bias across studies 
a) Language bias: only articles in English were considered. 
b) Database bias: only articles found in English language databases were 
assessed such as Medline and Web of Science 
c) Researcher bias: although the initial search was based on strict inclusion 
criteria, the initial selection of papers was done by a single author. 
d) Study quality and publication bias: only studies published in peer review 
journals were included in this review. However, it is well known that studies 
which report significant results are more likely to be published than ones which 
report non-significant results ("the file drawer problem" Rosenthal, 1979).  
 
4. Results 
The search strategy (underlined in section 3.2) returned 197 studies from Web 
of Science. An additional six studies were identified from references cited in the 
studies returned by the search. Since there were no duplicates, a total of 203 
records were screened and 164 were excluded (see exclusion criteria described 
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Figure 1: PRISMA 2009 flow diagram of the study selection process. 
 
4. 1. Summary of studies 
Table 2 provides an overview of the 39 included papers. For a breakdown of 
participants' gender and average age, as well as study quality ratings please 
refer to Table 3 in Appendix One.  
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Table 2: Summary of studies. 
















2014 Njomboro, et 
al. 
Exploring social 
cognition in patients 
with apathy following 
acquired brain damage 



















Patients with frontal damage 
showed impaired social and 
moral judgements. There was 
no difference in emotion 
recognition between frontal an 
non frontal lesion groups but 
both groups performed lower 
than controls 
2013 Spikman, et 
al. 
Deficits in Facial 
Emotion Recognition 
Indicate Behavioral 
Changes and Impaired 
Self-Awareness after 
Moderate to Severe 
Traumatic Brain Injury 




Impaired emotion recognition 
in the patients, and in particular 
of Sadness and Anger. This 
correlated with impaired self-
awareness. 
2013 Mike, et al. Disconnection 
Mechanism and 
Regional Cortical 
Atrophy Contribute to 
Impaired Processing of 
Facial Expressions 
and Theory of Mind in 
Multiple Sclerosis: A 
Structural MRI Study 
Controlled 49/24 FP, Reading 





MS Poorer emotion and mental 
state recognition 
in patients with MS due to 
cortical gray matter damages. 
 
2013 Kemp et al. Caudate nucleus and 
social cognition: 
Neuropsychological 
and SPECT evidence 
from a patient with 





1/12 FP, FASOBT, 
Reading the 
Mind in the 
Eyes Test, 
MCJ,SAT 
Eckman 60 CVA Impairments in the “hot” social 
cognition as well as in the 
ability to recognize negative 




















2013 Dal Monte et 
al. 
A voxel-based lesion 
study on facial emotion 
recognition after 
penetrating brain injury 




Patients with damage to 
anterior and bilateral PFC 
lesions had deficits 
in recognizing unpleasant 
emotions, whereas damage to 
posterior and 
bilateral PFC resulted in 
impaired recognition 
of pleasant emotions 




Relation to General 
Cognitive Deficits, 
Injury Severity, and 
Prefrontal Lesions in 
Traumatic Brain Injury 
Patients 










significantly worse than healthy 
controls on all measures, with 
the highest effect size for the 
emotion recognition 
test (FEEST) 





Traumatic Brain Injury 
Single 
Group 






Patients showed affect 
recognition impairments and 
reduced empathy. 
2012 Martins et al. Atypical moral 
judgment following 
traumatic brain injury 













N/A Frontal TBI 
 
Patients showed more 
utilitarian responses for moral 
dilemmas when compared 
to controls and difficulties in 
social emotion recognition. 
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2012 Martins et al. Changes in social 
emotion recognition 
following traumatic 
frontal lobe injury 




Greene et al 
2004) 
N/A Frontal TBI Recognition of social emotions 
(arrogance and jealousy) was 
significantly reduced in 
patients; patients with bilateral 
lesions showed a lower 
accuracy on all social 
emotions. 
2012 Dethier et al. Spontaneous and 
posed emotional facial 
expressions following 
severe traumatic brain 
injury 
Controlled 23/29 N/A Facial 
expressivity 




Preference for utilitarian 
responses for moral dilemmas 
and difficulties 
in social emotion recognition in 
TBI patients 
 
2011 Xi, et al. Contributions of 
subregions of the 
prefrontal cortex to the 
theory of mind and 
decision making 
Controlled 30 (16 
VMPC; 14 
DLPC) /30 
FP N/A Prefrontal 
TBI - Focal 
Lesions 
Patients with prefrontal 
lesions showed impairments of 
the theory of mind (FP) but 
performance on the decision 
making 
tasks was unaffected. 
2011 Phillips et al. Specific Impairments 
of Emotion Perception 
in Multiple Sclerosis 
Controlled 32/33 N/A FEEST, 
DEPVT 
 
MS MS patients were impaired at 
both static and dynamic 
emotion recognition tasks. 
 




traumatic brain injury: 
Loss of implicit social 







Controlled 22/25 IAT, ASI, 
ATWS 




Patients performed normally on 
social cognition tasks but 
showed impairment on 
executive function tasks 
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2011 McDonald et 
al. 
Emotion Perception 
and Alexithymia in 
People With Severe 
Traumatic Brain Injury: 
One Disorder or Two? 
A Preliminary 
Investigation 




Patients were impaired for 
matching facial expressions. 
Their performance on ‘fear’ 
was especially poor. They also 
scored significantly higher on 
alexithymia scale but there was 
no association between poor 
emotion recognition and 
Alexithymia. 
2011 McDonald et 
al. 
Impaired mimicry 
response to angry 
faces following severe 
traumatic brain injury 
Controlled 21/20 N/A Modified  
Ekman 60 
Frontal TBI Reduced emotion recognition 
and reactivity to angry 
expressions in the TBI group. 
2011 Callahan et 
al. 
Liberal bias mediates 
emotion recognition 
deficits in frontal 
traumatic brain injury 
Controlled 14/22 N/A Modified  
Ekman 60 
Frontal TBI Patients showed facial emotion 
recognition impairment and a 
liberal bias when rating 
facial expressions, leading 
them to associate intense 
ratings of incorrect emotional 
labels to sad, disgusted, 
surprised and fearful facial 
expressions. 
2010 Williams et 
al. 
Impairment in the 
recognition of emotion 
across different media 
following traumatic 
brain injury 




Patients were significantly 
impaired for basic emotion 
recognition. The difference 
between the recognition of 
positive and negative emotions 






























traumatic brain injury 




Mind in the 






Patients performed significantly 
lower than controls on Reading 
the Mind in the Eyes Test. 
However only patients with 
lesions in the ventromedial   
cortex (VMPC) performed 
poorly on the FP test. 
2009 Henry et al. Evidence for deficits in 
facial affect recognition 
and theory of mind in 
multiple sclerosis 
Controlled 27/30 Reading the 
Mind in the 
Eyes Test 
Ekman 60 MS MS participants were signifi 
cantly impaired on the ToM 
task, and also on the facial 
emotion recognition tasks 
especially for anger and fear. 
2009 Chiavarino et 
al. 
Frontal and parietal 
lobe involvement in the 












Patients with parietal and 
frontal damage had more 
difficulties  than controls in 
understanding the intentional 
nature of pretence. Patients 
with parietal lesions patients in 
particular, had difficulties with 
the identification of pretend 
actions. 
2007 Koenigs et 
al. 
























Abnormal pattern of 
judgements on moral dilemmas 









































The patient showed no 
impairment in TOM tasks, but 
was impaired for emotion 
recognition tasks and social 
norms violations. 




traumatic brain injury 
Controlled 28/28 N/A TAS-20 TBI (8 
patients had 
frontal TBI) 
Patients had difficulties 
identifying emotions and 
showed reduced introspection. 
2006 Henry et al. Theory of mind 
following traumatic 




Controlled 16/17 Reading the 
Mind in the 
Eyes Test 





Patients’ recognition of basic 
emotions, as well as their 
capacity to detect subtle social 
emotions, 
was significantly reduced 
relative to controls. 
2006 Beer et al. Orbitofrontal cortex 












Patients showed inappropriate 
social behaviour and were 
unaware that their performance 
violated social norms despite 
being familiar with the norms 
themselves. 
2005 McDonald et 
al. 
Differential impairment 
in recognition of 
emotion across 
different media in 
people with severe 
traumatic brain injury 
Controlled 34/28 N/A TASIT/EET 
(audio & video 
presentation) 
Severe TBI Patients significantly impaired 
in recognising and interpreting 
emotion from static and 


























Tsoory et al. 
Impairment in 
cognitive and affective 
empathy in patients 
















Patients with right or left orbital 
and medial  PFC were 
significantly 
impaired in both cognitive and 
affective empathy as compared 
to parietal patients and healthy 
controls.  Patients with right 
parietal lesions 
were also impaired. 
2004 McDonald et 
al. 
Social perception 
deficits after traumatic 
brain injury: Interaction 
between emotion 
recognition, 
mentalizing ability, and 
social communication 





TASIT (part 1) Severe TBI Patients had marked difficulty 
with social perception and 
basic emotion recognition. 
They could recognize speaker 
beliefs only when this 
information was explicitly 
provided (i.e. unable to infer 
meaning of interpersonal 
exchanges). 
2004 Green et al. Deficits in facial 
emotion perception in 
adults with recent 
traumatic brain injury 
Controlled 30/30 N/A FAB Chronic TBI Patients were less accurate 
than controls on facial emotion 
perception tasks. This was 
observed regardless of 
whether the lesions were focal 
and specific to areas known to 
be involved in facial emotion 
processing or more diffuse. 
2003 Hornak et al. Changes in emotion 
after circumscribed 
surgical lesions of the 
orbitofrontal and 
cingulate cortices 












Patients with bilateral lesions 
of the OFC or lesions in the 
ACC showed impairments in 
voice and face expression and 
social cognition, whereas 
patients with unilateral damage 
in the OFC showed deficits 
only in emotion recognition. 
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Pietura et al. 
Perception of emotions 
from faces and voices 
following unilateral 
brain damage 












Right hemisphere patients 
showed marked impairment on 
both emotion recognition and 
labelling of facial expressions.  
Negative emotions more 
impaired than positive.  Similar 
results for emotions conveyed 
by prosody. 
2003 Milders et al. Neuropsychological 
impairments and 
changes in emotional 
and social behaviour 
following severe 
traumatic brain injury 
Controlled 17/17 FP, 
QMEE, Eyes in 







Severe TBI TBI patients were impaired at 
recognising facial and vocal 
emotions and detecting faux 
pas, but did not show impaired 
empathy ratings. 
2003 Charbonnea
u et al. 
Perception and 
production of facial 
and prosodic emotions 
by chronic CVA 
patients 










Patients with right hemisphere 
damage showed impaired 
processing of facial (positive 
and negative) and prosodic  
(negative only) emotion 
recognition. 
2002 Hopkins et 
al. 
Altered electrodermal 
response to facial 
expression after 
closed head injury 
Controlled 15/15 N/A Modified 
Ekman 60 
TBI TBI participants showed 
reduced ability to recognise 
negative facial expression and 
reduced electrodermal activity 
for negative emotions in 





















2002 Tranel et al. Asymmetric functional 
roles of right and left 
ventromedial prefrontal 
cortices in social 
conduct, decision-

















Patients with lesions in the 
right ventro-medial  prefrontal 
cortex (VMPC) showed 
disturbances in social and 
interpersonal behaviour, 
whereas patients with lesion in 
the left VMPC showed intact 
social functioning. 
2001 Happe et al. Acquired mind-
blindness following 
frontal lobe surgery? A 
single case study of 
impaired 'theory of 




























The patient who had 
undergone frontal surgery to 
address bipolar disorder (BP) 
showed impaired TOM. 
However the other patient who 
had BP but not surgery 
showed intact TOM. 
2000 Blair & 
Cipolotti 
Impaired social 
response reversal - A 

















(Blair et al., 
1995) 
Facial Emotion  
recognition 







Patient showed impairment in 
recognition of some facial 
expressions (anger and 
disgust). He also showed 
difficulties in recognising 
violations of acceptable social 
behaviour and attributions of 

























1998 Stone et al Frontal lobe 
contributions to theory 
of mind 
Controlled 10 (5 
bilateral 
















severe head injury 
Controlled 15/15 N/A Facial 
Recognition 
Task 
TBI Patients impaired for emotion 
recognition, especially 
recognition of negative 
emotions. 
MST= Moral Sense Test (Kamm, 1998); SAT= Social Awareness Test  (Dewey, 1991); TOM= Theory of Mind test; FEEST= Facial Expression 
of Emotion Stimuli and Tests (Young et al., 2002); FP=  Faux-Pas Test (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2006); FASOBT= First- and 
Second-Order False-Beliefs Tasks (Ehrle et al., 2011); DANVA2-AF=The Diagnostic Assessment of Nonverbal Affect 2–Adult Faces (Nowicki 
et al., 1994); DANVA2-AP = The Diagnostic Assessment of Nonverbal Affect 2–Adult Paralanguage (Nowicki et al., 1994); MCJ = Moral and 
Conventional Judgments Test [e.g., (Blair, 1995); Ekman 60 Test (Ekman and Friesen, 1976); EIST= Emotional Inference from Stories Test 
(Zupan, 2009); IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980); Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, (Baron-Cohen et. al., 2001); Faces test  
(Baron-Cohen et. al., 1997); DEPVT = Dynamic emotion perception video task (Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007); ASI = The ambivalent sexism 
inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996); ATWS = The attitudes toward women scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1972); IAT = Implicit association test (Milne 
& Grafman, 2001); TAS-20 = Toronto Alexithymia Scale (Bagby, Parker & Taylor 1994); TASIT/EET =  The Awareness of Social Inference 
Test, Part 1–The Emotion Evaluation Test (EET) (McDonald & Rollins, 2002); JCT = Joke Comprehension Test (Corcoran et al., 1997); QMEE 
= Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (Meherabian & Epstein, 1972); FAB = Florida Affect Battery (bowers et al., 1998). 
Anatomical regions: OFC = orbitofrontal cortex; DLPC = dorso-lateral prefrontal cortex; VMPF = ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, OFC = orbito-
frontal cortex; ACC = anterior cingulate cortex 
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4. 2. Study design and Participants 
Most of the studies included in this review (33 out of 39) employed a quasi-
experimental design, whereby performance on emotion recognition and social 
cognition tasks of adult patients with various neurological conditions (e.g. traumatic 
brain injury, stroke, multiple sclerosis, herpes simplex encephalitis, surgical lesions, 
etc) were compared to a healthy control group matched for age, gender, education 
and IQ. Two papers employed a quasi-experimental design with no healthy control 
group (i.e. compared emotion recognition and social cognition between patients with 
lesions in different areas of the brain). Sample sizes varied from 180 patients/54 
controls (DalMonte et al, 2013) to 6 patients/12 controls (Koenigs et al, 2007). Only 
five studies presented equal numbers patients and controls. On average (across all 
studies that presented detailed participant data) there were more males than females 
in both patient (27.4 males vs. 11.6 females) and healthy control groups (18.5 males 
vs. 11.1 females). The majority of papers reported no significant differences between 
average ages of patient and control groups. 
Four studies presented single cases: two studies had healthy controls for 
comparison, one compared a patient with frontal lesions and dysexecutive syndrome 
with another patient with frontal lesions but without dysexecutive syndrome, and 
another one presented a single patient and no controls.  
The majority of studies were conducted on English speaking participants (28 
studies). However, 11 studies were conducted with participants whose first language 
was: French (two studies), Dutch (two studies), Portuguese (two studies), Hungarian 
(one study), Italian (one study), Hebrew (one study), Chinese (one study), Japanese 
(one study). 
These studies employed a wide range of tasks designed to measure emotion 
recognition and social cognition. A brief overview of these tasks is presented below, 




4. 3. Tasks commonly used for assessing Emotion Recognition and Social 
Cognition 
4. 3. 1. Emotion Recognition  
One of the most frequently used and well validated face emotion recognition tasks is 
the Ekman 60 task proposed by Ekman and Friesen (1971). The Ekman task 
comprises 60 black-and-white photographs of the faces of ten people (six female, 
four male) posing the six basic emotions, giving a total of 60 photographs. The 
participants are asked to decide which emotion name (happiness, surprise, fear, 
sadness, disgust, or anger) best described the facial expression shown. Although the 
Ekman 60 test has been shown to be sensitive to certain brain pathology (e.g. 
Huntington Disease; Milders, Crawford, et al., 2003; Frontotemporal Dementia; 
Diehl-Schmid, Pohl et al., 2007) several studies have reported ceiling effects when 
using the Ekman 60 test on non clinical populations (e.g. Young, Perrett,  Calder, 
Sprengelmeyer & Ekman , 2002; Suzuki, Hoshino, & Shigemasu, 2006) thus making 
comparisons difficult. Consequently a more sensitive battery was developed by 
Young et al. (2002): Facial Expressions of Emotion- Stimuli and Tests, (FEEST).  
FEEST which comprises of over 1000 images, incorporates the Ekman 60 Faces 
test, and adds the Emotion Hexagon test and Emotion Megamixes. These 
supplemental tests present more difficult to recognise emotions, created by 
morphing, caricaturing and other computer image manipulations of the original 
Ekman stimuli, thereby addressing the ceiling effects previously reported in the 
literature. Most papers included in this review which reported using FEEST as a 
measure of facial emotion recognition, only use the Ekman 60 subtest test. 
Whilst Ekman 60 and FEEST have been extensively used in facial emotion 
recognition studies with both non-clinical and clinical populations, tasks from larger 
batteries designed to test emotion perception across several modalities have also 
been occasionally employed. For example Neumann, Zupan, Babbage, Radnovich, 
et al., (2012) used tasks from the Diagnostic Assessment of Nonverbal Affect 
(DANVA, Nowicki and Marshall, 1994). This battery has seven subtests designed to 
measure participants' perception of facial emotion, emotional postures and gestures 
as well as their ability to convey emotion through facial emotion, gestures and tone 
of their voice. The Receptive Facial Expression subtest on DANVA comprises twenty 
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faces that depict happiness, sadness, anger, and fear and four faces in neutral 
poses. Unlike the Ekman 60, which comprises only Caucasian faces, the stimuli 
used in this subtest are multiracial. Unlike Ekman 60 or FEEST the DANVA does not 
cover surprise and disgust, but it offers the possibility to investigate emotion 
recognition across several modalities. DANVA is a widely used measure with 
reported good reliability across different races, sexes, ages and clinical populations, 
including TBI (Spell and Frank 2000; Radice-Neumann, Zupan, Tomita and Willer, 
2009). 
A less frequently used facial emotion recognition task is the Florida Test Battery 
(Bowers, Blonder and Heilman, 1991). It comprises photographs of four different 
women, each expressing one of five different emotions: happy, sad, angry, 
frightened and neutral. Unlike the previously presented tasks, it had not been 
extensively validated on either non-clinical or clinical populations. Additionally it does 
not address all basic emotions, and only comprises photographs of women. Only 
one paper included in this systematic review (Green et al., 2004) had used stimuli 
from this battery in their experimental task. 
All tasks presented above rely on static images (photographs) of facial emotion. 
However, it has been argued that they do not accurately represent 'real' facial 
emotion (i.e. as observed in natural human interaction), which is highly dynamic, 
changes rapidly and conveys additional cues by movement itself (Basilli, 1978). To 
address the dynamic nature of facial emotion, McDonald, Flanagar and Rollins 
(2002) devised The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT). TASIT includes 
several subtests (social cognitive tasks are reviewed later), with one emotion 
recognition task (Part 1: The Emotion Evaluation Test (EET)) which aims to be more 
ecologically valid. The EET comprises of 28 short video clips of professional actors 
engaged in an ambiguous or neutral conversation while depicting one of the six 
basic emotions or a neutral state. The authors claim that in order to make the task as 
realistic as possible, each actor induced the emotion before enacting the script, and 
even though the interactions were not completely spontaneous, the resulting 
vignettes represented a reasonable approximation of a real emotional state. 
Importantly, the TASIT has been validated on both non clinical participants and TBI 
patients (McDonald, Flanagar, Rollins, and Kinch, 2003).  
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All tasks presented so far rely on participants recognising the facial emotion in 
others. A different approach was used by Dethier, Blairy, Rosenberg and McDonald 
(2012) who measured spontaneous and posed facial expressivity in TBI patients. 
They presented participants with faces from the Ekman 60 test showing happiness, 
sadness and anger and then asked them to imitate these expressions. In the second 
part of the task, participants had to express the emotion after being exposed to a 
word (rather than a face). Their expressivity was assessed by two judges, blind to 
the participant’s group (e.g., TBI or control). This task has the advantage that it 
measures the accuracy of production as well as recognition of emotion.  
Another non-visual emotion recognition task used in the literature is the Emotional 
Inference from Stories Test (EIST; Neumann, Zupan, Babbage, Duncan, Radnovich 
et al., 2002) which comprises of twelve short stories. After reading the story, 
participants simply have to decide which the four basic emotions (happiness, 
sadness, anger and fear) was predominant for the character in the story.  
Another approach to assessing emotion recognition without visually presenting faces 
is the Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker & Taylor 1994). 
Alexithymia is a multifaceted personality trait which refers to difficulties identifying 
and describing emotional states in self and others. Alexithymia is often associated 
with disturbances in emotion regulation and social functioning (e.g. FeldmanHall, 
Dalgleish and Mobbs, 2013). The TAS-20 is a self-report 20-item questionnaire 
which has been shown to have good cross-cultural reliability and validity (e.g. Bressi 
et al., 1995; Taylor et al., 2003).  
 
4. 3. 2. Social Cognition  
Social cognition refers to the ability to understand that one's own (and other's) 
behaviour is guided by his/her own internal thoughts, beliefs, emotions and 
intentions, or in other words, to develop a Theory of Mind (ToM; Firth and Firth, 
2010). A ToM also allows one to understand that others may hold a different point of 
view than one's own: cognitive empathy (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, Wolf, and 
Convit, 2007). Thus ToM tasks and cognitive empathy tasks are generally used to 
assess social cognition. Usually, these tasks require participants to infer the subtle 
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emotional states of characters depicted in short stories, cartoons or human actors 
from still images or video clips. Some of these tasks are extensively validated and 
have been employed in several studies; others appear in only one study. 
Typical ToM tasks involve the attribution of false beliefs. First and Second Order 
False Beliefs Tasks (FASOBT; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino and Humphreys, 2004; 
Ehrle, Henry, Pesa & Bakchine, 2011) present participants with videos or verbal 
stories of a person who placed an object in one of two identical boxes in full view of 
another person. When the second person left the room, the first actor swapped the 
boxes. Upon returning the second person has to locate the objects. In order to 
correctly solve this task, the participants have to infer the second character’s false 
belief and chose the empty box. In half of the trials the participants could see where 
the first actor has hidden the object (Reality Known) whereas in the other half they 
could not (Reality Unknown); this ensured participants’ attribution of false belief 
could not be disrupted by their own knowledge of the correct answer (Samson et al, 
2004). A similar variant of this task is the aim to test participants’ ability to deduce 
another person’s mental state.  
Several studies used moral judgment tasks and tasks tapping onto knowledge of 
social norms to assess social cognition. There seems to be a consensus in the 
literature that social emotion processing (e.g., compassion, shame, guilt) and 
judgment of moral dilemmas are closely interlinked (Koenigs, Young, Adolphs, 
Tranel, et al., 2007). Moral dilemmas (e.g. Moral Sense Test, Kamm, 1998; 50 
Dilemmas, Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley and Cohen, 2004) are fictional vignettes 
of social situations which present the participant with a forced choice between two 
alternative actions one of which will inevitably disadvantage one of the parties 
involved in the vignette. Patients with prefrontal brain lesions often produce an 
abnormally utilitarian response on these dilemmas, which requires the participant to 
disregard an emotional response against inflicting direct harm to another person, 
thereby showing diminished emotional responsibility (e.g. sacrifice their own child to 
save some strangers). Other tasks (e.g. Social Awareness Test; Dewey, 1991) 
present participants with nine short stories describing both usual and unusual social 
interactions; participants have to judge the behaviour of the characters in those 
vignettes as “fairly normal”, “strange” or “shocking behaviour”. Although this task has 
shown good reliability in participants with Asperger’s syndrome (Dewey, 1991) and 
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autism (Callenmark, Kjellin, Ronnqvist and Bolte, 2014) other studies have failed to 
show similar reliability in non-clinical populations (e.g. Soderstrand & Almkvist, 
2012). Variations of these tasks have also been proposed (e.g. The Moral and 
Conventional Judgments Test; Blair, 1995; Blair and Cipolotti, 2000). 
Another instrument commonly used in several studies is the Faux Pas recognition 
test (Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight 1998). This test comprises of several stories in 
which a character unwittingly makes an awkward comment not realizing that it might 
hurt another person. In order to detect a faux pas, the participant has to understand 
the beliefs and points of view of both characters in the respective social situation and 
to correctly infer the emotional states associated with them (e.g. cognitive empathy). 
There are reports of good reliability of the instrument in the literature (e.g. 
Soderstrand and Almkvist, 2012).  
In contrast, the Joke Comprehension Test (Corcoran et al, 1997) or Cartoon task 
(Happe, Brownell and Winnder 1999), use a series of cartoon drawings to test the 
participant's ability to appreciate the humour based on understanding the character's 
thoughts and predicting the intentions of various characters in the cartoon series. 
Variations of these tasks are aimed at detecting whether participants understood that 
the cartoon character is operating on a false belief or is in violation of a social norm. 
Tasks that tap into cognitive and emotional empathy have also been used to assess 
social cognition. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davies, 1980) is often used 
to assess cognitive empathy. The IRI is a 28 item self-report measure which includes 
four subscales, each tapping different aspects of empathy: the Perspective Taking 
Subscale, which measures the tendency to spontaneously adopt the psychological 
point of view of others; the Fantasy Subscale, which assesses the tendency to 
resonate with the feelings and actions of fictitious characters from books and films; 
the Empathetic Concern Subscale, which assesses feelings of sympathy and 
concern towards the misfortunes of others; and the Personal Distress Subscale, 
which assesses feelings of anxiety and concern about self in difficult social 
situations.  
The Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy (QMEE; Meherabian & Epstein, 
1972) is a 33 item self-report measure designed to assess emotional empathy, which 
is the tendency to report emotional arousal in reaction to the perceived emotional 
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experiences of other people (e.g., becoming tearful as a result of seeing someone 
else cry). The QMEE has been one of the most widely utilized instrument used to 
measure emotional empathy (Davis, 1994, Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell, & Hagen, 
1985) 
All the tasks presented so far rely mostly on verbal reasoning. Nonetheless, visual 
tasks have also been used to assess social cognition. A widely used task, the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test - revised (Baron-Cohen Wheelwright, Hill, Raste 
and Plumb, 2001) requires participants to match the complex social emotions 
displayed in 36 photographs of the eyes of a human actor, with verbal descriptions 
(such as playful, worried, fantasising, pensive, reflective, flirtatious, distrustful, 
suspicious etc). Several studies have reported that Reading the Mind in the Eyes 
Test showed good cross cultural reliability in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (e.g. Fernandez-Abascal, Cabello, Fernandez-Berrocal, and Baron-
Cohen, 2013; Hallerback, Lugnegard, Hjarthag, and Gillberg, 2009; Yildirim, Kasar, 
Guduk, Ates, et al., 2011; Rojas, Serrano, Dillon, Bartoloni, et al., 2011; Prevost, 
Carrier, Chowne, Zelkowitzet al., 2014).  
The Awareness of Social Inference Test (TASIT;McDonald et al., 2002) addresses 
social cognition, in addition to basic facial perception, through short video clips of 
actors engaged in sarcastic exchanges, sincere exchanges or lies. Participants are 
asked several questions assessing their understanding of the actors' emotional state 
(focusing on complex emotions such as annoyance and contempt), beliefs (first-
order theory of mind) and intentions towards their conversational partners (second-
order theory of mind). This task has been reported to have good cross cultural 
ecological validity and reliability in healthy controls (Westerhof-Evers, Visser-Keizer, 
McDonald and Spikman, 2004). A similar, albeit simpler task, the Dynamic Emotion 
Perception Video Task (Slessor, Phillips, & Bull, 2007) presented participants with 
video clips portraying characters interacting. Participants had to chose a word out of 
several options that best described the complex social emotion portrayed by the 
characters (e.g. frustrated, excited,  bored).  
Finally, although a plethora of instruments to assess social cognition with readily 
available psychometric proprieties have been published up to date, some studies 
used newly developed measures which had not been validated on non-clinical 
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populations. For example, Hornak et al., (2003) proposed a social cognition 
questionnaire which comprised items that tapped into emotional empathy, emotion 
recognition, public behaviour, interpersonal relationships and antisocial behaviour. 
Other studies (e.g., Tranel et al, 2002) used clinical interviews to assess social 
behaviour, seconded by family ratings of social conduct. 
 
4. 4. Changes in Emotion Recognition and Social Cognition 
Although all the studies selected in this review included at least some participants (if 
not all) who had frontal lesions, these lesions were not homogenous. Thus, the 
studies were grouped according to the type of brain lesion: traumatic brain injury 
(TBI); focal brain damage due to post operative lesions, cerebro-vascular accident 
(CVA) or unspecified aetiology; diffuse brain injury (multiple sclerosis - MS); and 
multiple types of lesions, both focal and diffuse (e.g. TBI, CVA, Anoxia, Herpes 
Simplex Encephalitis - HSE).  
 
4. 4. 1. Changes in basic emotion recognition and social cognition in patients with 
TBI (N=24) 
The majority of papers included in this review (n=24/39) described changes in basic 
emotion recognition and/or social cognition in participants who had TBI. Twelve 
studies investigated changes in basic emotion recognition, four looked at changes in 
social cognition and eight looked at both emotion perception and social cognition in 
the same clinical population.  
 
4. 4. 1. 1. Emotion recognition 
Overall, the majority of studies reporting on patients with TBI included in this review 
found various degrees of impairment in the ability to recognise facial emotion 
recognition. A plethora of studies reported global deficits in facial emotion perception 
across all emotions using Ekman 60 stimuli or modified versions of the task (Green, 
Turner and Thompson, 2004; Henry et al, 2006; Mitchell, Avny & Blair, 2006; Henry, 
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Phillips, Beatty, McDonald et al., 2009; Williams and Wood, 2010; Callahan, Ueda, 
Sakata, Plamondon and Murai, 2011; Spikman, Timmerman, Milders, Veenstra and 
van der Naalt, 2012; Dal Monte, Krueger, Solomon, Schintu, et al., 2013; Spikman, 
Milders, Visser-Keizer, Westerhof-Evers,  et al., 2013). 
 Several studies, however, showed that only the recognition of negative facial 
emotions is impaired in patients with frontal TBI whilst positive emotions are 
recognised at the same level as controls (Jackson & Moffat, 1997, Blair & Cipolotti, 
2000; Hopkins, Dywan & Segalowitz, 2002, Kemp, Berthel, Dufour, Despres, et al., 
2013). Interestingly, Hopkins et al. (2002) report that TBI participants additionally 
showed reduced electrodermal activity for negative emotions in comparison to 
controls. This suggests that the impairment in negative emotion recognition is 
severe, since both implicit and explicit recognition mechanisms were affected, 
whereas mechanisms underlining the recognition of positive emotion (e.g., 
happiness) is relatively well preserved. However, research on non-clinical 
participants suggested that positive emotions are more accurately recognised 
because the Ekman stimuli contain just one positive emotion (happiness) and five 
different negative emotions, which may create confusion between different negative 
emotions and mislabel them (e.g. Calvo & Lundqvist, 2008). In order to reduce this 
effect, Hopkins et al. (2002) did not use all negative emotion stimuli in order to 
reduce repeated exposure and prevent participants habituating to the negative 
emotions.  
McDonald and Saunders (2005) found that only some participants with TBI (eight out 
of 34) showed impaired facial emotion recognition from still photographs. However 
the authors report that when a different task was used (e.g., Ekman 60), the majority 
of participants (22 out of 34) showed significant impairment in emotion recognition. 
Nevertheless, they argue that the Ekman stimuli may be too difficult for people with 
TBI, because of their poor visual quality and the fact that they appear "dated" 
(McDonald and Saunders, 2005). Since several studies report ceiling effects when 
using the Ekman 60 on healthy populations (e.g. Young, et al., 2002; Suzuki, et al., 
2006) it becomes problematic to choose a task that is comparable in difficulty for 
both patients and healthy controls. Thus, Henry et al., (2006) used a self-report 
measure which taps into symptoms associated with Alexithymia (TAS-20) and found 
that TBI patients showed difficulties in recognising and describing emotions in 
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comparison to healthy controls. Notably, effects sizes were larger for emotion 
recognition than description. McDonald, Rosenfeld, Henry, Togher et al., (2011) 
assessed TBI patients for both Alexithymia (using TAS-20) and visual facial emotion 
recognition (using Ekman 60 test) and found that patients were impaired recognising 
facial expressions (especially fear) but there was no correlation between emotion 
recognition scores and alexithymic symptoms. The authors concluded that even 
though TBI patients reported significantly greater alexithymic symptoms than healthy 
controls, alexithymia as measured by TAS-20 does not appear to capture the 
difficulties TBI patients show with facial emotion perception. 
Impairments in facial emotion recognition are also reported in studies which 
employed dynamic facial emotion stimuli. McDonald and Flanagan (2004) found that 
TBI participants performed significantly lower than controls when recognising 
emotion from video clips (the TASIT: EET task) suggesting a global impairment in 
facial emotion recognition across all emotions. In contrast, McDonald and Saunders 
(2005) found that patients with severe TBI showed performance similar to healthy 
controls on the same task (TASIT: EET). Whilst these results appear contradictory, 
the heterogeneity, both in location and severity, of the TBI lesions reported in the 
patient groups presented in these two papers, prevent a direct comparison. 
However, it is generally agreed that patients with frontal pathology are more likely to 
exhibit emotion perception difficulties, regardless of stimulus type (static, dynamic) or 
modality (auditory, visual; McDonald and Saunders, 2005).  
Deficits in emotion recognition across several modalities have also been reported. 
Milders, Fuchs and Crawford (2003) found that patients with frontal TBI had 
significant difficulties in recognising emotion from voice and facial emotion from still 
photographs in comparison to healthy controls. McDonald and Saunders (2005) 
found that patients with severe TBI were impaired in emotion recognition from both 
audiovisual and audio stimuli. Similar effects were reported in single case studies 
and quasi-experimental studies without a healthy control group. For example, 
Mitchell et al., (2006) presented a single case study of a patient with bilateral frontal 
TBI who was impaired on both facial and auditory emotion recognition. Neumann et 
al., (2012) investigated a large sample (N=106) of patients with moderate TBI and 
found that patients with dysosmia (olfactory dysfunction) showed impairments in 
facial and vocal affect recognition in comparison to patients without dysosmia who 
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presented with intact emotion recognition (both auditory and visual). This is probably 
because olfactory cortices, such as the orbitofrontal areas and insula, are also 
involved in affect recognition. 
In addition to impairments in facial emotion recognition and matching, McDonald, Li, 
De Sousa, Rushby, et al. (2011) also found reduced automatic facial muscle activity 
in response to exposure to faces displaying emotion (Ekman 60 stimuli) in patients 
with TBI. Similarly, Dethier et al., (2012) found that TBI patients were impaired in 
their ability to pose sad facial expressions and also showed reduced intensity for 
spontaneous facial expressions of sadness in comparison to healthy controls. 
Most of the studies described above reported on patients with focal TBI. Green et al. 
(2004) reported that patients with recently acquired TBI and either focal or diffuse 
frontal damage, were significantly less accurate at tasks involving discrimination and 
labelling of facial emotion than matched controls, but were non-impaired 
performance at emotionally neutral tasks. 
 
4. 4. 1. 2. Social Cognition 
All studies reviewed here reported impairments of various components of social 
cognition in patients with TBI. As most studies employed several social cognition 
tests, it is difficult to separate results based on the task used. Instead a synthesis of 
results will be presented based on overall findings across several tasks used.  
Impairments in ToM have been frequently reported in patients with TBI. For example, 
Milders et al., (2003), reported that participants with severe TBI found it more difficult 
to detect inappropriate social behaviour (Faux Pas test) than healthy controls despite 
the fact that they showed similar levels of story comprehension as healthy controls. 
Interestingly, TBI patients did not show impaired empathy ratings, and were able to 
detect subtle social emotions (as assessed by the Mind in the Eyes Test) at levels 
comparable to controls (Milders et al, 2003). However, in the absence of detailed 
information about the locus of the lesions in the patient sample, it is difficult to link 
this pattern of functional impairment to specific brain areas. This limitation was 
addressed by Geraci, Surian, Ferraro & Cantagallo, (2010) who reported that 
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patients with focal damage in the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) were 
impaired on the Faux Pas test. However, patients with damage to dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPC) showed intact Faux Pas judgements. Spikman et al., (2012) 
reported that patients with frontal TBI showed impaired detection for inappropriate 
behaviour on the Faux Pas task, and presented with reduced ability to infer mental 
states from cartoons and reduced empathy on a self report measure (EEQ). 
In contrast to Milders et al, (2003) Geraci et al, (2010) reported impairments on the 
Mind in the Eyes Test in both groups (VMPC and DLPC) of patients. However, it is 
important to note that these results have been reported on a small sample sizes (11 
VMPC, 7 DLPC). In contrast Xi, Zhu, Niu, Zhu, et al., (2011) assessed a larger 
sample of TBI patients with focal damage to the VMPC (n=16) and DLPC (n=14) 
found that both groups of patients with prefrontal lesions showed impaired 
performance on the Faux Pas task. Similar to Geraci et al., (2010), Henry et al., 
(2006) also reported that TBI patients performed lower on the Mind in the Eyes test 
in comparison to healthy controls. Notably, this effect was of smaller size than the 
impairment they found with basic emotion recognition. However, unlike previous 
studies clinical samples (i.e. Geraci et al., 2013 and Xi et al., 2011) Henry et al's 
patient sample contained not only participants with frontal damage, but also with 
temporal and parietal damage. Additionally, half the sample had no information 
available on the lesion site. These limitations prevent a direct comparison with 
previous studies. A study by Martins, Faisca, Esteves, Simao, et al. (2012) found 
that patients with lesions in the prefrontal cortex showed significant impairments in 
recognising two social emotions: arrogance and jealousy, but relatively intact 
recognition of guilt. There were no differences between patients with left or right 
hemisphere damage, but the impairment pattern was more pronounced in patients 
with bilateral damage.  
Judging complex social emotion from static black-and-white images (Mind in The 
Eyes Test) or judging complex social interactions from short written stories could be 
more difficult than in real life situations. Thus, McDonald et al. (2004) investigated 
participants' ability to recognise the mental state of others (beliefs, emotions) from 
videotaped vignettes. They found that severe TBI participants were less able than 
controls to infer speaker's beliefs (first order theory of mind) and even more impaired 
at judging what they intended their conversational partners to believe (second order 
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beliefs). Interestingly, McDonald et al (2004) did not find impairments in either social 
or basic emotion perception. Some patients showed significant difficulties in 
recognising basic facial emotion but unimpaired social cognition and vice versa, 
despite common frontal pathology. 
Martins, Faisca, Esteves, Muresan, et al., (2012) investigated the ability to perform 
moral judgements in participants with TBI. They found atypical (utilitarian responses) 
to personal moral dilemmas, as well as difficulties in recognising complex social 
emotions in comparison to healthy controls. This study's findings are very important 
because they link recognition of complex social emotions with the ability to 
adequately judge moral dilemmas. Due to impaired social emotion processing (or 
reduced empathy) patients with frontal TBI do not perceive the moral conflict in these 
dilemmas and tend to rely almost exclusively on cognitive processing. Therefore they 
produce only utilitarian judgements through abstract reasoning and cost-benefit 
analysis. The reduced empathy hypothesis is also supported by studies of Milders et 
al. (2003) and Spikman et al. (2012) who reported reduced empathy in patients with 
frontal TBI on a self-report measure (Questionnaire Measure of Emotional Empathy; 
Meherabian & Epstein, 1972). Similar results were reported by Blair & Cipolotti 
(2006) on a single case study of a patient with extensive right frontal TBI. The patient 
exhibited high levels of aggressive behaviour, a lack of empathy and guilt towards 
others, had difficulties in recognising violations of acceptable social behaviour and 
was impaired in the ability to infer feelings of embarrassment and fear in story 
protagonists. 
However, not all aspects of social cognition have been shown to be impaired in 
patients with TBI. For example, McDonald, Saad and James (2011) did not find any 
impairment on an implicit social cognition measure (implicit association test (IAT); 
Milne & Grafman, 2001). They found that frontal TBI participants responded faster to 
items that are consistent with stereotypes (e.g., male–strong, female–weak) in 
comparison to items that contradict stereotypes (e.g., male–weak, female–strong). 
Typically, non-clinical participants respond to the IAT in a manner congruent to their 
internalised social stereotypes, although these responses are not usually produced 
in an explicit task. Nevertheless, accessing stereotypical views remains a very small 
part of the wider social cognition function, and unlike to change the global picture of 




4. 4. 2. Changes in basic emotion recognition and social cognition in patients with 
focal brain damage (N=9) 
Eleven studies included in this review described changes in basic emotion 
recognition (n=2), social cognition (n=5), or both (n=2).  
 
4. 4. 2. 1. Emotion Recognition 
Similar to the findings in the TBI literature, Kucharska-Pietura, Phillips, Gernand and 
David (2003) reported that recognition of negative facial emotions is particularly 
impaired in patients with right hemisphere lesions (lesions due to single CVA). 
Charbonneau, Scherzer, Aspirot and Cohen (2003), however, found that participants 
who had lesions in the right hemisphere (RH) underperformed at tasks involving 
identification of happiness, surprise and fear from facial stimuli in comparison to both 
controls and participants with left hemisphere (LH) lesions. Thus, impairments in 
positive emotions (happiness) in patients with RH lesions have also been reported. 
Interestingly, they found that RH participants were impaired on tasks involving verbal 
discrimination, imitation and production of negative emotions (fear, sadness, anger).  
Deficits in emotion recognition across several modalities have also been reported. 
Hornak et al. (2003) found that patients with bilateral lesions (due surgical excisions) 
of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) or lesions in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) 
showed impairments in voice and face emotion recognition, whereas patients with 
lesions in the dorsolateral regions are unimpaired.  
 
4. 4. 2. 2. Social cognition 
Tranel, Bechara and Denburg (2002) compared patients with focal lesions of the left 
or right ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC) and reported that only patients with 
lesions in the right VMPC showed disturbances in social and interpersonal behaviour 
(as assessed by clinician and from reports of the patients' close family), whereas 
patients with a lesion in the left VMPC showed intact social functioning. However, the 
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small sample size (n=7), lack of a control group, and the usage of non-standardised 
tasks represent clear limitations of this study.  Koenings et al, (2007) suggested that 
patients with lesions in the VMPC produce an abnormally utilitarian pattern of 
responses on moral dilemmas tests, which require the participant to disregard an 
emotional response against inflicting direct harm to another person. This pattern of 
responses was not found on participants with lesions outside VMPC. It should be 
noted however, that there were only six patients with lesions in the VMPC in this 
study. Nevertheless, another study carried out on a larger sample (29 patients) also 
showed atypical (utilitarian responses) to personal moral dilemmas, as well as 
difficulties in recognising complex social emotions in comparison to healthy controls 
(Martins, Faisca, Esteves, Muresan, et al., 2012).  
Stone, Baron-Cohen and Knight (1998) found that patients with bilateral damage to 
the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) showed good performance on first- and second- order 
false belief tasks, but were impaired on the Faux Pas test. In contrast, patients with 
left dorsolateral lesions performed at comparable levels to healthy controls in the 
Faux Pas test and failed only in the versions of the tasks with high working memory 
demands. Hornak et al, 2003 found that patients with bilateral focal damage in the 
OFC scored lower than controls on self-report measures of empathy (e.g., difficulties 
noticing emotional states in others, not caring what others think) and social 
behaviour (e.g., not being close to their family and partners, having difficulties in 
making and maintaining relationships). Interestingly, the authors note that these 
effects were smaller than in previous studies conducted with patients with traumatic 
lesions to the VMPC. Similarly, Beer et al., (2006) reported that patients with focal 
lesions to the OFC made socially inappropriate self-disclosures when talking to a 
stranger and were unaware that their behaviour violated social norms despite 
unimpaired knowledge of the social norms themselves. Interestingly, patients with 
damage to medial and lateral regions of the prefrontal cortex were more aware of the 
inappropriateness of their behaviour despite having comparatively larger lesions. 
Beer et al. therefore suggested that the OCF also has a role in self monitoring in 
social situations. 
Similar results have also been reported in single case studies. Happe, Malhi and 
Checkley (2001) reported reduced ability to infer mental states of characters in a 
series of cartoons in a patient with post surgery damage to the orbitofrontal cortex, 
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which suggests empathy deficits. The patient also showed a similar pattern of 
impairment on a verbal task (short story task) requiring him to make inferences about 
a character's thoughts, feelings and intentions. Interestingly, the patient showed 
unimpaired performance on tasks which did not require ToM judgements. Kemp et 
al. (2013) found that a patient with focal damage to the caudate nucleus following a 
stroke also showed a loss of empathy, difficulties in detecting faux pas and 
difficulties recognizing social emotions in others (as assessed by the Mind in the 
Eyes test). Although the damage was not direct to the OFC, the caudate nucleus 
damage resulted in the disconnection of the sub-cortical orbito-frontal loop, thereby 
disrupting the normal functioning of the OFC. Interestingly, not all aspects of ToM 
were affected. The patient showed unimpaired judgements of the appropriateness of 
social behaviours (as assessed by Social Situations Test), unimpaired moral 
judgements (as assessed by Moral Judgement Tasks) and also unimpaired first- and 
second-order false beliefs. 
 
4. 4. 3. Changes in basic emotion recognition and social cognition in patients with 
diffuse brain damage (N=3) 
All three studies included in this section report on patients with multiple sclerosis 
(MS), which is an inflammatory disorder affecting the myelin sheathing of axonal 
fibres in the central nervous system, which is thought to be the result of destruction 
by the immune system or failure of the myelin-producing cells (Nakahara, Maeda, 
Aiso and Suzuki, 2012). Axonal damage in MS eventually results in disconnection of 
frontal-subcortical brain tracts involved in the processing of emotional signals 
(Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008). 
Henry et al. (2009) reported that participants with MS had difficulties recognising 
facial expressions of the basic emotions of fear and anger, but showed recognition 
performance similar to controls for surprise, sadness, disgust and happiness (Ekman 
60 task). Somewhat similar results were reported by Phillips, Henry, Scott, Summers  
et al., (2011) who found that people with MS showed reduced performance in 
comparison to controls at tasks involving recognition of all basic emotions from static 
(photographs, FEEST, Young et al, 2002) and dynamic (video clips, Slessor et al, 
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2007) stimuli. Although Mike, Strammer, Ardi, Orsi et al. (2013) did not use the 
Ekman 60 task, they also reported impairments across all basic emotions in patients 
with MS on another basic emotion recognition task (Faces test; Baron-Cohen et. al., 
1997) 
Difficulties in social cognition have been reported by Henry et al, (2009) who found 
that MS patients performed significantly below healthy controls in identifying complex 
social emotions from pictures of the eye region (Mind in the Eyes Test). Mike at al., 
2013 reported similar results on the Mind in the Eyes Test, but also found that MS 
participants had difficulties detecting Faux Pas in a series of stories. 
 
4. 4. 4. Changes in basic emotion recognition and social cognition in patients with 
lesions of different aetiology (N=3) 
 There are conflicting reports regarding basic emotion recognition in patients with 
multiple lesions (e.g., frontal and parietal lobes). Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, 
Berger et al, (2004) did not find impairments in basic facial emotion recognition (e.g., 
Ekman 60) or affective prosody in patients with lesions in the prefrontal and parietal 
regions (TBI, stroke, brain tumours, aneurysm, herpes simplex encephalitis). In 
contrast, Njomboro, Humphreys and Deb (2014) found that patients with lesions in 
the fronto-temporal and parietal regions (stroke, TBI, anoxia and herpes simplex 
encephalitis) performed significantly worse than controls across all emotions on both 
Ekman 60 task and Emotion Hexagon Test. There were no differences however, 
between patients who had frontal and temporal lesions. 
Two studies reported changes in various components of social cognition. Shamay-
Tsoory et al, (2004) found that patients with lesions in the orbital and medial regions 
of the prefrontal cortex were significantly impaired in both cognitive and affective 
empathy (as assessed by QMEE and IRI) when compared to controls or patients 
with lesions in the parietal lobes. This pattern of impairment was present regardless 
of the laterality of the lesion. Interestingly, patients with right parietal lesions were 
also impaired in cognitive and affective empathy, whereas patients with left parietal 
lesions were not impaired at tasks measuring empathy. 
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Chivavarino, Apperley and Humphreys (2009) investigated the ability to indentify 
pretended actions in patients with lesions in the frontal, parietal and temporal regions 
due to stroke, anoxia and herpes simplex encephalitis). They found that patients with 
parietal and frontal damage experienced more difficulties than controls in 
discriminating between real and pretended actions. Notably, patients with parietal 
damage were more impaired than patients with frontal damage. However, the 
patients with frontal damage showed impairment judgements of intentionality of the 
pretended actions, thereby suggesting poor ToM skills. Njomboro, et al., (2014) 
reported that that patients with lesions in the fronto-temporal and parietal regions 
showed impaired moral reasoning judgements (as assessed by MST, Kamm, 1998), 
had difficulties in assessing the appropriateness of social behaviours (SAT; Dewey, 
1991) and showed impaired ToM judgements (first- and second-order false beliefs). 
 
5. Discussion 
The majority of papers reviewed seem to be in agreement that impairments in 
emotional recognition and social cognition are very often associated with damage in 
the frontal cortex, especially in the orbitofrontal and ventromedial areas. However, 
the degree of impairment remains a subject of debate. For example, studies 
reporting on focal damage to the orbitofrontal cortex have suggested that the 
perception of negative emotions is more affected than the perception of positive 
emotions (e.g., Kucharska-Pietura et al., 2003). Reduced autonomic responses to 
negative emotions in patients with ventromedial lesions seem to suggest that 
impairments can occur before emotional processing reaches conscious awareness 
(e.g., Hopkins et al. 2002). In contrast, other studies report a global impairment 
across all emotions (e.g., Hornak et al., 2003). Interestingly, patients with lesions in 
both orbitofrontal and ventromedial areas seem to have difficulties expressing as 
well as perceiving emotions (e.g., Dethier et al, 2012). 
Since studies conducted on participants with very similar focal damage to a specific 
area are not in agreement, it is perhaps not surprising that studies which investigate 
patients with lesions across several regions of the frontal lobes (e.g., TBI) are in a 
similar position. Some TBI studies report impairments for negative emotions only 
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(e.g., Jackson & Moffat, 1997, Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Hopkins, et al, 2002, Kemp, et 
al., 2013) whereas others report impairments across all emotions (e.g., McDonald & 
Flanagan, 2004; McDonald & Saunders 2005). There seems to be a relative 
consensus in the literature that reduced emotional recognition is ubiquitous in TBI 
patients, regardless of the modality and stimuli or tasks used. Moreover, a wide 
range of lesions sites (frontal e.g., Blair et al., 2000; McDonald et al., 2011; Callahan 
et al., 2011; fronto-temporal e.g., Martins et al.2012; prefrontal e.g., Spikman et al. 
2012) and injury severity (severe e.g., McDonald et al. 2011; or moderate e.g., 
Spikman et al., 2013) seem to produce a similar pattern of impairment.  
The literature distinguishes between studies that have been conducted on TBI 
patients with focal lesions (e.g., DalMonte et al., 2013), versus studies which 
investigated patients who presented with both focal and diffuse damage subsequent 
to TBI (e.g., Green et al., 2004). However, since most TBI injuries occur through 
rapid deceleration (e.g., traffic accidents and other forceful collisions), diffuse axonal 
injury often occurs in TBI as a result of asymmetrical mechanical loading at cellular 
level (e.g., Smith, Meaney and Shull, 2003; Cloots, van Dommelen, Kleiven and 
Geers, 2013). Thus it seems unlikely that the majority of patients with TBI would only 
exhibit focal damage without any diffuse damage at all. Since emotion processing is 
carried out across multiple and highly complex neuro-anatomical circuits, which are 
not independent of each other, damage to one would affect the functioning of the 
rest of the network. The high interconnectivity of brain areas involved in emotion 
processing (prefrontal cortex, amygdala and temporal lobes, and regions of the 
parietal cortex) may explain why patients with lesions in any of these areas exhibit a 
similar pattern of impairment.  
This idea is supported by the reported variability in emotion recognition abilities of 
patients with diffuse brain damage (e.g., MS). Whilst some papers reported 
impairments only for fear and anger (e.g., Henry et al., 2009), others reported global 
emotion recognition impairment (Phillips et al, 2011; Mike et al, 2013). This is 
probably because a variable number connections between the processing areas 
described above had been affected by the MS and thus different degrees of 
impairment were observed. Of note, both the Henry et al., and Phillips et al., studies 
have been conducted on similar sample sizes and used similar facial recognition 
tasks. However, there was no imaging data to allow direct comparison of white 
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matter lesions between samples. However, Mike et al. used 3T MRI scans to 
determine the extent of lesions and reported that impairments in facial emotion 
recognition correlated with lesions of fibre tracts interconnecting cortical regions 
related to emotion processing. 
The finding that deficits in emotion recognition are almost always reported in patients 
who also present with impairments in social cognition seems to add support to the 
idea that intact emotion recognition is a prerequisite for effective social cognition. 
Indeed, impaired ability to detect and recognise emotional states in others would 
make "hot" social cognition (e.g., the ability to empathise with others) very difficult. 
Reduced empathy has often been reported in patients with lesions in the orbitofrontal 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex (various aetiologies) that have difficulties in 
perceiving moral conflict and tend to rely almost exclusively on cognitive processing, 
thereby producing "utilitarian" judgements (e.g., Stone et al, 1998; Milders et al., 
2003; Koenings et al., 2007; Spikman et al, 2012). Impairments in both cognitive and 
affective empathy have also been linked to damage to the orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., 
Shamay-Tsoory et al, 2004) 
Additionally, detection and interpretation of complex social emotions (e.g., "guilt" or 
"regret") would be very difficult (if not impossible) without the understanding of the 
six basic emotions. Indeed, impairments in both complex social emotion processing 
and basic emotion recognition have been extensively reported (e.g., Henry et al, 
2006, Neuman et al, 2012; Martins et al.,2012; Spikman et al, 2012; Kemp et al, 
2013). Notably, difficulties with "hot" social cognitions are reported not only for 
patients with focal lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, but also in patients 
with diffuse damage in the frontal white matter due to MS. As in the case of emotion 
recognition, Mike et al. 2013 reported that impairments social perception correlated 
with lesions of fibre tracts interconnecting various cortical regions including the 
VMPC. 
Impairments in ToM (or "Cold" social cognition skills) are also widely reported. There 
seems to be a relative consensus in the literature that damage to the ventromedial 
and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (due to TBI, stroke, surgical lesions, etc.) is also 
followed by impairments in "cold" social cognition (e.g., Tranel et al, 2002; Geraci et 
al, 2010; Njomboro, et al., 2014). Since ventromedial areas are also heavily involved 
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in basic emotion processing it is not surprising that the majority of studies which 
looked at "cold" social cognition and emotion recognition in patients with damage in 
those areas report impairments in both. However, it has been argued that the 
reported deficits in ToM may not be strongly related to impairments in basic emotion 
recognition. Since most tasks used to assess ToM are in the form of short stories 
which participants have to remember and manipulate mentally to extract relevant 
information upon which to base their decisions, deficits in working memory (also 
associated with frontal lobe damage) may explain some of the impairments seen in 
these tasks (McDonald, 2013).  
Whilst all the studies reviewed here have a number of limitations (e.g., unequal 
patient/control samples or even absence of a control group, small sample sizes, 
unequal gender representation, the use of instruments with poor or no validation), 
the majority of studies were found to be of good or sufficient quality for the purpose 
of this qualitative synthesis. The overall conclusion of this review is that the majority 
of evidence suggests that frontal lobe damage is very often followed by a certain 
degree of impairment in emotion recognition and social cognition, which may explain 
why carers and families of patients with frontal brain damage often report significant 
changes in their personality and social behaviour (e.g. Hoefinen, et al., 2001; Tesa et 
al., 2006). Reduced ability to understand how others are feeling significantly impacts 
the selection of appropriate responses, which in turn limits the success of social 
interactions. Thus, it seems essential that patients with frontal damage should be 
offered interventions aimed at retraining their basic emotion processing and social 
skills. 
Although steps have been taken to ensure this review is comprehensive and 
unbiased, it has nevertheless several limitations. First, due to the wide range of tasks 
used, a quantitative comparison of the results across all papers was not possible. It 
is therefore difficult to compare the performance of patients with different lesions and 
determine which lesions are more likely to create more marked impairments, so 
remediation strategies can be more effectively directed towards the patients who 
need it most. Second, this review only included studies published in peer review 
journals. However, it is well known that studies which report significant results are 
more likely to be published than ones which report non-significant results (e.g., "the 
file drawer problem"; Rosenthal, 1979). Therefore, the true occurrence of frequency 
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of these emotional and social difficulties in the general population (e.g., patients with 
TBI, MS) cannot be accurately inferred from this review. Finally, this review focused 
only on adults with frontal brain damage. Future reviews should also assess the 
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Table 3: A summary of participants' gender and average age across all studies included in the review, as well as study quality 
ratings.  
Year Reference Patient Group Healthy Control Group Study 
Quality Male Female Age (M; SD) Male Female Age 
2014 Njomboro, et al. 36 13 48.75; 11.8 unclear unclear unclear ++ 
2013 Spikman, et al. 34 17 37.5; 14.9 17 16 37.9; 13.2 ++ 
2013 Mike, et al. 31 18 39.8; 9.31 13 11 36.7; 7.27 ++ 
2013 Kemp et al. 1 0 44 12 0 44.8; 2.5 + 
2013 Dal Monte et al. 180 0 N/A 53 0 N/A + 
2012 Spikman et al. 20 8 30.1; 12.9 17 16 37.9; 13.2 ++ 
2012 Neumann et al. 75 31 39.5;N/A 0 0 0 + 
2012 Martins et al. 17 12 29.31; 3.25 25 16 27.9; 5.7 ++ 
2012 Martins et al. 20 12 29.9; 6.07 25 16 27.9; 5.7 ++ 
2012 Dethier et al. 5 18 46.34; 13.14 12 17 42.22; 14.1 + 
2011 Xi, et al. 16 14 34.7 14 16 34.76 ++ 
2011 Phillips et al. 4 28 N/A 9 24 N/A + 
2011 McDonald et al. 15 7 44; 14.8 13 12 33.4; 12.9 + 
2011 McDonald et al. 10 10 43.1; 13.3 9 11 42.5; 11.6 ++ 
2011 McDonald et al. 17 4 48.4; 3.8 12 8 36.2; 13.2 + 
2011 Callahan et al. 10 4 38; 12.9 11 11 40; 7.7 ++ 
2010 Williams et al. 53 11 35.84; 13.33 53 11 36.9; 14.24 ++ 
2010 Geraci et al. N/A N/A N/A 14 6 36; 9.27 ++ 




Year Reference Patient Group Healthy Control Group Study 
Quality Male Female Age (M; SD) Male Female Age 





58 8 6 69 + 
2007 Koenigs et al. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A ++ 
2006 Mitchell et al. 1 0 51 5 0 60 - 
2006 Henry et al. 22 6 40.3; 13.6 22 9 39.8; 17.68 ++ 
2006 Henry et al. 14 2 44.4; 13.36 * * * ++ 
2006 Beer et al. unclear unclear unclear unclear unclear unclear + 






6 frontal / 5 
posterior 
35.44; 13.10 15 4 34.05; 15.81 ++ 
2004 McDonald et al. 25 9 41; 12 22 12 36; 13 ++ 
2004 Green et al. * * * * * * + 






12 RH/ 13 
LH 
N/A 24 26 N/A ++ 
2003 Milders et al. 10 7 30.5; 13.3 10 7 29.1; 12.1 ++ 
2003 Charbonneau et al. 
10 RH/10 
LH 
7 LH/5 RH 62.59; 5.98 11 5 61.75; 5.21 + 
2002 Hopkins et al. * * * * * * ++ 
2002 Tranel et al. 3 RH/ 3LH 0 RH/ 1 LH 49.7 N/A N/A N/A + 
2001 Happe et al. 1 0 76 9 10 73 + 
2000 Blair & Cipolotti 1 0 56 0 0 0 + 
1998 Stone et al N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A - 
1997 Jackson & Moffat N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A + 
Note: N/A - information not available from the paper; *-  information not available but authors present statistics suggesting no 
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Most patients who have damage to areas of the frontal lobes experience a wide 
range of behaviour and personality changes such as impulsiveness (Winstanley 
et al, 2004), antisocial personality traits (Meyers et al, 1992) and poor socio-
moral judgment (e.g. Blair and Cipolotti, 2000).  Such deficits have in the past 
been linked to impairments in executive functioning (e.g. Tanji et al 2007). 
However, in order to adequately regulate social behaviour, one must first be 
able to understand other people's mental states (e.g., beliefs, emotions and 
intentions), abilities known as "social cognition." It has been proposed that 
individuals rely on facial appearance and facial emotion to make social 
decisions (Todorov, Baron & Oostenhof, 2008). Although the literature seems to 
consistently show that the impairments in basic emotion recognition and social 
cognition frequently occur together in patients with frontal brain damage, a 
theoretical model linking the two cognitive abilities remains elusive. Oosterhof & 
Todorov (2009) propose such a model whereby interpersonal contact is based 
on rapid evaluation of faces on two independent dimensions: trustworthiness 
and dominance (Oosterhof & Todorov, 2008; Todorov, Said, Engell, & 
Oosterhof, 2008). This study investigated the ability to evaluate face 
trustworthiness and dominance as well as the recognition accuracy of both 
simple and complex facial emotions in patients with focal frontal lobe damage. 
Neuropsychological measures have also been used to assess executive 
functioning. 
Twenty patients with post surgical brain lesions in the frontal lobe were 
compared with twenty healthy controls matched for age, sex, education, and 
premorbid IQ on two measures of social cognition (trustworthiness/dominance 
task (Sprengelmeyer et al., in press) and Mind in the Eyes task, Baron-Cohen et 
al., 2001), a basic emotion recognition task (Ekman 60), and several 
neuropsychological tests currently used to assess executive functioning and 
facial processing abilities. Patients were impaired for trustworthiness and 
dominance judgements, but not for basic or complex emotion recognition (Mind 
in the Eyes Test). Patients also performed more poorly than controls on all 
neuropsychological measures of executive functioning, but were unimpaired at 
tasks involving non-emotional face processing. These findings suggest that 
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although basic emotion information extracted from facial expressions may be a 
used for trustworthiness and dominance judgements, further processing must 
occur in areas which are not involved with basic emotion processing. If those 
areas are affected, trustworthiness and dominance can be impaired whereas 







It is now widely accepted that people routinely extract a wide range of 
information from facial features such as gender, age, race and familiarity. In 
addition to this basic information, it has been suggested that socially relevant 
information may be conveyed by facial emotion, such as internal states, specific 
intentions towards others or particular behaviours expected from others 
(Ekman, 1997). Additionally, the ability to disguise or interfere with these 
expressions also plays an important role in modern social interaction (Okubo, 
Kobayashi and Ishikawa, 2012). Thus, accurate perception and interpretation of 
facial emotions is essential in order to guide social interaction. Currently, there 
is a general agreement there are six “basic” facial emotions which are 
universally recognised: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise 
(e.g. Ekman, Sorenson and Friesen, 1969; Izard 1968; 1971).  
Several studies reported that participants with focal damage to the frontal cortex 
(especially orbitofrontal areas) show an impairment in the recognition of 
negative emotions, whereas recognition of positive emotions is relatively less 
affected (e.g., Jackson & Moffat, 1997, Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Hopkins, Dywan 
& Segalowitz, 2002; Kucharska-Pietura et al., 2003; Kemp, Berthel, Dufour, 
Despres, et al., 2013). Other studies conducted on participants with traumatic 
injuries to the frontal lobes (encompassing orbitofrontal, dorsolateral and 
ventromedial areas) report global impairment in the recognition of all basic 
emotions (e.g. Green, Turner and Thompson, 2004; Mitchell, Avny & Blair, 
2006; Henry, Phillips, Beatty, McDonald et al., 2009; Williams and Wood, 2010; 
Callahan, Ueda, Sakata, Plamondon and Murai, 2011; Spikman, Timmerman, 
Milders, et al., 2012; Dal Monte, Krueger, Solomon, et al., 2013; Spikman, 
Milders, Visser-Keizer, et al., 2013). It has also been found that patients with 
lesions in both orbitofrontal and ventromedial areas seem to have difficulties 
expressing as well as perceiving emotions (e.g., Dethier et al, 2012).  
However, difficulties in basic facial emotion recognition are not reported solely 
in patients with frontal lobe damage. For example, some studies found that the 
recognition of fear and anger is severely impaired in patients with bilateral 
amygdala damage whilst the recognition of other facial emotions seemed 
relatively unimpaired (e.g. Adolphs, Tranel, Damasio, et al., 1994, Calder et al., 
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1996, Calder et al., 2001). A similar pattern of impairment is reported in patients 
with diffuse brain damage. For example Henry et al. (2009) reported that 
participants with multiple sclerosis (MS) had difficulties recognising facial 
expressions of fear and anger, but showed recognition performance similar to 
controls for surprise, sadness, disgust and happiness. This is probably because 
axonal damage in MS eventually results in disconnection of frontal-subcortical 
brain tracts involved in the processing of emotional signals (Ruffman, Henry, 
Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008). 
Several studies suggested that impaired emotion recognition also affects one's 
"social cognition" abilities. Social cognition is an umbrella term for several 
cognitive skills that allow an individual to form a representation of other people's 
mental states (e.g., beliefs, emotions and intentions). Some of these skills are 
employed to detect a wide range of complex emotions in others (such as 
jealousy or love) and empathise with them (e.g., experiencing a similar emotion 
in the absence of the original stimulation, triggered solely by the perceived 
emotion in others). Other social cognition skills allow an individual to think from 
another person's perspective (also known as forming a Theory of Mind - ToM; 
Frith and Frith, 2010). It is therefore reasonable to assume that impaired basic 
emotion recognition would disrupt some aspects of social cognition. For 
example, difficulties in detecting a basic emotion such as sadness would 
probably impair one's ability to empathise with the person who is displaying 
sadness. Indeed, significant difficulties with processing of complex social 
emotions (such as guilt), reduced empathy and impairments in theory of mind 
(ToM) have been frequently reported in participants with frontal lobe damage 
(for a review see Radice-Neumann, Zupan, Babbage and Willer, 2007; Mc 
Donald, 2013). There seems to be a consensus in the literature that patients 
with frontal brain lesions generally perform poorer than healthy controls on 
tasks involving social cognition and basic emotion recognition (e.g. Milders, 
Fuchs and Crawford, 2003; Hornak, Bramham, Rolls, et. al., 2003; McDonald 
and Flanagan, 2004; Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, et al., 2004; Henry, 
Phillips, Crawford, et al., 2006; Mitchell, Anvy and Blair, 2006; Spikman, 
Timmerman, Milders, Veenstra and van der Naalt, 2012; Njomboro, Humphreys 
and Deb, 2014). 
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Therefore, it has been proposed that in order to make sense of social 
behaviour, one must be able to accurately perceive and interpret social cues 
such as emotional expressions (facial, vocal or general body language), as well 
as correctly infer others' perspectives, intents, beliefs, emotional states (social 
cognition). The majority of studies published so far have focused on assessing 
social cognition through tasks require participants to infer the subtle emotional 
states, intentions and beliefs of characters depicted in short stories, cartoons or 
human actors from still images or video clips (e.g. Stone, Baron-Cohen and 
Knight, 1998; McDonald et al., 2002; Samson, Apperly, Chiavarino and 
Humphreys, 2004; Ehrle, Henry, Pesa & Bakchine, 2011). Although the studies 
seem to consistently show that the impairments in basic emotion recognition 
and social cognition (as measured by the task mentioned before) frequently 
occur together, a theoretical model linking the two cognitive abilities remains 
elusive. Oosterhof & Todorov (2009) propose such a model based on their 
observations that social decisions seem based on the information conveyed 
from basic facial emotions and found that negatively valenced faces (e.g. angry, 
sad, fearful) are generally judged as less approachable and trustworthy than 
happy faces. Other studies showed that these judgements are made very fast, 
between 39 and 100ms (Bar, Neta and Linz, 2006, Willis and Todorov, 2006; 
Todorov, et al., 2008).  
This research prompted Todorov and his colleagues to propose a data driven 
model of interpersonal contact based on rapid evaluation of faces on two 
independent dimensions: trustworthiness and dominance (Oosterhof & Todorov, 
2008; Todorov, Said, Engell, & Oosterhof, 2008). They argue that 
trustworthiness evaluation is simply the expression of an adaptive mechanism 
which signals whether the person should be avoided or approached. 
Conversely, dominance evaluation is based on the facial cues which signal 
physical strength. Taken together, the two dimensions could provide enough 
information to accurately infer harmful intentions or the ability to cause harm. 
Todorov et al, propose that recognition of trustworthy and dominance is 




Figure 1. Correlations of trait dimensions with basic emotions (in Todorov, Fiske & 
Prentice. Social Neuroscience: Toward Understanding the Underpinnings of the Social 
Mind. Oxford University Press). 
 
If successful interpersonal contact is driven by the ability to accurately perceive 
and interpret facial emotions, changes in facial emotion recognition abilities 
would also impact on people's ability to make accurate trustworthy and 
dominance judgements. However, mixed results are often reported in the 
literature. On the one hand, several studies have reported impairments in both 
social cognition and basic emotion recognition in participants with frontal brain 
lesions (e.g. Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Milders et al., 2003; Hornak, Bramham, 
Rolls, Morris et al, 2003; McDonald et al., 2004; Shamay-Tsoory et al., Henry et 
al., 2006; Mitchell et al., 2006; Spikman et al., 2012; Njomboro, et al., 2014). On 
the other hand, some studies reported deficits in social cognition but relatively 
intact emotion recognition. For example, Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, (1998) 
suggested that participants with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala 
judged unfamiliar individuals as more approachable and trustworthy than 
healthy controls. Other studies report impaired social behaviour regulation in 
patients with orbitofrontal lesions (e.g. inappropriate disclosures to strangers), 
but intact basic emotional expression recognition (e.g. Beer, Heerey, Keltner, 
Scabini, & Knight, 2003). These results seem to suggest that the ability to 
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accurately recognise and classify basic facial emotion and the ability to use this 
information to guide social behaviour may be functionally dissociable. 
More recently, Willis, Palermo, Burke, McGrillen, & Miller (2010) also showed 
that patients with orbitofrontal cortex damage rated faces showing negative 
emotion as significantly more approachable than healthy controls. Of note, this 
pattern of responses was not found in patients with frontal lobe lesions but 
without orbitofrontal damage. Additionally, Willis et al. (2010) found no 
differences in the ratings of approachability for faces displaying positive 
emotions in patients with orbitofrontal lesions. These patients showed 
unimpaired basic facial emotion recognition abilities, thereby suggesting that 
only approachability judgements were impaired. Thus the link between basic 
emotion recognition and judgements which drive interpersonal contact remains 
highly debated. This study aims to address this question by investigating both 
processes in patients with focal frontal lobe damage.  
Arguably, complex social interactions may not be solely dependent on 
recognising the six basic emotions, although clearly these must form the basis 
of social cognition. The recognition of complex social emotions and mental 
states such as guilt, admiration, thoughtfulness or flirtatiousness have been 
explored by Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jolliffe (1997). They proposed that 
these complex mental and emotional states can also be inferred from the facial 
expressions, especially by carefully examining the region around the eyes, 
which seem to contain most of the information needed to make these social 
judgements. Previous research employed the Eyes in the Mind test proposed by 
Baron-Cohen et al, (2001) to investigate complex social emotion recognition in 
patients with frontal lobe damage and reported mixed results. On the one hand, 
Milders et al, (2003) who found that patients with severe TBI (with extensive 
bilateral damage to the frontal lobes) were able to detect subtle social emotions 
at levels comparable to controls. On the other hand, other studies reported 
impairments on the Mind in the Eyes Test in patients with smaller lesions in the 
ventromedial or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g. Henry et al, 2006; Geraci et 
al, 2010). This study aims investigate complex social emotion recognition, by 
using the Mind in the Eyes test in patients with focal lesions to the frontal lobes 
of the brain.  
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In the present study, patients with unilateral and bilateral surgical excisions in 
various regions of the frontal lobe of the brain were compared to healthy 
controls on a series of emotion recognition and social perception tasks as well 
as on neuropsychological measures widely used to assess executive 
functioning as face processing. This was done in order to find out i) whether  
patients with frontal lobe damage show impaired trustworthy and dominance 
judgements in comparison with healthy controls; ii) whether patients also show 
impaired basic and complex emotion recognition, and iii) whether impairment in 
executive functioning (as measured by several neuropsychological tests: 
Hayling Brixton, FAS, Trail making, DEX) is correlated with the performance in 




2. 1. Participants 
 
2. 1. 1. Frontal cortex lesion group 
 
Twenty patients (11 female, 9 male, Mean age=54.1 years, SD=15) were 
included in the study. They were under the care of the Joint Neuro-Oncology 
Clinic at King's College Hospital, London and had frontal cortical tumour 
resections at least 6 months prior to participating in the current study. The 
lesion site was ascertained by qualified neurosurgeons from MRI or CT scans 
and neuroradiogical reports. The lesions were defined anatomically1 as: 
orbitofrontal (Brodmann areas 10, 11, 12 and 47); medial (Brodmann areas 8, 9, 
24, 25, and 32) and dorsolateral (Brodmann areas 44, 45 and 46). These areas 
are depicted in Figure 2 below. 
 
                                                          
1 These anatomical divisions have been previously used in the literature described in the introduction. 
Classifying lesions in those areas would facilitate the comparison between this study's results and others 




Figure 2. Brain maps showing main regions used to classify lesion sites, 
encompassing relevant Brodmann areas (Medial: 8, 9, 24, 25, 32; Dorsolateral: 44, 45 
46; Orbitofrontal: 10, 11, 12, 47). 
 
Lesion data are summarised in Table 1. There was an approximately half split in 
terms of left versus right hemisphere lesions, with 11 left and 9 right, and a 
further one patient with a bilateral lesions. Nine patients had lesions located in 
the medial areas of the frontal lobe, six in the dorsolateral areas and one in the 
orbitofrontal areas. Three had extensive lesions covering both orbitofrontal and 























1 M L  X  Oligodendroglioma grade II 
2 F L X   Glioblastoma multiforme grade IV 
3 M L  X  Oligodendroglioma grade II 
4 M L   X Anaplastic oligodendroglioma grade III 
5 F L   X Atypical Meningioma grade II 
6 M L  X  Anaplastic oligodendroglioma grade III 
7 M R  X  Pleomorphic xanthoastrocytoma grade II 
8 M R  X  Atypical meningioma grade II 
9 F L   X Atypical meningioma grade II 
10 F R  X  Anaplastic oligodendroma WHO grade III 
11 F B X X  Atypical meningioma grade II 
12 F L  X  Neurocytoma, grade II (WHO 
13 F R  X  Oligoastrocytoma grade III 
14 F R  X  Atypical Meningioma grade II 
15 F R X X  
Rhabdoid meningioma with 
focal papilary pattern WHO 
grade III 
16 F L   X Astrocytoma WHO Grade II 
17 F R   X Anaplastic oligoastrocytoma WHO grade III 
18 M R  X  Glioblastoma Multiforme Grade IV 
19 M L   X Oligodendroglioma grade II 
20 M L X X  Atypical Meningioma Grade II 
Table 1. Summary of lesion sites and tumour classification for each participant in the 
frontal cortex lesion group. 
 
Exclusion criteria included: damage outside the frontal cortex, a history of 
alcohol or drug dependence, psychiatric disorders, English as a second 





2. 1. 2. Healthy Control group 
 
Twenty healthy control participants were group matched with the patients for 
gender ratio and approximate age (11 female, 9 male, Mean age=52.6 years, 
SD=16.8) and also pre-morbid IQ with the patient groups were recruited locally. 
They had no neurological and psychiatric history and also had English as their 
first language with IQ estimates above 70.  
Ethical approval was obtained from the local NHS Research Ethics Committee. 
Both groups gave written informed consent. All participants were offered £10 for 
their participation. 
 
2. 2. Measures 
 
2. 2. 1. Neuropsychological measures and self-report questionnaires 
 
Standardised neuropsychological measures were used to test intellectual and 
executive functioning. The Test of Premorbid Functioning (TOPF; Wechsler, 
2011),  a revised and updated version of the Wechsler Test of Adult Reading, 
provided an estimate of premorbid intellectual functioning. Executive functioning 
was tested using: the Trail Making Test (TMT; Army Individual Test Battery 
1944) which measures temporal sequencing and mental flexibility; Hayling 
Sentence completion test, a measure of response inhibition; the Brixton Test, a 
measure of planning and set shifting (Burgess & Shallice, 1997); and the F-A-S 
a subtest of the Neurosensory Center Comprehensive Examination for Aphasia 
(NCCEA; Spreen & Benton, 1977), which is a measure of phonemic word 
fluency which taps into executive control over cognitive process such as 
selective attention, and mental set shifting.  
For behavioural abnormality detection, the Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX; 
Wilson et al, 1996) was used, a 20-item standardized measure of behavioural 
difficulties associated with executive functioning such as impulsivity, inhibition 
control, monitoring, and planning.  Depression, anxiety and irritability was 
measured using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scales - Snaith Irritability 
75 
 
Scale (HADS-SIS, Snaith et al. 1978; Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), a  22-item self 
report scale that generates ordinal data; seven of the items relate to anxiety 
(maximum score of 21), seven  to depression (maximum score of 21) and eight  
to irritability (maximum score of 24).  
The neuropsychological tests and questionnaires were administered in pen-
and-paper format to all participants. 
 
2. 2. 2. Experimental procedure to assess social cognition 
 
a. Trustworthiness and Dominance task (Sprengelmeyer et. al., in press) 
The faces used in this study were originally constructed by taking 500 non-
famous faces from the Internet in a separate pilot study and asking non-clinical 
participants to rate them for trustworthiness and dominance (Sprengelmeyer et. 
al., in press). The 10% most trustworthy and 10% least trustworthy looking 
males and females were selected. These faces were then morphed together to 
create four average faces: two very trustworthy looking (one male, one female), 
and two untrustworthy looking (one male, one female). These are highlighted 
with red squares in Figure 3 (located on rows 2 and 9, columns 2 and 9). These 
trustworthy prototypes were then morphed on two 10 point continua (see Figure 





Figure 3. Examples of stimuli design. Four faces (two male, two female) were morphed 
on two 10-point continua (Trustworthiness and Sex), resulting in 100 faces.  
 
To assess the participants' ability to make social judgments about 
trustworthiness and dominance, they were presented with four separate blocks 
of 40 trials. In each trial participants were presented with a single face and 
asked to make one of four different judgements: i) trustworthiness ii) 
trustworthiness sex control condition - femininity iii) dominance and iv)  
dominance sex control condition - femininity. The control conditions help 
distinguish between deficits of trustworthiness and dominance, and impaired 
general face processing. For the trustworthy/dominance tasks 40 stimuli were 
selected including all ten levels of trustworthy/dominance across faces taken 
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from the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 9th rows across the sex morphing. For the sex 
control tasks 40 stimuli were selected including all ten levels sex across faces 
taken from the 2nd, 4th, 7th and 9th rows across the trustworthy/dominance 
morphing. This gives 40 faces for each of the four tasks (trustworthiness, 
trustworthiness control, dominance, dominance control), providing a total of 160 
stimuli. Each of the faces presented has to be rated individually by participants 
on a 7 point Likert scale for trustworthiness, dominance or femininity (control 
task), depending on the block (see Figure 4). 
Each of the four tasks was presented in separate trial blocks, with the stimuli in 
each task randomized and presented sequentially on a computer screen. Block 
order was consistent across all participants: trustworthiness, trustworthiness 
sex control, dominance, dominance sex control. Each face was presented until 
the participant responded by pressing the keys 1 to 7 to indicate their choice. 
This was followed by a white blank image lasting one second until the next trial. 
There was no time limit for each trial, but participants were encouraged to make 
their decision as quickly and "instinctively" as they could. Following a response 





Is this person Trustworthy? Is this person Feminine? 
  
NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 YES 
 
Is this person Dominant? Is this person Feminine? 
  
NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 YES NO 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 YES 
Figure 4. Example stimuli for the Trustworthy and Dominance task together with the 
control task (femininity/masculinity) 
 
b. Revised complex social emotion recognition test, "Mind in the Eyes Test" 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) 
In this task, the participants have to judge the emotions suggested by 36 
photographs of the eyes of human actors, displaying complex social emotions 
or mental states (panicked, playful, upset, desire, insisting, worried, fantasising, 
uneasy, despondent, preoccupied, cautious, regretful, sceptical, anticipating, 
accusing, contemplative, thoughtful, doubtful, decisive, tentative, friendly, 
fantasising, preoccupied, defiant, interested, hostile, cautions, pensive, 
interested, reflective, flirtatious, confident, serious, concerned, distrustful, 
nervous, suspicious). For each stimulus there is a choice of four words 
describing the emotion displayed, one of which is the correct one (see Figure 
5). For this study, the material was presented on a computer and the 
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participants responded by mouse clicking their chosen word. Similarly to the 
previous task, there was a one second blank inter stimulus interval between two 
consecutive stimuli and with no revisiting of answers. 
 
Playful Comforting Irritated Bored 
 
Joking Flustered Desire Convinced 
 
Terrified Upset Arrogant Annoyed 
 
Joking Insisting Amused Relaxed 
Figure 5. An example of the complex emotion recognition test (Baron-Cohen et al., 
2001). Only one word correctly describes the emotion displayed. 
 
This test showed good cross cultural reliability in both clinical and non-clinical 
populations (e.g. Fernandez-Abascal, Cabello, Fernandez-Berrocal, and Baron-
Cohen, 2013; Hallerback, Lugnegard, Hjarthag, and Gillberg, 2009; Yildirim, 
Kasar, Guduk, Ates, et al., 2011; Rojas, Serrano, Dillon, Bartoloni, et al., 2011; 
Prevost, Carrier, Chowne, Zelkowitzet al., 2014). 
 
c. Ekman 60 faces test (Ekman and Friesen, 1976) 
This task's purpose was to measure the accuracy of participant's facial 
emotional recognition concerning primary facial emotions. Photographs of the 
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faces of 10 people (6 female, 4 male) were taken from the Ekman and Friesen 
(1976) series. For each face, there were poses corresponding to each of 6 
emotions (happiness, surprise, fear, sadness, disgust, and anger), giving a total 
of 60 photographs (see Figure 6 for example stimuli). These were shown on a 
computer screen one at a time in a random order, and the participants were be 
asked to decide which of the emotion names (happiness, surprise, fear, 
sadness, disgust, or anger) best described the facial expression shown. There 
was a one second blank inter-stimulus interval between trials, no time limit for 
this task and no possibility to revisit answers. 
 
Happiness Surprise Fear Sadness Disgust Anger 
 
Happiness Surprise Fear Sadness Disgust Anger 
 
Happiness Surprise Fear Sadness Disgust Anger 
 
Happiness Surprise Fear Sadness Disgust Anger 
Figure 6.  Examples of the stimuli and response choices in the Ekman 60 face test. 




d. Benton Facial Recognition Test (BFRT). 
The Short Form of the BFRT (Benton, Hamsher, Varney and Spreen, 1983) was 
administered. This test consists of 13 items. For each item, participants are 
presented with an unfamiliar target face (always presented in a frontal pose) 
and an array of 6 faces presented simultaneously with the target face (see 
Figure 7).  
 
  
Figure 7.  Example stimuli for the BFRT conditions one and two. On the left the target 
face at the top has one match in the array below. On the right, the target face at the top 
can be matched with three of the six faces presented in the array below, but these are 
shown in different viewpoints and lighting conditions. 
 
The participants are asked to identify the target face in this array in three 
conditions of increasing difficulty. In the first condition the participants have to 
match the target face with an identical photograph among five distractors. In the 
second condition they have to match the target face with three photos of the 
target taken from different angles which are presented together with three 
distractors. Finally, in the third and most difficult condition, they are asked to 
match the target face with three photos of the target taken under different 
lighting conditions (again these are presented together with three distractors). 
This task was also presented on a computer screen. The target face was 
presented at the top of the screen and the array of responses was presented 
immediately below it (similarly to the paper version of the test). The participants 
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3. 1. Demographic and neuropsychological variables 
 
The descriptive statistics summarised in Table 2. These were analysed using 
independent t tests to compare the control and patient groups. Sex ratios 
between groups were perfectly matched and age, education and pre-morbid IQ 
showed good group matching. The patients scored significantly higher than 
controls on the Dysexecutive Questionnaire, HADS anxiety, depression and 
irritability. The patients performed significantly worse than the controls across all 





 Controls Patients Statistical comparison 
 Mean SD Mean SD t p d 
Age 52.6 16.8 54.1 15.0 -.3 .768 0.097 
Years of education 12.7 1.8 12.9 2.0 -.3 .745 0.097 
TOPF 104.8 7.8 106.5 8.8 -.6 .533 0.195 
DEX 2.2 2.7 33.7 9.4 -14.4 < .001 4.672 
HADS-SIS: Anxiety 3.7 3.1 8.3 3.6 -4.3 < .001 1.395 
HADS-SIS: Depression 1.3 1.7 6.1 3.6 -5.3 < .001 1.720 
HADS-SIS: Irritability 1.0 1.1 9.5 4.9 -7.5 < .001 2.433 
Trail making: Trial A time (s) 30.7 7.5 38.3 16.0 -1.9 .063 0.616 
Trail making: Trial B time (s) 67.5 17.3 90.1 43.6 -2.2 .038 0.714 
Trail making test: B-A time 36.8 10.5 51.8 29.5 -2.1 .039 0.681 
FAS scaled scores 10.7 2.4 6.2 2.5 5.9 < .001 1.914 
Category fluency scaled 
scores 10.7 2.4 5.8 2.9 5.8 < .001 1.882 
Hayling overall scaled score 7.2 1.1 4.5 1.1 7.5 < .001 2.433 
Brixton scaled score 6.8 1.3 4.3 2.0 4.7 < .001 1.525 
* Note, df = 38 for all analyses. 
Table 2: Demographic and neuropsychological variables, with statistical comparison 
between control (n = 20; female 11) and patient (n= 20; female 11) groups. t tests show 
statistical group comparisons. 
 
3. 2. Facial processing analysis strategy 
 
Initial analyses used ANCOVAs to compare performance on each of the face 
processing tasks, making three separate between-subjects comparisons: 
controls vs. patients, left vs. right hemisphere lesions, medial vs. dorsolateral 
lesions. For each task the experimental or test manipulations were included as 
a within-subject factor. 
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The between-subject group factor varied between three different analyses. First, 
patients were compared with controls; second, unilateral left (LH, N = 11) were 
compared with right hemisphere lesions (RH, N = 8) (this excluded the one 
bilateral lesion patient); third,   medial lesions (N = 12) were compared with 
dorsolateral lesions (N = 6) (here two patients had lesions in multiple sites and 
were excluded from these analyses). 
The within-subject factor for the trustworthiness and dominance tasks there 
were 10 levels (low trustworthiness/dominance through to high 
trustworthiness/dominance). For the Ekman 60 task there were six levels 
(anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness and surprise).  
In all of the analyses the ANCOVA method was used to control for anxiety, 
depression and irritability, as patients scored significantly higher than controls 
on all three of these variables (see Table 2) and they were deemed as possibly 
influencing facial perceptual responding. 
To address the hypotheses of this study multiple correlation coefficients were 
calculated across the ten experimental conditions for the trustworthiness and 
dominance tasks (including the sex control tasks). With this measure a stronger 
correlation indicates that ratings were related across the ten experimental 
conditions (i.e., responses were more accurate), whereas a weaker correlation 
indicates that ratings were less related or unrelated (i.e., responses were more 
random). For controls it is expected that responses will be highly correlated, 
whereas for patients there is typically no correlation across the ratings. These 
correlation coefficients were compared using independent measures t tests and 
were also correlated with accuracy for the processing of the six basic emotions 
(patients and controls separately). 
Full descriptive statistics are presented for all analyses in the Appendices. Line 
graphs, with error bars showing ± 1 standard error, are presented to aid in the 






3. 3. Trustworthiness: Group comparisons 
 
3. 3. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
 Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 1 and are presented graphically 
in Figure 8. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant (W = .017, χ2 (44) = 
130.3, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to 
all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (4.4, 152.8) = 11.9, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .253) showing that ratings of trustworthiness increase as level of facial 
trustworthiness increases, with no main effect of group (F (1, 35) = 1.0, p = 
.332, partial η2 = .027). The interaction between level and group was significant 
(F (4.4, 152.8) = 4.5, p < .001, partial η2 = .253; see Figure 8). The significant 
interaction was broken down using a polynomial trend analysis for each group 
separately to determine how their trustworthiness ratings changed across the 
ten levels of increasing trustworthiness. For the controls there is a significant 
linear increase in trustworthiness ratings as the level of trustworthiness within a 
face increases (F (1, 16) = 182.2, p < .001, partial η2 = .919), whereas for the 
patients there is no significant change (F (1, 16) = 3.0, p = .101, partial η2 = 
.159). 
None of the HADS-SIS control variables were significant confounds (anxiety: F 
(1, 35) = 1.6, p = .215, partial η2 = .043; depression: F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .856, 




Figure 8. Mean trustworthiness ratings (± 1 SE) for control and patient participants as 
a function of trustworthiness level. 
 
3. 3. 2. Left versus right hemisphere lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 2. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .003, χ2 (44) = 64.7, p = .037), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
 The main effect of level was not significant (F (3.3, 46.4) = 1.7, p = .167, partial 
η2 = .111), nor was the main effect of lesion laterality (F (1, 35) = 0.5, p = .506, 
partial η2 = .032) or the interaction between level and lesion laterality (F (3.3, 
46.4) = 0.7, p = .596, partial η2 = .045). 
The HADS-SIS control variables were not significant (anxiety: F (1, 35) = 0.1, p 
= .724, partial η2 = .009; depression: F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .813, partial η2 = .004; 





3. 3. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 3. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was not significant (W = .002, χ2 (44) = 59.3, p = .097. 
The main effect of level was not significant (F (9, 117) = 1.6, p = .114, partial η2 
= .112), nor was the main effect of lesion location (F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .978, 
partial η2 = .000) or the interaction between level and lesion location (F (9, 117) 
= 0.5, p = .533, partial η2 = .064). 
 There were no significant confounds (anxiety: F (1, 35) = 0.2, p = .682, partial 
η2 = .013; depression: F (1, 35) = 0.4, p = .563, partial η2 = .026; irritability: F (1, 
35) = 0.6, p = .465, partial η2 = .042).  
 
3. 3. 4. Summary of analyses on the trustworthiness task results 
 
When comparing control and patients, controls show the expected increase in 
trustworthiness ratings, whereas patients do not. There are no differences 
according to lesion laterality or site. 
 
3. 4. Trustworthiness sex control task: Group comparisons 
 
3. 4. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 4 and are presented graphically 
in Figure 9. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant (W = .005, χ2 (44) = 
168.1, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to 
all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (3.4, 120.0) = 44.1, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .558) showing that ratings of femininity increase as level of facial femininity 
increases. The main effect of group was significant (F (1, 35) = 9.5, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .214) with femininity ratings higher for patients (M = 4.6, SE = .14) 
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than for controls (M = 3.9, SE = .14). The interaction between level and group 
was not significant (F (3.4, 120.0) = 1.4, p = .191, partial η2 = .038). 
HADS-SIS Anxiety was a significant control variable (F (1, 35) = 5.6, p = .024, 
partial η2 = .137), but neither of the other HADS-SIS control variables were 
significant (depression: F (1, 35) = 2.1, p = .156, partial η2 = .057; irritability: F 
(1, 35) = 1.9, p = .181, partial η2 = .051). 
 
 
Figure 9. Estimated marginal mean femininity ratings (± 1 SE) for control and patient 
participants as a function of femininity level. 
 
3. 4. 2. Left versus right hemisphere lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 5 and are presented graphically 
in Figure 10. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant (W = .000, χ2 (44) = 
123.4, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied to 
all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (2.4, 33.8) = 16.1, p < .001, partial η2 
= .534) showing increasing femininity ratings as level of facial femininity 
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increases. The main effect of lesion laterality was not significant (F (1, 35) = 9.7, 
p = .083, partial η2 = .199), however the interaction between level and lesion 
laterality was (F (2.4, 33.8) = 2.7, p = .007, partial η2 = .161). This was broken 
down using a polynomial trend analysis for each group separately. There was a 
significant linear increase in trustworthiness ratings for patients with left 
hemisphere lesions (F (1, 10) = 594.4, p < .001, partial η2 = .969) and for 
patients with right hemisphere lesions (F (1, 7) = 30.0, p = .001, partial η2 = 
.811). Inspection of Figure 10 shows that the interaction arises from a more 
marked linear increase in ratings for patients with left hemisphere lesions than 
for patients with right hemisphere lesions. 
HADS-SIS Anxiety was a significant control variable (F (1, 35) = 7.1, p = .019, 
partial η2 = .336), but neither of the others were s (depression: F (1, 35) = 1.6, p 
= .233, partial η2 = .100; irritability: F (1, 35) = 0.9, p = .373, partial η2 = .057). 
 
 
Figure 10. Estimated marginal mean femininity ratings (± 1 SE) for patient with left and 




3. 4. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 6. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .000, χ2 (44) = 123.8, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (2.1, 27.7) = 9.6, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.424) showing that ratings of femininity increase as level of facial femininity 
increases. The main effect of lesion site was not significant (F (1, 35) = 1.7, p = 
.221, partial η2 = .113), nor was the interaction (F (2.4, 33.8) = 2.7, p = .007, 
partial η2 = .161). 
HADS-SIS Anxiety was a significant control variable (F (1, 35) = 6.2, p = .027, 
partial η2 = .323), but neither of the other HADS-SIS control variables were 
significant confounds (depression: F (1, 35) = 1.7, p = .211, partial η2 = .118; 
irritability: F (1, 35) = 4.1, p = .064, partial η2 = .240). 
 
3. 4. 4. Summary 
 
Patients rate faces as more feminine than controls, regardless of the level of 
femininity within the face. The increase in rated femininity is more marked for 
patients with left hemisphere lesions than for patients with right hemisphere 
lesions; however there are no differences according to lesion site. 
 
3. 5. Dominance: Group comparisons 
 
3. 5. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 7 and are presented graphically 
in Figure 11. Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant (W = .093, χ2 (44) = 




The main effect of level was significant (F (6.1, 212.7) = 2.3, p = .019, partial η2 
= .060) showing that ratings of dominance increase as level of facial dominance 
increases. The main effect of group was not significant (F (1, 35) = 1.0, p = 
.329, partial η2 = .027). The interaction between level and group was significant 
(F (6.1, 212.7) = 21.5, p < .001, partial η2 = .381; see Figure 11). For controls 
there is a significant linear increase in dominance ratings as the level of 
dominance within a face increases (F (1, 16) = 172.2, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.915). In contrast, for patients there is a significant linear decrease in 
dominance ratings (F (1, 16) = 10.8, p = .005, partial η2 = .403). 
None of the HADS-SIS variables were significant confounds (anxiety: F (1, 35) 
= 0.2, p = .649, partial η2 = .006; depression: F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .877, partial η2 
= .001; irritability: F (1, 35) = 1.3, p = .264, partial η2 = .035). 
 
Figure 11. Mean dominance ratings (± 1 SE) for control and patient participants as a 
function of dominance level. 
 
3. 5. 2. Left versus right hemisphere lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 8. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was not significant (W = .014, χ2 (44) = 45.8, p = .471). 
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The main effect of level was significant (F (9, 126) = 2.5, p = .011, partial η2 = 
.152) showing that ratings of dominance increase as level of facial dominance 
increases. The main effect of lesion laterality was not significant (F (1, 14) = 0.1, 
p = .959, partial η2 = .000), nor was the interaction (F (9, 126) = 0.7, p = .738, 
partial η2 = .045). 
None of the HADS-SIS control variables were significant (anxiety: F (1, 14) = 
0.2, p = .693, partial η2 = .011; depression: F (1, 14) = 0.1, p = .722, partial η2 = 
.009; irritability: F (1, 14) = 1.2, p = .297, partial η2 = .077). 
 
3. 5. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 9. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was not significant (W = .003, χ2 (44) = 55.5, p = .168). 
The main effect of level was significant (F (9, 117) = 3.8, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.225) showing that ratings of dominance increase as level of facial dominance 
increases. The main effect of lesion site was not significant (F (1, 13) = 0.1, p = 
.896, partial η2 = .001), nor was the interaction between level and lesion site (F 
(9, 117) = 1.7, p = .088, partial η2 = .118). 
The HADS-SIS variables were not significant confounds (anxiety: F (1, 13) = 
0.5, p = .483, partial η2 = .039; depression: F (1, 13) = 0.7, p = .698, partial η2 = 
.012; irritability: F (1, 13) = 1.2, p = .298, partial η2 = .083). 
 
3. 5. 4. Summary 
 
When comparing control and patients, controls show the expected increase in 
dominance ratings, whereas patients show the opposite pattern of decreasing 






3. 6. Dominance sex control task: Group comparisons 
 
3. 6. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 10. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .026, χ2 (44) = 116.2, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (4.2, 146.5) = 29.3, p < .001, partial 
η2 = .456) showing that ratings of femininity increase as level of facial femininity 
increases. The main effect of group was not significant (F (1, 35) = 0.8, p = 
.371, partial η2 = .023). The interaction between level and group was not 
significant (F (4.2, 146.5) = 0.5, p = .851, partial η2 = .015). 
None of the HADS-SIS control variables were significant (anxiety: F (1, 35) = 
0.1, p = .731, partial η2 = .003; depression: F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .893, partial η2 = 
.001; irritability: F (1, 35) = 2.0, p = .170, partial η2 = .053).   
 
3. 6. 2. Left versus right hemisphere lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 11. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .000, χ2 (44) = 83.3, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (3.1, 43.4) = 7.6, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.352) showing that ratings of femininity increase as level of facial femininity 
increases. The main effect of lesion laterality was not significant (F (1, 14) = 0.3, 
p = .577, partial η2 = .023), nor was the interaction (F (3.1, 43.4) = 1.2, p = .342, 
partial η2 = .076). 
The HADS-SIS variables were not significant confounds (anxiety: F (1, 14) = 
0.7, p = .430, partial η2 = .045; depression: F (1, 14) = 0.1, p = .877, partial η2 = 






3. 6. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 12. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .000, χ2 (44) = 86.4, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of level was significant (F (2.3, 36.3) = 6.6, p < .001, partial η2 = 
.337) showing that ratings of femininity increase as level of facial femininity 
increases. The main effect of lesion site was not significant (F (1, 13) = 0.5, p = 
.463, partial η2 = .042), nor was the interaction between level and lesion site (F 
(2.3, 36.3) = 0.9, p = .425, partial η2 = .068). 
None of the HADS-SIS variables were significant confounds (anxiety: F (1, 13) 
= 0.5, p = .508, partial η2 = .034; depression: F (1, 13) = 0.1, p = .852, partial η2 
= .003; irritability: F (1, 13) = 0.5, p = .490, partial η2 = .037). 
 
3. 6. 4. Summary 
 
Femininity ratings increase with increasing levels of facial femininity, but this 
does not vary between patients and controls. There were no differences 
according to lesion laterality or site. 
 
3. 7. Ekman 60 task: Group comparisons 
 
3. 7. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 13. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .266, χ2 (14) = 43.8, p < .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of emotion was significant (F (3.5, 121.0) = 3.4, p = .006, partial 
η2 = .088). For the descriptive statistics for this main effect, see Table 3. Anger 
was recognised with significantly less accuracy than disgust (p = .009), 
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happiness (p < .001), sadness (p < .001) and surprise (p < .001), but not fear (p 
= .926). Disgust was recognised with significantly greater accuracy than fear (p 
=.002), with less accuracy than happiness (p < .001) and surprise (p < .001), 
but not differently from sadness (p = .071). Fear was recognised with 
significantly less accuracy than happiness (p < .001), sadness (p < .001) and 
surprise (p < .001). Happiness was recognised with significantly greater 
accuracy than sadness (p < .001) and surprise (p < .001). Sadness was 
recognised with significantly greater accuracy than surprise (p = .003). 
 
Emotion Mean SE 
Anger 7.4 .3 
Disgust 8.2 .2 
Fear 7.4 .3 
Happiness 10.0 .0 
Sadness 8.8 .2 
Surprise 9.4 .1 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for the main effect of emotion on the Ekman 60 task. 
 
The main effect of group was not significant (F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .894, partial η2 
= .001), nor was the interaction between emotion and group was not significant 
(F (3.5, 121.0) = 0.6, p = .538, partial η2 = .021). 
HADS-SIS Irritability was a significant control variable (F (1, 35) = 9.7, p = .004, 
partial η2 = .217), but neither of the other HADS-SIS control variables were 
significant confounds (anxiety: F (1, 35) = 3.1, p = .087, partial η2 = .081; 
depression: F (1, 35) = 0.8, p = .371, partial η2 = .023). 
 




Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 14. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .047, χ2 (14) = 37.0, p = .001), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of emotion was significant (F (2.3, 39.1) = 2.6, p = .034, partial 
η2 = .156). For the descriptive statistics for this main effect, see Table 4. Anger 
was recognised with significantly less accuracy than disgust (p = .031), 
happiness (p < .001), sadness (p = .001) and surprise (p < .001), but not fear (p 
= .336). Disgust was recognised with significantly greater accuracy than fear (p 
=.005), with less accuracy than happiness (p < .001) and sadness (p = .014) 
and surprise (p = .001). Fear was recognised with significantly less accuracy 
than happiness (p < .001), sadness (p < .001) and surprise (p < .001). 
Happiness was recognised with significantly greater accuracy than sadness (p 
< .001) and surprise (p = .018). Sadness was recognised with significantly 
greater accuracy than surprise (p = .007). 
 
Emotion Mean SE 
Anger 6.6 .4 
Disgust 7.6 .4 
Fear 6.2 .5 
Happiness 10.0 .0 
Sadness 8.7 .2 
Surprise 9.6 .1 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the main effect of emotion on the Ekman 60 task. 
 
The main effect of lesion laterality was not significant (F (1, 14) = 0.1, p = .880, 
partial η2 = .002), nor was the interaction between emotion and lesion laterality 
(F (2.3, 39.1) = 0.4, p = .875, partial η2 = .025). 
HADS-SIS Anxiety was a significant control variable (F (1, 14) = 5.6, p = .033, 
partial η2 = .285), as was HADS-SIS Irritability (F (1, 14) = 10.8, p = .005, partial 
η2 = .435), but HADS-SIS Depression was not (F (1, 14) = 1.0, p = .341, partial 




3. 7. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Full descriptive statistics are given in Appendix 15. Mauchley’s test of sphericity 
was significant (W = .048, χ2 (14) = 33.8, p = .003), therefore the Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was applied to all relevant analyses. 
The main effect of emotion was not significant (F (2.6, 34.2) = 1.6, p = .218, 
partial η2 = .108), nor was the main effect of lesion site (F (1, 13) = 0.3, p = 
.601, partial η2 = .022), or the interaction between emotion and lesion site (F 
(2.6, 34.2) = 0.4, p = .863, partial η2 = .028). 
HADS-SIS Anxiety was a significant control variable (F (1, 13) = 5.6, p = .034, 
partial η2 = .302), as was HADS-SIS Irritability (F (1, 13) = 15.8, p = .002, partial 
η2 = .549), but HADS-SIS Depression was not (F (1, 13) = 0.5, p = .500, partial 
η2 = .036). 
 
3. 7. 4. Summary 
 
The emotions are recognised with differing levels of accuracy, but this does not 
differ between control and patient participants or according to lesion laterality or 
site. 
 
3. 8. Mind in the Eyes task: Group comparisons 
 
3. 8. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 16.  
The main effect of group was not significant (F (1, 35) = 3.7, p = .063, partial η2 
= .095). HADS-SIS Irritability was a significant control variable (F (1, 35) = 4.8, p 
= .035, partial η2 = .120), but neither of the other HADS-SIS control variables 
were significant (anxiety: F (1, 35) = 1.3, p = .270, partial η2 = .035; depression: 




3. 8. 2. Left versus right hemisphere lesions 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 16.  
The main effect of lesion laterality was not significant (F (1, 14) = 1.7, p = .212, 
partial η2 = .109). None of the HADS-SIS control variables were significant 
(anxiety: F (1, 14) = 1.1, p = .320, partial η2 = .070; depression: F (1, 14) = 0.3, 
p = .608, partial η2 = .019; irritability: F (1, 14) = 0.6, p = .438, partial η2 = .043). 
 
3. 8. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 16.  
The main effect of lesion site was not significant (F (1, 13) = 0.9, p = .356, 
partial η2 = .066). The HADS-SIS variables were not significant confounds 
(anxiety: F (1, 13) = 0.1, p = .787, partial η2 = .006; depression: F (1, 13) = 0.1, 
p = .812, partial η2 = .005; irritability: F (1, 13) = 2.4, p = .142, partial η2 = .158). 
 
3. 8. 4. Summary 
 
Performance on the Mind in the Eyes Test did not differ according to group, 
lesion laterality or lesion site. 
 
3. 9. Benton face recognition task: Group comparisons 
 
3. 9. 1. Controls versus patients 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 16.  
The main effect of group was not significant (F (1, 35) = 0.1, p = .849, partial η2 
= .001). None of the HADS-SIS variables were significant confounds (anxiety: F 
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(1, 35) = 0.6, p = .440, partial η2 = .017; depression: F (1, 35) = 0.8, p = .378, 
partial η2 = .022; irritability: F (1, 35) = 0.4, p = .514, partial η2 = .012). 
 
3. 9. 2. Left versus right hemisphere lesions 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 16.  
The main effect of lesion laterality was not significant (F (1, 14) = 0.1, p = .731, 
partial η2 = .009). The HADS-SIS control variables were not significant (anxiety: 
F (1, 14) = 0.1, p = .820, partial η2 = .004; depression: F (1, 14) = 0.1, p = .791, 
partial η2 = .005; irritability: F (1, 14) = 0.2, p = .641, partial η2 = .016). 
 
3. 9. 3. Medial versus dorsolateral lesions 
 
Descriptive statistics are presented in Appendix 16.  
The main effect of lesion site was not significant (F (1, 13) = 0.1, p = .834, 
partial η2 = .004). None of the HADS-SIS variables were significant confounds 
(anxiety: F (1, 13) = 0.2, p = .642, partial η2 = .017; depression: F (1, 13) = 0.1, 
p = .954, partial η2 = .000; irritability: F (1, 13) = 0.1, p = .849, partial η2 = .003). 
 
3. 9. 4. Summary 
 
Performance on the Emotion in the Eyes task did not differ according to group, 
lesion laterality or lesion site. 
 
3. 10. Summary of all group comparison analyses 
 
A summary of all analyses showing significant differences according to group 
(control vs. patient), lesion laterality (left hemisphere vs. right hemisphere) or 










Patients: No change 
- - 
Trust: sex control 
Main effect 
Patients > Controls 
Interaction 
Increase greater for 










control - - - 
Ekman 60 - - - 
Emotion in the 
Eyes - - - 
Benton Task - - - 
Table 5. Summary of all findings involving a significant effect of group, lesion laterality 
or lesion site. 
 
3. 11. Relationships between face processing tasks 
 
For the two trustworthiness and dominance tasks and their two corresponding 
control (femininity) tasks multiple correlation coefficients were computed. These 
multiple correlation coefficients were calculated across the individual ratings on 
the task, and represent the overall performance across the 10 levels of the task. 
A positive coefficient (referred in the text as "overall performance coefficient") 
indicates that participant ratings of trustworthiness, dominance or femininity 
increase with the manipulated increase in trust, dominance or femininity. In 
other words, a positive coefficient is expected if the judgements are correct. 
Negative coefficients suggest impaired judgements. 
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These overall performance coefficients across the ten levels of each of the four 
tasks were compared for each of the three group comparisons described 
previously (see Table 6).  
For both the trustworthiness and the dominance tasks the overall performance 
coefficients were significantly higher for controls than for patients; however 
these differences were not seen in the control tasks. When comparing groups 
according to lesion laterality the only difference found was stronger (negative) 
correlation values across levels for patients with right hemisphere lesions in 
comparison to patients with left hemisphere lesions, for the main dominance 
task only. 
The trustworthiness and dominance overall performance coefficients were then 
correlated with the other face processing tasks (see Table 7) for each of the 
groups separately. Although some significant correlations were found for the 
control tasks, they are not clinically relevant.  
When looking at control and patients separately, the trustworthiness and 
dominance overall performance coefficients were not correlated with any of the 
other face processing tasks. 
There were no significant correlations for patients with left hemisphere lesions; 
however, for patients with right hemisphere lesions there was a significant 
positive correlation between performance on the dominance task and 
performance on the Mind in the Eyes task. This shows that patients who 
accurately recognised subtle emotional states in the Mind in the Eyes task also 
were more accurate at judging various degrees of dominance. 
For patients with medial lesions, there were significant correlations between the 
trustworthiness task and accuracy for perceiving fear, and between the 
dominance task and accuracy for perceiving anger. This shows that patients 
with medial lesions who are more accurate at perceiving fear have high overall 
performance values for the trustworthiness task, and those who respond more 
accurately to angry faces tend to have high overall performance values for the 
trustworthiness task. 
For patients with dorsolateral lesions there was one significant negative 
correlation; however, this should be interpreted with some caution as there were 
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only six patients with lesions in this area.  Patients with dorsolateral lesions who 
are more accurate at processing sadness sow poor overall performance to the 
dominance task (e.g. give dominance ratings more randomly). 
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 Group comparison Lesion laterality comparison Lesion site comparison 
 Controls 
(N = 20) 
Patients 
(N = 20) 
Comparison 
(df = 38) 
LH 
(N = 11) 
RH 
(N = 8) 
Comparison 
(df = 17) 
Medial 
(N = 12) 
Dorsolateral 
(N = 6) 
Comparison 
 (df = 16) 
 M SD M SD t p M SD M SD t p M SD M SD t p 
Trust. .94 .10 -.04 .55 7.8 < .001 -.12 .48 .14 .63 -1.0 .339 -.01 .56 -.01 .63 0.1 .975 
Dom. .95 .05 -.31 .29 19.1 < .001 -.18 .28 -.44 .24 2.1 .048 -.36 .32 -.15 .23 -1.5 .159 
Trust. Con. .96 .04 .92 .19 0.9 .366 .97 .02 .85 .29 1.4 .170 .90 .24 .94 .06 -0.4 .679 
Dom. Con. .94 .05 .89 .21 1.0 .314 .93 .13 .81 .30 1.3 .218 .87 .25 .89 .17 -0.1 .898 













































































































Anger r -.030 .009 .068 .316 -.012 .230 -.315 -.364 -.385 -.090 -.158 -.481 .033 .635 -.497 -.343 .314 .597 -.333 -.300 -.516 -.597 -.662 -.673 
p .901 .969 .777 .175 .959 .329 .176 .115 .242 .793 .643 .135 .938 .091 .210 .405 .319 .041 .291 .343 .294 .211 .152 .143 
Disgust r -.260 .038 -.195 -.384 -.237 -.171 -.124 -.231 -.198 -.560 -.393 -.247 -.275 .336 -.154 -.271 -.157 -.011 -.156 -.289 -.214 -.742 -.703 -.426 
p .268 .874 .409 .094 .314 .472 .604 .327 .559 .073 .231 .465 .510 .416 .716 .516 .626 .974 .628 .362 .685 .091 .120 .399 
Fear r -.223 -.247 -.455 .050 .281 .165 -.137 -.154 .004 .103 -.202 -.446 .368 .098 -.164 .062 .641 .321 -.184 -.114 -.225 -.613 -.480 -.482 
p .345 .293 .044 .835 .231 .487 .566 .518 .991 .763 .551 .169 .370 .818 .697 .884 .025 .310 .567 .724 .668 .196 .336 .333 
Happy r -.103 -.075 -.200 .334 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
p .667 .754 .399 .151 * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Sadness r -.110 -.172 -.124 .484 -.438 -.092 .672 .630 -.155 -.102 -.117 .390 -.698 -.350 .827 .750 -.480 .156 .862 .748 -.320 -.934 -.888 .144 
p .644 .468 .604 .031 .053 .701 .001 .003 .650 .766 .732 .236 .054 .396 .011 .032 .114 .628 .000 .005 .537 .006 .018 .786 
Surprise r -.149 .128 -.032 .215 .214 .059 -.127 .331 .152 -.024 .103 .843 .446 .067 -.300 .028 .281 .264 -.184 .096 .226 -.378 -.139 .934 
p .532 .591 .894 .362 .364 .805 .594 .154 .656 .945 .763 .001 .269 .876 .470 .947 .376 .407 .566 .766 .667 .460 .793 .006 
Eckman 
Total 
r -.196 -.148 -.272 .046 .057 .209 -.148 -.150 -.209 -.167 -.267 -.316 .126 .445 -.212 -.094 .382 .555 -.169 -.135 -.342 -.779 -.714 -.418 
p .408 .533 .245 .849 .812 .376 .535 .527 .538 .624 .427 .343 .767 .269 .614 .825 .221 .061 .599 .677 .507 .068 .111 .409 
Mind in 
the Eye 
r .118 .238 .000 .297 .202 .090 -.365 -.413 -.233 -.327 .237 -.136 .351 .824 -.524 -.538 .541 .393 -.450 -.478 -.270 -.350 -.208 -.589 
p .619 .311 1.000 .204 .392 .707 .113 .070 .491 .326 .483 .690 .393 .012 .183 .169 .069 .206 .142 .116 .605 .496 .692 .218 
Benton 
Total 
r -.236 .194 -.108 .119 .143 -.097 -.072 -.003 -.019 -.133 .183 .071 .484 -.315 -.264 -.130 .208 -.160 -.082 .005 .398 .554 .136 -.110 
p .316 .413 .651 .616 .548 .685 .761 .989 .956 .697 .591 .837 .224 .447 .528 .759 .517 .620 .801 .989 .435 .254 .797 .835 
* Where happiness accuracy reached ceiling for all participants, correlations could not be computed. 





The most important finding of this study is that patients with frontal lobe damage 
have significantly more difficulties than healthy controls in judging 
trustworthiness and dominance from facial expressions. This effect did not differ 
according to lesion laterality or site. Overall, this suggests that the frontal lobe 
has a vital role in the perception of trustworthiness and dominance from facial 
expressions. This finding is in line with previous reports in the literature, which 
suggested that patients with focal frontal lobe damage show reduced ability to 
infer mental states of other people from their facial expressions (e.g. Happe, 
Malhi and Checkley, 2001; Tranel, Bechara and Denburg, 2002; Hornak et al, 
2003; McDonald et al., 2004; Kemp et al., 2013).  
Importantly, difficulties in understanding others' mental states may subsequently 
lead to errors in predicting their actions, which may lead to behaviours that are 
not congruent with social expectations and norms. Indeed, several studies 
reported that patients with frontal damage often produce behaviours that violate 
social norms despite unimpaired knowledge of the social norms themselves 
(e.g. Beer et al, 2006). Impaired perceptions of trustworthiness and dominance 
may help explain this behaviour.  For example, if patients with frontal damage 
are unable to distinguish between whether a person is trustworthy or not this 
may explain why they make socially inappropriate self-disclosures when talking 
to a stranger (Beer et al, 2006) or not having confidence in their judgement  and 
may withdraw from social interactions (e.g. Blais and Boisvert, 2005). Similarly, 
misperceptions of dominance may lead to inaccurate appraisal of others' 
harmful intentions which could lead to aggression and antisocial behaviours 
(Meyer, Berman, Scheibel and Hayman, 1992; McDonald and Saunders 2005).  
This study has not found significant differences between patients and controls 
on the other social cognition task, Mind in the Eyes Test. It is somewhat difficult 
to interpret this result in the context of other studies, as the literature to date 
presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, our results are similar to with the 
findings of Milders et al, (2003) who found that patients with severe TBI (with 
extensive bilateral damage to the frontal lobes) were able to detect subtle social 
emotions at levels comparable to controls. On the other hand, other studies 
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reported impairments on the Mind in the Eyes Test in patients with smaller 
lesions in the ventromedial or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (e.g. Henry et al, 
2006; Geraci et al, 2010). Since most of the patients who took part in our study 
had focal lesions in the medial and dorsolateral areas it was expected that they 
performed worse than controls on this task. There are two possible explanations 
for these results.  
First, there seems to be sufficient evidence in the literature that the prefrontal 
cortex is involved in processing complex social emotion from faces. However, 
the opinions are divided on whether a single, highly specialised area is involved, 
or whether there are several interconnected areas spread over ventromedial 
and dorsolateral regions (for a review see Radice-Neumann et al, 2007). There 
are also mixed results in the literature with regard to the involvement of the left, 
right or bilateral areas (e.g. McDonald 2013). Since most of the patients who 
took part in this study had focal unilateral lesions, it is possible that most of 
them were able to rely on unaffected areas and perform at levels comparable to 
controls.  
Second, most studies that used the Mind in the Eyes Test to assess social 
cognition on patients with frontal lobe damage, were conducted with TBI 
patients. Very frequently diffuse axonal injury often occurs in TBI as a result of 
asymmetrical mechanical loading at cellular level (e.g., Smith, Meaney and 
Shull, 2003; Cloots, van Dommelen, Kleiven and Geers, 2013). Since frontal 
areas exhibit a high degree of interconnectivity, it is possible that the 
impairment in complex social emotion recognition reported in some of the 
previous research may be due to connectivity problems in addition to focal 
damage to specific areas. This idea is further supported by the findings of Henry 
et al, (2009) who found that MS patients performed significantly worse than 
healthy controls at the Mind in the Eyes Test. Since the patient sample 
presented in this study had focal surgical lesions, it is possible that the 
interconnectivity with other areas remained largely unaffected. This may explain 
why the patients' complex social emotion recognition appears relatively intact.  
Additionally, it is important to mention that there was a trend in the data, with 
patients performing slightly worse than controls on the Eyes in the Mind test. In 
a larger sample size this could achieve statistical significance. It is also possible 
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that not all complex social emotions are equally well recognised in patients with 
frontal damage. For example, Martins, Faisca, Esteves, Simao, et al. (2012) 
found that patients with lesions in the medial areas of prefrontal cortex showed 
significant impairments in recognising two social emotions: arrogance and 
jealousy, but relatively intact recognition of guilt. Unfortunately, it is not possible 
to analyse individual complex social emotions in the Mind in the Eyes Test. 
However, future research should investigate this possibility by using different 
instruments to assess the recognition of complex social emotions from faces. 
This study has also not found any significant differences in basic emotion 
recognition abilities between patients and healthy controls. Similarly, Shamay-
Tsoory, Tomer, Goldsher, Berger et al, (2004) did not find impairments in basic 
facial emotion recognition (Ekman 60 task) in patients with lesions in the 
prefrontal cortex. McDonald and Saunders (2005) found that only a few 
participants with TBI (eight out of 34) showed impaired facial emotion 
recognition from still photographs. Other studies suggested that only the 
recognition of negative facial emotions is impaired in patients with frontal TBI 
whilst positive emotions are recognised at the same level as controls (Jackson 
& Moffat, 1997, Blair & Cipolotti, 2000; Hopkins, Dywan & Segalowitz, 2002, 
Kemp, Berthel, Dufour, Despres, et al., 2013). In contrast, there are several 
studies that reported impaired facial emotion recognition across all emotions in 
patients with frontal lobe damage (Mitchell, Avny & Blair, 2006; Henry, Phillips, 
Beatty, McDonald et al., 2009; Williams and Wood, 2010; Callahan, Ueda, 
Sakata, Plamondon and Murai, 2011; Spikman, et al., 2012; Dal Monte, 
Krueger, Solomon, Schintu, et al., 2013; Spikman, Milders, Visser-Keizer, 
Westerhof-Evers,  et al., 2013; Njomboro, et al., 2014). It has been proposed 
that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and amygdala play a crucial role in basic 
facial emotion recognition (e.g. see Radice-Neumann et al, 2007; McDonald, 
2013). Since only three patients had OFC damage, and no patients had 
amygdala damage, it is perhaps not surprising that no significant impairments in 
basic facial emotion recognition were found. 
This study generally found that found that anger and fear and disgust were 
recognised with significant less accuracy than happiness, sadness and surprise. 
This effect was observed in both patients and controls. Previous studies 
conducted on non-clinical populations (presenting with no neurological or 
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psychiatric conditions) have shown that happiness is recognised with far greater 
accuracy (87-97%) than negative emotions, particularly fear (68-88%; Ekman, 
Sorenson and Friesen, 1969). Malatesta, Izard, Culver and Nicolich (1987) 
found that the accuracy of recognition of anger, fear and sadness decreases 
with age whereas Moreno, Borod, Welkowitz and Alpert, (1993) found improved 
recognition of some positive emotions such as happiness, and a slight decline 
in the recognition of sadness. Calder, Keane, Manly et al., (2003) reported a 
progressive reduction in the recognition of fear and anger with increasing age. 
Thus, the findings regarding basic emotion recognition presented in this study 
are broadly in line with previous research. The fact that patients showed the 
same pattern of basic emotion recognition as controls adds further support to 
the idea the their basic emotion recognition is unimpaired. However, Oosterhof 
& Todorov (2009) interpersonal contact model, proposes that trustworthy and 
dominance judgements are highly correlated with basic facial emotions. 
Nevertheless, our findings suggest that despite unimpaired basic emotion 
recognition, patients with frontal lobe damage struggled with trustworthiness 
and dominance judgements relative to healthy controls. Interestingly, 
correlational analysis suggests that patients with medial lesions who are more 
accurate at perceiving fear also show very accurate ratings for the 
trustworthiness task. Similarly, those who recognise more accurately angry 
faces tend to show accurate ratings for the trustworthiness task. 
Taken together these findings seem to suggest that basic emotion information 
extracted from facial expressions may be a prerequisite for trustworthiness and 
dominance judgements. However, further processing must occur in areas which 
are not involved with basic emotion processing. If those areas are affected, 
trustworthiness and dominance can be impaired whereas basic emotion 
recognition remains relatively unaffected. Correlational analysis also showed 
that patients with right hemisphere lesions who accurately recognised subtle 
emotional states (Mind in the Eyes Test) were also more accurate at judging 
various degrees of dominance. This may suggest cascade-type processing in 
the right medial frontal cortex whereby basic facial emotion information may be 
utilised for higher order emotional processing (e.g. interpreting complex social 
emotions), which in turn may be used to facilitate interpersonal contact. Future 
research should further investigate the possibility that complex emotion may 
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also be driving interpersonal contact in addition to basic emotion as originally 
proposed by Todorov et al.'s (2008) model. 
This study found that participants with frontal lesions performed more poorly 
than controls on executive function tasks, but there was no significant 
correlation between their performance on those tasks and social cognition or 
emotion recognition tasks. This seems to suggest that executive function 
difficulties have no clear relationship with trustworthiness and dominance 
judgements. However, individual differences may account for this lack of 
relationship. There were no differences between the two groups on basic facial 
processing tasks (e.g. BFRT) suggesting the effects reported here are not due 
to overall difficulties in face processing. 
 
This study has several limitations. First, due to unavailability of scans for 
several patients, the exact lesion size could not be ascertained. Therefore we 
are unable to accurately determine how extensive the lesions were that created 
the patterns of impairment reported in this study. Second, due to time 
limitations, the number of participants with OFC damage was relatively low. 
Thus, we cannot directly compare our results with other studies that reported 
various degrees of impairment in basic facial emotion recognition in patients 
with focal OFC damage. Future research should address this limitation for two 
reasons. A plethora of studies mentioned in this paper suggested that OFC 
lesions are likely to produce impairments in basic facial emotion recognition 
(e.g. McDonald, 2013). If lesions in the OFC do result in impairments in basic 
facial emotion recognition and also in trustworthiness/dominance judgements, 
this would provide strong support for Todorov et al.'s (2008) model. However, if 
impaired basic emotion recognition is observed but trustworthiness/dominance 
judgements are intact, this would suggest Todorov et al.'s model needs to take 
into account other factors, such as the ability to interpret complex social 
emotions as suggested by the results of the current study. It is unclear how 
these impairments in trustworthiness/dominance judgements relate to other 
social cognition skills (e.g. ToM, empathy, socio-moral judgements) and 
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Appendix 1: Descriptive statistics for the trustworthiness task for controls and 
patients, and a comparison using simple planned comparisons. 
 Controls Patients 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Trustworthiness: Level 1 1.7 .4 4.1 .4 .001 C < P 
Trustworthiness: Level 2 2.5 .4 3.4 .4 .138 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 3 2.6 .4 4.2 .4 .010 C < P 
Trustworthiness: Level 4 3.4 .3 4.3 .3 .123 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 5 4.1 .3 3.9 .3 .707 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 6 3.8 .4 4.5 .4 .345 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 7 4.5 .4 4.4 .4 .949 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 8 5.0 .5 4.3 .5 .377 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 9 5.2 .4 5.1 .4 .921 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 
10 6.1 .4 4.5 .4 .024 
C >P 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 





Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics for the trustworthiness task for patients with 





hemisphere p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Trustworthiness: Level 1 4.2 .56 3.9 .67 .747 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 2 3.7 .46 4.3 .55 .397 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 3 4.6 .47 4.2 .56 .549 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 4 3.9 .39 4.8 .47 .178 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 5 3.8 .34 4.4 .40 .346 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 6 3.8 .55 4.7 .66 .347 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 7 3.8 .50 4.5 .59 .378 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 8 3.7 .62 4.5 .74 .430 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 9 4.7 .55 4.4 .65 .706 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 
10 4.1 .59 4.4 .70 .830 
- 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 3: Descriptive statistics for the trustworthiness task for patients with 
medial and dorsolateral lesions, and a comparison using simple planned 
comparisons. 
 Medial Dorsolateral 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Trustworthiness: Level 1 4.1 0.6 4.3 0.8 .848 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 2 3.9 0.5 4.3 0.7 .658 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 3 4.2 0.4 5.2 0.5 .185 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 4 4.7 0.4 4.3 0.6 .611 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 5 3.9 0.3 4.2 0.5 .605 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 6 4.2 0.5 4.2 0.8 .993 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 7 4.7 0.4 3.1 0.6 .051 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 8 4.1 0.7 3.6 1.0 .650 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 9 4.6 0.5 4.7 0.7 .894 - 
Trustworthiness: Level 
10 4.1 0.6 4.8 0.8 .484 
- 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 4: Descriptive statistics for the trustworthiness sex control task for 
controls and patients, and a comparison using simple planned comparisons. 
 Controls Patients 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 1 1.8 .3 1.9 .3 .850 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 2 1.8 .3 2.8 .3 .041 C < P 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 3 2.2 .3 3.3 .3 .032 C < P 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 4 2.9 .3 4.0 .3 .021 C < P 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 5 3.6 .2 4.4 .2 .016 C < P 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 6 3.8 .2 5.0 .2 .002 C < P 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 7 4.7 .2 5.4 .2 .032 C < P 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 8 5.5 .2 5.8 .2 .269 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 9 6.0 .2 6.2 .2 .346 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 10 6.2 .2 6.7 .2 .081 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 





Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics for the trustworthiness sex control task for 





hemisphere p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 1 1.6 0.4 2.6 0.5 .173 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 2 2.3 0.3 3.3 0.4 .090 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 3 2.7 0.3 3.9 0.4 .045 L<R 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 4 3.4 0.3 4.5 0.4 .046 L<R 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 5 4.0 0.3 4.7 0.3 .094 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 6 4.6 0.2 5.1 0.2 .155 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 7 5.2 0.2 5.5 0.2 .382 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 8 5.9 0.2 5.7 0.2 .590 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 9 6.3 0.1 6.1 0.2 .369 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 10 6.7 0.1 6.4 0.2 .191 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics for the trustworthiness sex control task for 
patients with medial and dorsolateral lesions, and a comparison using simple 
planned comparisons. 
 Medial Dorsolateral 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 1 2.4 0.4 1.6 0.6 .341 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 2 2.9 0.3 2.5 0.5 .486 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 3 3.4 0.4 2.8 0.5 .460 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 4 4.1 0.3 3.3 0.5 .169 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 5 4.5 0.2 4.0 0.3 .239 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 6 5.0 0.1 4.6 0.2 .222 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 7 5.5 0.2 5.3 0.2 .603 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 8 5.8 0.2 6.0 0.3 .705 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 9 6.2 0.1 6.3 0.2 .955 - 
Trustworthiness/sex: 
Level 10 6.6 0.1 6.5 0.2 .565 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics for the dominance task for controls and 
patients, and a comparison using simple planned comparisons. 
 Controls Patients 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Dominance: Level 1 1.8 .3 4.8 .3 < .001 C < P 
Dominance: Level 2 2.3 .4 3.9 .4 .014 C < P 
Dominance: Level 3 2.3 .5 4.6 .5 .009 C < P 
Dominance: Level 4 3.6 .5 4.1 .5 .483 - 
Dominance: Level 5 4.1 .5 4.3 .5 .772 - 
Dominance: Level 6 4.6 .4 3.6 .4 .137 - 
Dominance: Level 7 5.6 .4 3.3 .4 .002 C >P 
Dominance: Level 8 6.0 .3 3.3 .3 < .001 C >P 
Dominance: Level 9 6.3 .4 3.2 .4 < .001 C >P 
Dominance: Level 10 6.5 .4 3.0 .4 < .001 C >P 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 





Appendix 8: Descriptive statistics for the dominance task for patients with left 





hemisphere p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Dominance: Level 1 4.7 0.4 4.5 0.5 .827 - 
Dominance: Level 2 4.1 0.5 4.2 0.6 .911 - 
Dominance: Level 3 3.8 0.7 4.7 0.8 .395 - 
Dominance: Level 4 3.9 0.6 4.5 0.7 .552 - 
Dominance: Level 5 4.5 0.6 4.0 0.8 .644 - 
Dominance: Level 6 4.1 0.5 4.1 0.6 .987 - 
Dominance: Level 7 3.9 0.5 3.9 0.6 .953 - 
Dominance: Level 8 3.9 0.5 3.2 0.6 .381 - 
Dominance: Level 9 3.6 0.6 3.5 0.7 .920 - 
Dominance: Level 10 3.5 0.6 3.0 0.7 .617 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 







Appendix 9: Descriptive statistics for the dominance task for patients with 
medial and dorsolateral lesions, and a comparison using simple planned 
comparisons. 
 Medial Dorsolateral 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Dominance: Level 1 5.1 0.4 3.8 0.6 .091 - 
Dominance: Level 2 4.3 0.4 4.0 0.6 .675 - 
Dominance: Level 3 4.5 0.6 3.2 0.9 .240 - 
Dominance: Level 4 4.4 0.6 4.0 0.8 .709 - 
Dominance: Level 5 4.0 0.6 4.8 0.9 .476 - 
Dominance: Level 6 3.7 0.5 4.4 0.8 .469 - 
Dominance: Level 7 3.8 0.5 3.6 0.7 .811 - 
Dominance: Level 8 3.4 0.4 3.7 0.6 .650 - 
Dominance: Level 9 3.5 0.5 3.2 0.7 .698 - 
Dominance: Level 10 2.8 0.6 3.9 0.8 .308 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 10: Descriptive statistics for the dominance sex control task for 
controls and patients, and a comparison using simple planned comparisons. 
 Controls Patients 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Dominance/sex: Level 1 1.7 .3 2.1 .3 .483 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 2 2.4 .3 2.5 .3 .735 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 3 3.0 .2 2.8 .2 .679 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 4 3.6 .2 3.6 .2 .916 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 5 3.8 .2 4.2 .2 .262 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 6 4.2 .2 4.6 .2 .328 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 7 4.6 .2 5.2 .2 .135 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 8 5.5 .2 5.4 .2 .880 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 9 6.0 .2 6.0 .2 .997 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 
10 6.4 .2 6.3 .2 .842 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 





Appendix 11: Descriptive statistics for the dominance sex control task for 





hemisphere p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Dominance/sex: Level 1 1.7 0.4 2.7 0.5 .198 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 2 2.5 0.3 3.0 0.4 .407 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 3 2.9 0.3 3.3 0.3 .291 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 4 3.6 0.3 3.8 0.3 .639 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 5 4.4 0.3 4.2 0.4 .628 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 6 4.5 0.2 4.8 0.3 .475 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 7 5.3 0.3 4.9 0.3 .354 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 8 5.7 0.2 5.7 0.2 .955 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 9 6.2 0.1 6.1 0.2 .540 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 
10 6.5 0.2 6.2 0.2 .315 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 12: Descriptive statistics for the dominance sex control task for 
patients with medial and dorsolateral lesions, and a comparison using simple 
planned comparisons. 
 Medial Dorsolateral 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Dominance/sex: Level 1 2.5 0.4 1.8 0.6 .388 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 2 2.6 0.3 3.0 0.5 .568 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 3 3.1 0.3 3.3 0.4 .687 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 4 3.8 0.2 3.7 0.3 .861 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 5 4.2 0.3 4.7 0.4 .320 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 6 4.8 0.2 4.5 0.3 .358 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 7 5.3 0.2 4.8 0.3 .300 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 8 5.8 0.2 5.2 0.2 .060 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 9 6.3 0.1 6.0 0.2 .171 - 
Dominance /sex: Level 
10 6.5 0.2 6.1 0.2 .236 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 







Appendix 13: Descriptive statistics for the Ekman 60 task for controls and 
patients, and a comparison using simple planned comparisons. 
 Controls Patients 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Anger 7.7 .5 7.1 .5 .557 - 
Disgust 8.6 .5 7.8 .5 .382 - 
Fear 7.4 .5 7.4 .5 .948 - 
Happiness 9.9 .0 10.0 .0 .192 - 
Sadness 8.8 .4 8.7 .4 .939 - 
Surprise 9.0 .3 9.8 .3 .070 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 
controls and patients. The direction is given for any significant differences. 
 
Appendix 14: Descriptive statistics for the Ekman 60 task for patients with left 





hemisphere p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Anger 6.2 0.6 7.1 0.7 .409 - 
Disgust 7.7 0.5 7.6 0.6 .894 - 
Fear 6.2 0.6 6.2 0.8 1.000 - 
Happiness 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 - - 
Sadness 8.8 0.3 8.7 0.3 .898 - 
Surprise 9.8 0.2 9.4 0.2 .352 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 






Appendix 15: Descriptive statistics for the Ekman 60 task for patients with 
medial and dorsolateral lesions, and a comparison using simple planned 
comparisons. 
 Medial Dorsolateral 
p Dir. 
M SE M SE 
Anger 6.3 0.6 6.1 0.8 .839 - 
Disgust 7.4 0.5 7.8 0.7 .641 - 
Fear 5.5 0.6 6.5 0.8 .371 - 
Happiness 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 - - 
Sadness 8.6 0.3 8.7 0.4 .861 - 
Surprise 9.6 0.2 9.6 0.3 .989 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the simple planned comparison between 
patients with medial and dorsolateral lesions. The direction is given for any 
significant differences. 
 
Appendix 16: Descriptive statistics for the Emotion in the Eyes and Benton face 
recognition tasks for and comparisons. 
 M SE M SE p Dir. 
 Controls Patients   
Emotion in the eyes 26.2 1.5 21.3 1.5 .063 - 




hemisphere   
Emotion in the eyes 18.9 2.0 23.1 2.3 .212 - 
Benton face recognition 50.2 1.0 49.6 1.2 .731 - 
 Medial Dorsolateral   
Emotion in the eyes 20.6 1.9 17.2 2.8 .356 - 
Benton face recognition 50.1 0.9 49.7 1.3 .834 - 
Note: Means are Estimated Marginal Means, corrected for the three HADS-SIS 
confound variables. The p value is for the univariate ANCOVA comparing the 
two groups. The direction is given for any significant differences. 
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 Fax:020 797 22592 
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Dear Dr Vladeanu  
 
Study title: Social cognition and emotional processing in patients 
with focal frontal lobe damage 
REC reference: 14/LO/0559 
Protocol number: 001 
IRAS project ID: 141727 
 
Thank you for your letter of 04 June 2014, responding to the Committee’s request for further 
information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
 
The further information was considered in correspondence by a Sub-Committee of the REC. A 
list of the Sub-Committee members is attached.   
 
We plan to publish your research summary wording for the above study on the HRA website, 
together with your contact details. Publication will be no earlier than three months from the 
date of this opinion letter.  Should you wish to provide a substitute contact point, require 
further information, or wish to make a request to postpone publication, please contact the 
REC Manager, Mr Atul Patel, nrescommittee.london-surreyborders@nhs.net. 
 
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the above 
research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting documentation 
as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
 
 
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
 




You should notify the REC in writing once all conditions have been met (except for site 
approvals from host organisations) and provide copies of any revised documentation 
with updated version numbers. The REC will acknowledge receipt and provide a final list 
of the approved documentation for the study, which can be made available to host 
organisations to facilitate their permission for the study. Failure to provide the final 
versions to the REC may cause delay in obtaining permissions. 
 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to the 
start of the study at the site concerned. 
 
Management permission ("R&D approval") should be sought from all NHS organisations 
involved in the study in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements. 
 
Guidance on applying for NHS permission for research is available in the Integrated Research 
Application System or at http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk.   
 
Where a NHS organisation’s role in the study is limited to identifying and referring potential 
participants to research sites ("participant identification centre"), guidance should be sought 
from the R&D office on the information it requires to give permission for this activity. 
 
For non-NHS sites, site management permission should be obtained in accordance with the 
procedures of the relevant host organisation.  
 
Sponsors are not required to notify the Committee of approvals from host organisations 
 
Registration of Clinical Trials 
 
All clinical trials (defined as the first four categories on the IRAS filter page) must be registered 
on a publically accessible database within 6 weeks of recruitment of the first participant (for 
medical device studies, within the timeline determined by the current registration and publication 
trees).   
 
There is no requirement to separately notify the REC but you should do so at the earliest 
opportunity e.g when submitting an amendment.  We will audit the registration details as part of 
the annual progress reporting process. 
 
To ensure transparency in research, we strongly recommend that all research is registered but 
for non clinical trials this is not currently mandatory. 
 
If a sponsor wishes to contest the need for registration they should contact Catherine Blewett 
(catherineblewett@nhs.net), the HRA does not, however, expect exceptions to be made. 
Guidance on where to register is provided within IRAS.  
 
It is the responsibility of the sponsor to ensure that all the conditions are complied with 
before the start of the study or its initiation at a particular site (as applicable). 
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The favourable opinion applies to all NHS sites taking part in the study, subject to management 
permission being obtained from the NHS/HSC R&D office prior to the start of the study (see 






The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
Document   Version   Date   
Covering letter on headed paper    28 April 2014  
Letters of invitation to participant  1  24 April 2014  
Other [CV Lidia Hervas]      
Other [CV Reniner Spregelmayer]      
Other [Template Letter Confirming Assessment]  001  19 November 2013  
Participant consent form [Healthy Volunteer]  2  24 April 2014  
Participant consent form [Patient]  2  24 April 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Patient]  3  02 June 2014  
Participant information sheet (PIS) [Healthy Volunteer ]  3  02 June 2014  
REC Application Form      
Research protocol or project proposal  001  16 December 2013  
Response to Request for Further Information      
Response to Request for Further Information    03 June 2014  
Summary CV for Chief Investigator (CI)  Matel 
Vladeanu  
  
Validated questionnaire [HADS SIS ]      
Validated questionnaire [DEX]      
 
Statement of compliance 
 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for Research 
Ethics Committees in the UK. 
 




The attached document “After ethical review – guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
 
 Notifying substantial amendments 
 Adding new sites and investigators 
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 Notification of serious breaches of the protocol 
 Progress and safety reports 
 Notifying the end of the study 
 
The HRA website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of 




You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make your views known 
please use the feedback form available on the HRA website: 
http://www.hra.nhs.uk/about-the-hra/governance/quality-assurance/   
 
We are pleased to welcome researchers and R & D staff at our NRES committee members’ 
training days – see details at http://www.hra.nhs.uk/hra-training/  
 
14/LO/0559                          Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 











Enclosures: List of names and professions of members who were present at the 
meeting and those who submitted written comments 
  
   “After ethical review – guidance for  researchers”  
 
Copy to:  Dr. Zoe Harris, Research Office, 




NRES Committee London - Surrey Borders 
 
Attendance at Sub-Committee of the REC meeting on 11 June 2014 
 
  
Committee Members:  
 
Name   Profession   Present    Notes   
Sir Adrian Baillie  Financial Investment 
Advisor  
Yes     
Mr Dominic Fairclough  Solicitor  Yes     
  
Also in attendance:  
 
Name   Position (or reason for attending)   
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King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust 
Joint Neuro-Oncology Clinic 
Suite 5, Golden Jubilee Wing,  









We are writing to inform you of a research study you could potentially be involved in, if you 
wish to do so. We are contacting you because you had surgery done at the Joint Neuro-
Oncology Clinic at King’s College Hospital. Everyone who has received treatment from this 
service within the last six months and consented to be on the research register, is being 
asked if they would like to take part. 
 
What is this research about? 
 
We are interested in finding out whether people experience any difficulties after brain 
surgery, particularly with the way they form impressions of other people. In our day-to-day 
life, when we meet new people we form impressions of them very quickly, usually based 
on their appearance and the emotion they show on their faces. We may approach 
someone and start to chat if they appear relaxed and smiling, or we  leave them alone if 
they appear tense or angry. Psychological studies suggested that the frontal part of the 
brain (also known as the Frontal Lobes) play a major role in making these social 
judgments. After having surgery on this part of the brain, some people may find it more 
difficult to form accurate impressions of people they come in contact with. Consequently, 
they may find meeting new people or taking part in social situations (such as a party) more 
stressful.  
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We would like to develop new ways of helping people who experience these difficulties.  
Therefore, we would like to ask for your help. We would like to understand: 
• How well you can interpret simple facial expressions by looking at pictures of faces 
• Whether you consider some people more approachable or trustworthy than others 
(by just looking at their face). 
 
Even if you do not think your abilities are different in any way, we would still like to invite 
you to take part in this research. The answers are provided for you, you only have to 
chose the one that seems the most accurate. It is important to note that there are no right 
or wrong answers! 
 
We would also ask you to complete a series of short tasks that measure thinking 
processes such as concentration, memory, planning and problem solving. This research 
will take part at King's College London (address and map will be provided to you in future 
correspondence if you're interested in taking part). We will be able to contribute £10 to 
your travel expenses (payable in cash when you attend). 
 
Who is organizing this research? 
The research is led by Dr. Matei Vladeanu. He is a Clinical Psychologist in Training at the 
Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London. Dr. Vladeanu is supervised by:  
• Dr Lidia Yágüez (Lecturer in Clinical Psychology; Academic Director of the 
D.Clin.Psy Training Programme at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College 
London; and Honorary Clinical Psychologist/Neuropsychologist at King’s College 
Hospital NHS Foundation Trust). 
• Dr Keyoumars Ashkan, Consultant Neurosurgeon and Reader in Neurosurgery, 
King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust. 
 
Where can I find more information about this study? 
We have enclosed a detailed information sheet. You can also contact directly Dr. Matei 
Vladeanu who is leading this research:  
Telephone: 07872 160 262 
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Address: 3rd Floor, 4 Winsor Walk, Denmark Hill, SE5 8AF 
 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Taking part in this research is your choice. You do not need to take part if you do not 
want to. 
 
If you are interested in participating, please let us know by contacting a member of the 
clinical care team by phone 020 3299 4151 or email: kch-tr.neuro-oncology@nhs.net. 
You can also contact Dr. Vladeanu (lead researcher) directly at telephone: 07872 160 262, 
or email: matei.vladeanu@kcl.ac.uk or by letter (postal address: 3rd Floor, 4 Winsor Walk, 






Dr Keyoumars Ashkan,  
Consultant Neurosurgeon and Reader in Neurosurgery 
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1. What is the purpose of this research? 
 
People can form impressions of other people very quickly, usually based on their 
appearance and the emotion they show on 
their faces. For example if someone 
appears relaxed and is smiling, it is 
probably okay to approach and start a 
conversation. On the other hand, if 
someone is frowning and appears tense or 
angry, it may not be the best time to 
approach him/her and try to make conversation.  Psychological studies suggested 
that the frontal part of the brain (also known as the 
Frontal Lobes) plays a major role in making these social 
judgments. The Frontal Lobes (shown in purple in the 
picture on the right) are one of the four main lobes or 
regions of the brain. They are positioned at the front 
region of the brain and are involved in lots of essential 
functions such as: movement, decision-making, problem 
solving, and planning. Very importantly for this study, the 
Frontal Lobes are involved in the ability to recognize future consequences resulting 
from current actions, to choose between good and bad actions (or better and best), 
interpret subtle emotions (such as guilt or admiration) and suppress socially 
Frontal Lobe of the brain 
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unacceptable responses (such as laughing at someone who is showing saddnes 
and is tearful). 
 
After having surgery on this part of the brain (the Frontal Lobe), some people may 
find it more difficult to form accurate impressions of people they 
come in contact with. Consequently, they may find meeting new 
people or taking part in social situations (such as a party) more 
stressful. We would like to develop new ways of helping people 
through this stressful time. To begin with, we need to find out 
what might have changed when you are trying to form an impression of someone 
else. For example, we are interested to find out how accurately you can interpret 
simple facial expressions (such as happiness, anger, sadness) or more complex 
ones (such as guilt, admiration or thoughtfulness). Also, we are interested to see 
whether you consider some people more approachable or trustworthy than others. 
 
2. Why have you asked me to take part? 
 
We have asked you to take part because you had surgery done at the Joint Neuro-
Oncology Clinic at King’s College Hospital. Everyone who has received treatment 
from this service within the last six months and consented to be on the research 
register, is being asked if they would like to take part. 
 
3. What will I be asked to do?    
 
We will ask you to complete a series of short tasks that measure 
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We will also ask you to look at some pictures of people you 
have never met before and make some judgements such 
as: 
• How approachable do they seem to you? 
• How trustworthy do they seem to you? 
• What emotion do you think they are expressing? 
 
Possible answers are provided for you, you only have to choose the one that 
seems the most accurate. It is important to note that there are no right or wrong 
answers! The pictures will be presented on a computer screen, so it is important to 
have your glasses with you (if you normally wear glasses). 
 
Before we ask you to complete the tasks and answer these questions, you will 
need to sign a consent form to say that you would like to take part. 
 
4. How long will this research take? 
 
It will take maximum 2 hours to complete all the tasks and answer all the 
questionnaires. You do not have to answer them all at one time. You can take as 
many breaks as you need. 
 
5. Do I have to take part?    
 
No. Taking part in this research is your choice. You do not need to take part if you 
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6. Where do I need to go? 
 
We would like to invite you to attend an appointment at King’s College London. If 
you are unable to attend this appointment we can make alternative arrangements 
to visit you at home. We will be able pay you £10 for taking part in this research. 
 
If you're unable to travel to King's College, the lead researcher (Dr. Matei 
Vladeanu) can visit you at home. He will bring with him all materials necessary for 
the study - you do not have to provide anything. This visit will be arranged with you 
in advance, at a date and time that is convenient for you. Dr Vladeanu will be 
conducting this visit in accordance to the Trust's Lone Working and Research 
Policies. 
 
7. What will you do with my answers?  
 
You will be given a code, so that your answers to questions are anonymous. They 
will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a secure office at King’s College, London. 
Only the researchers involved in this study will know your name and be able to 
identify you.  
 
If you are interested, we can send you a summary of what we find. The findings will 
also be written up as part of a doctoral thesis and described in a scientific paper. 
Your name or any personal information will not be shown in any reports.  
 
We will keep all questionnaires for 10 years. Then they will be destroyed securely 
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8. Are there any benefits for me? 
 
This research may not help you directly. The aim of our research is to understand 
how well people form impressions of others and how accurately they can interpret 
emotions shown on people’s faces after they have had surgery on the front part of 
the brain. By taking part in this research you will be helping us to achieve this. 
 
9. Will there be any risks involved? 
 
We do not think that you will be exposed to any risks if you take part in this study. 
You do not have to answer questions that you feel uncomfortable answering. You 
can leave any individual questions blank that you feel unable to answer for any 
reason.  
Your GP will be informed that you are taking part in this study. If you have reported 
currently feeling distressed, with your permission, we will send a letter to your 
GP informing your doctor about your experience of distress in our study. 
Your GP will decide what the best treatment for how you are feeling is. We 
will encourage you to talk to your GP if you are concerned with how you are 
feeling. 
 
10. What if I change my mind about taking part? 
 
You can change your mind and stop taking part in the study at any time, without 
explaining why. If you stop taking part we will destroy any documents with your 
name or address on them. We will keep all questionnaires already completed 
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11. What if there is a problem? 
 
If you experience a problem or have any worries about the study you can contact 
Dr. Matei Vladeanu on 07872 160262. We will do our best to help you or answer 
any questions.  
 
If you want general advice about taking part in research or you would like to 
complain formally through the NHS you can contact the Patient Advice and Liaison 
Service at King’s College Hospital at Denmark Hill, London, SE5 9RS or by 
telephone on 020 3299 3601 or e-mail at kch-tr.PALS@nhs.net. 
 
If during the research something goes wrong that hurts you and this is due to 
someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action for 
compensation against King’s College London, but you may have to pay your legal 
costs. However, we think it is unlikely that anything will go wrong in this way. 
 
12. Who is funding this research? 
 
This research is funded by: 
• The Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London 
 
13. Who is organising this research? 
 
The research is led by Matei Vladeanu. He is a doctoral student at the Institute of 
Psychiatry, King’s College London. Matei is supervised by:  
• Dr. Lidia Yágüez (Lecturer in Clinical Psychology; Academic Director of the 
D.Clin.Psy Training Programme at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College 
London; and Honorary Clinical Psychologist/Neuropsychologist at King’s 
College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust). 
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• Dr. Keyoumars Ashkan, Consultant Neurosurgeon and Reader in 
Neurosurgery, King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust.  
 
14. Who has reviewed the research? 
 
This research has been examined by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee. This group protects your safety, your rights, well-
being and dignity. 
 
15. Would you like to take part in this research? 
 
If you would like to take part in this research study or have any further questions 
please contact Matei Vladeanu: 
 
3rd Floor, Addiction Sciences Building 
4 Windsor Walk 
Denmark Hill, SE5 8AF 
Tel: 07821 740 833 
matei.vladeanu@kcl.ac.uk 
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Patient Identification Number for this trial: 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Social Cognition and Facial Emotions 
Name of Researcher: Dr Matei Vladeanu 
Please initial all 
boxes  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 01.11.2013 
(version 002) for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason, without my medical care or legal 
rights being affected. 
2. I understand that relevant sections of my medical notes and data collected during 
the study may be looked at by a member of the research team (Dr Matei 
Vladeanu) or from the NHS Trust, where it is relevant to my taking part in this 
research. I give permission for these individuals to have access to my records. 
3. I agree to my GP being informed of my participation in the study if I report feeling 
emotionally distressed or if I score within the clinical range on a measure of 
emotional distress completed as part of this research.    
4. If I lose capacity to give consent during the study, I agree that the data already 
collected with consent can still be used for this research. No further data will be 
collected or any research procedures carried out. 
5. I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
                                
Dr Matei Vladeanu          
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1. What is the purpose of this research? 
 
People can form impressions of other people very quickly, usually based on their 
appearance and the emotion they show on 
their faces. For example, if someone 
appears relaxed and is smiling, it is 
probably okay to approach and start a 
conversation. On the other hand, if 
someone is frowning and appears tense or 
angry, it may not be the best time to 
approach him/her and try to make conversation.  Psychological studies have 
shown that the frontal part of the brain (also known as the Frontal Lobes) plays a 
major role in making these social judgments. The Frontal 
Lobes (shown in purple in the picture on the right) are one of 
the four main lobes or regions of the brain. They are 
positioned at the very front region of the brain and are involved 
in lots of essential functions such as: movement, decision-
making, problem solving, and planning. Very importantly for this study, the Frontal 
Lobes are involved in the ability to recognize future consequences resulting from 
current actions, to choose between good and bad actions (or better and best), 
interpret subtle emotions (such as guilt or admiration) and suppress socially 
unacceptable responses (such as laughing at someone who is showing saddness 
and is tearful). 
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Some people find it very easy to form accurate impressions of people they come in 
contact with, whereas others find it more difficult. Some people 
find it difficult to form accurate impressions after brain surgery 
in the frontal part of the brain. We would like to understand the 
consequences of this type of surgery on the ability to form 
accurate impressions of others and develop new ways of 
helping people who had this type of surgery. However, we need to find out how 
healthy volunteers (people who did not have surgery to the frontal part of the 
brain), such as yourself, are able to from impressions of someone else. We are 
also interested to find out how accurately you can interpret simple facial 
expressions (such as happiness, anger, sadness) or more complex ones (such as 
guilt, admiration or thoughtfulness). Also, we are interested to see whether you 
consider some people more approachable or trustworthy than others. 
 
2. Why have you asked me to take part? 
 
We have asked you to take part in this study because you volunteered to take part 
in research at King's College London and made your contact details available 
through "Mindsearch" and/or other public database. You do not need to take part if 
you don't want to. 
 
3. What will I be asked to do?    
 
We will ask you to complete a series of short tasks that measure 
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We will also ask you to look at some pictures of people you 
have never met before and make some judgements such 
as: 
• How approachable do they seem to you? 
• How trustworthy do they seem to you? 
• What emotion do you think they are expressing? 
 
Possible answers are provided for you, you only have to choose the one that 
seems the most accurate. It is important to note that there are no right or wrong 
answers! The pictures will be presented on a computer screen, so it is important to 
have your glasses with you (if you normally wear glasses). 
 
Before we ask you to complete the tasks and answer these questions, you will 
need to sign a consent form to say that you would like to take part. 
 
4. How long will this research take? 
 
It will take a maximum of 2 hours to complete all the tasks and answer all the 
questionnaires. You do not have to answer them all at one time. You can take as 
many breaks as you need. 
 
5. Do I have to take part?    
 
No. Taking part in this research is your choice. You do not need to take part if you 
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6. Where do I need to go? 
 
We would like to invite you to attend an appointment at King’s College London. We 
will be able pay you £10 for taking part in this research. 
 
7. What will you do with my answers?  
 
You will be given a code, so that your answers to questions are anonymous. They 
will be kept in a locked filing cabinet in a secure office at King’s College, London. 
Only the researchers involved in this study will know your name and be able to 
identify you.  
 
If you are interested, we can send you a summary of what we find. The findings will 
also be written up as part of a doctoral thesis and described in a scientific paper. 
Your name or any personal information will not be shown in any reports.  
 
We will keep all questionnaires for 10 years. Then they will be destroyed securely 
by shredding any paper records and permanently deleting information held on 
computer.  
 
8. Are there any benefits for me? 
 
This research may not help you directly. The aim of our research is to understand 
how well people form impressions of others and how accurately they can interpret 
emotions shown on people’s faces after they have had surgery on the front part of 
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9. Will there be any risks involved? 
 
We do not think that you will be exposed to any risks if you take part in this study. 
You do not have to answer questions that you feel uncomfortable answering. You 
can leave any individual questions blank that you feel unable to answer for any 
reason. We will encourage you to talk to your GP if you are concerned with how 
you are feeling. 
 
10 .What if I change my mind about taking part? 
 
You can change your mind and stop taking part in the study at any time, without 
explaining why. If you stop taking part we will destroy any documents with your 
name or address on them. We will keep all questionnaires already completed 
without your name or address on them.  
 
11. What if there is a problem? 
 
If you experience a problem or have any worries about the study you can contact 
Dr. Matei Vladeanu on 07872 160262. We will do our best to help you or answer 
any questions.  
 
If during the research something goes wrong that hurts you and this is due to 
someone’s negligence, then you may have grounds for a legal action for 
compensation against King’s College London, but you may have to pay your legal 
costs. However, we think it is unlikely that anything will go wrong in this way. 
 
12. Who is funding this research? 
 
This research is funded by: 
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• The Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College London 
 
13. Who is organising this research? 
 
The research is led by Dr. Matei Vladeanu. He is a doctoral student at the Institute 
of Psychiatry, King’s College London. Matei is supervised by:  
• Dr. Lidia Yágüez (Lecturer in Clinical Psychology; Academic Director of the 
D.Clin.Psy Training Programme at the Institute of Psychiatry, King’s College 
London; and Honorary Clinical Psychologist/Neuropsychologist at King’s 
College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust). 
• Dr. Keyoumars Ashkan, Consultant Neurosurgeon and Reader in 
Neurosurgery, King's College Hospital NHS Foundation Trust.  
 
14. Who has reviewed the research? 
 
This research has been examined by an independent group of people called a 
Research Ethics Committee. This group protects your safety, your rights, well-
being and dignity. 
 
15. Would you like to take part in this research? 
 
If you would like to take part in this research study or have any further questions 
please contact Dr. Matei Vladeanu: 
 
3rd Floor, Addiction Sciences Building 
4 Windsor Walk 
Denmark Hill, SE5 8AF 
Tel: 07821 740 833 
matei.vladeanu@kcl.ac.uk 
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Healthy Volunteer Identification Number for this trial: 
CONSENT FORM 
Title of Project: Social Cognition and Facial Emotions 
Name of Researcher: Dr Matei Vladeanu 
Please initial all 
boxes  
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated 24.04.2014 
(version 002) for the above study.  I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered satisfactorily. 
   
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at 




3. I agree to take part in the above study.    
 
 
            
Name of Participant   Date    Signature 
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Several governmental reports have described significant disparities in access to 
and experiences of mental health care and treatment outcomes between ethnic 
minority groups and the majority white community in the UK. (Inside Outside, 
Government Report 2003; Commission for Healthcare Audit and Inspection, 
2005). The Equality Act (2010) requires public services to take an active role in 
eliminating unlawful discrimination and promote equality of opportunity between 
different groups. This service project evaluated access to and drop-outs from 
psychological therapies across different ethnic groups for the Social inclusion, 
Hope and Recovery Project (SHARP) team, in the psychosis CAG within 
Lambeth (South London and Maudsley NHS Trust).   
Quantitative data were collected from referrals to SHARP between January 
2012 and July 2013 regarding clients who were offered psychological therapy 
but declined the offer and disengaged with the service, clients declined 
psychological therapy but accepted and engaged in other (non-psychological) 
therapies, clients who accepted the offer and then engaged in therapy and 
finally clients who accepted the offer of psychology, but later dropped out of 
therapy. Qualitative data was gathered by means of brief telephone interviews 
from clients from a range of ethnic backgrounds who were referred for 
psychology. A total of 21 clients were contacted and invited to take part in the 
brief feedback interview; 13 of these were clients who had dropped out of 
therapy, five of which declined the interview; eight were clients who has 
engaged with psychology and all agreed to take part in the interview.  The data 
presented is from eight clients who dropped out of therapy and eight clients who 
engaged with therapy.  
 
Results suggest that good insight into the referral generally facilitated 
engagement in all ethnic groups. On the other hand, unexpected events in the 
clients' lives, such as bereavement and separation were found to be among the 
reasons for abandoning therapy mainly in clients from a Black ethnic 
background. It also emerged that clients who expressed doubts about their 
cognitive abilities (which they perceived as inadequate for psychological 





2. 1. Prevalence of Psychosis in BME and Ethnic Minority Populations 
Many studies have reported comparatively higher rates of psychosis in BME in 
the UK, ranging from two to twelve times higher than for the White British 
population (e.g. Morgan, Dazzan and Morgan, 2006; Keating, 2007; 
Kirkbridge,Barker, Cowden, Stamps, Yang, Jones and Coid, 2008, Fung, 
Bhugra & Jones, 2009). It is now generally agreed that socioeconomic factors 
play a crucial role in the onset and subsequent relapses of psychotic disorder 
(Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005, Cantor-Graae, 2007, Kirkbridge et al., 2008, 
Pedersen & Cantor-Graae, 2012, Cantor-Graae &, Pedersen 2013).  Further, 
meta-analytic reviews of the literature have suggested that a history of migration 
is an important risk factor for psychosis.  For example, Cantor-Graae and 
colleagues (Cantor-Graae & Selten, 2005; Cantor-Graae, 2007) found that first 
generation black migrants who moved to counties with white majority 
populations (such as countries in Western Europe), have on average twice the 
risk of developing psychosis in comparison to the indigenous White population. 
Surprisingly, they found that the risk increases for second generation BME 
migrants, suggesting that, perhaps a complex interaction between biological, 
socioeconomic, and cultural factors may be at play. For example, it has been 
suggested that migrants from a BME background who are exposed to a 
crowded and unfamiliar urban environment, in a different culture based on high 
levels of social competition, may have experienced high levels of social 
isolation, economic deprivation and social defeat (Cantor-Graae, 2007). 
 
Discrimination also plays an important role to the migrant’s experience of social 
defeat, and may exacerbate social isolation, especially for second generation 
migrants (i.e. British born people from a BME background) who may feel even 
more humiliated by this "outsider" status (Selten and Cantor-Graae, 2005). 
Long term exposure to social defeat may cause biological changes to the 
dopamine system in the brain, thus explaining the interaction between the social 
and biological factors that contribute to the aetiology of psychotic disorder 
(Selten and Cantor-Graae, 2005; Selten, van der Ven, Rutten & Cantor-Graae, 
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2013). It is also important to mention that although rates of psychosis seem to 
be considerably higher for people from African and Caribbean communities 
living in the UK than for the White British population, rates in the Caribbean and 
Africa are comparable to the overall rate in England (Morgan et al., 2006). This 
seems to add further support to the idea that socioeconomic and environmental 
factors are at least as important as the genetic and biological factors with regard 
to the risk of developing psychotic disorder. 
 
It has been suggested that strong identification with a BME group subjected to 
discrimination and social disadvantage may increase the risk for developing 
psychosis (Reininghaus et. al., 2010). Even though the authors argue that the 
increase in risk is mainly because of the perceptions of disadvantage and not 
because of ethnic identity, it remains unclear whether cultural differences 
between BME and White British cultures also play a part in the formation of 
these perceptions. In this context of perceived disadvantage and discrimination, 
it may be very difficult to accept help from a predominantly white health service, 
with specific Western based treatments and outcome measures. 
 
Similarly to the rest of the UK, South London also shows disproportionately high 
rates of psychosis for service users belonging to the African and Caribbean 
communities in comparison to those from a White background (Castle, 
Wessely, Van Os, & Murray, 1998). According to the 2011 Census, Lambeth is 
one of the most densely populated (over 304000 people) and ethnically diverse 
boroughs in London (25.9% BME African and Caribbean; 4.1% White and BME 
mixed background; 39% White British, etc). Earlier surveys have found 
significantly higher rates of unemployment, crime rate and psychosis incidence 
than the national average (Garety and Rigg, 2011).  
 
2. 2. Access to psychological treatment for service users from a BME 
background 
The National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) recommends 
that psychological interventions (Cognitive Behavioural Therapy for psychosis 
(CBTp)) should be offered to all patients as it has been shown to be effective in 
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reducing hospitalisation and distress associated with the positive symptoms of 
psychosis (NICE, 2009). 
 
Efforts have been made to increase access to generic psychological treatment 
nationally (e.g. Improving Access to Psychological Therapies - IAPT). However, 
studies have consistently suggested that service users from a BME background 
(especially black males of African and Caribbean origin) are more likely to 
refuse psychological intervention or drop out before the end of the treatment 
(e.g. Morgan, 2009, Sainsbury Centre for Mental Health, 1998). A previous 
clinical audit conducted in the Psychosis CAG (South London and Maudsley 
NHS Trust) across the borough of Croydon, reported that 14% fewer BME 
clients completed a full course of psychological therapy (CBT for psychosis), in 
comparison to White clients (McGourty, 2011). This audit also reported that 
factors including level of deprivation and language preference were also 
important to consider as predictors of therapy take up, but did not find 
significant effects of age and gender. However, since an interaction between 
gender and ethnicity has been previously reported in the literature, with males 
from BME backgrounds displaying slightly higher risk of developing psychosis 
than females (e.g., Kirkbridge et al., 2008, Morgan, 2009) this audit aimed to 
investigate the effect of gender as well as ethnicity on engagement with 
Psychology services. 
 
The present audit aims to build on this previous work, within one local NHS 
service within the Psychosis CAG; the SHARP team. 
 
SHARP is a multidisciplinary tertiary service, offering multiple recovery-focused 
treatment pathways.  These include:  
• Occupational therapy(OT): 
o ‘Social inclusion therapy’: Around 20 individual sessions with an 
occupational therapist, aiming to promote social inclusion and 
engagement with the local community. 
o ‘Healthy living group’: A 16 week group programme aiming to 
educate clients on aspects of healthy living and to teach practical 




• Physical Therapy (PT): 
o Gym: weekly 1 hour group, not time-limited. 
o Aqua aerobics: weekly 1 hour group, not time-limited. 
o Football: weekly 1 hour group, not time=limited. 
• Psychological  Therapies (PSY): 
o CBT for psychosis: Following NICE-recommended guidelines of 
16-20 weekly sessions, where possible. 
o Family Interventions: Following NICE-recommended guidelines of 
meetings for at least 6 months, where possible. 
o Hearing Voices Group: Comprises 6 weekly group sessions. 
 
Additionally, at the time of this audit SHARP offered several pilot pathways such 
as Mindfulness and Acceptance and Commitment Therapy for Recovery (ACT). 
 
2. 3. Service evaluation objectives 
 
The present audit aims to evaluate and explore:  
a) The breakdown of ethnic backgrounds and gender of all referrals to the 
SHARP team, with an emphasis on referrals to psychology. 
b) The number of and distribution of engagement, non-engagement and 
drop out from psychology, based primarily on ethnicity, and also on 
gender. 
c) The possible reasons for non-engagement, drop-out, and engagement 




Audit approval for the project was granted from the Clinical Governance team 
within the Psychosis CAG (Appendix 1). 
 
Data were collected from referrals to SHARP between January 2012 and July 
2013. The SHARP team accepts referrals from both MAP and Psychosis 
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Clinical Academic Groups.  For the purpose of this audit, only those clients from 
the psychosis CAG were included.  
 
3. 1. Part One: Data on Referrals to the SHARP team 
Referral data was collected from the team's database, including total number of 
referrals, ethnic backgrounds, gender and the type of therapy they were 
referred to. The data were collapsed into three main categories (White 
Background: comprising White British, Irish and other White background; Black 
Background: comprising Black African, Black Caribbean, Other Black 
Background and Mixed Black-Other background, and Other Background: 
comprising all other recorded backgrounds, such as Asian and mixed Asian 
background etc.). The same procedure (e.g. collapsing data as described 
above) was applied to the Census data (2011).  
 
 
3. 2. Part Two: Data on Psychological Therapy 
Data was gathered from team notes and team members regarding clients who:  
i) were offered psychological therapy but declined the offer and disengaged with 
the service  
ii) declined psychological therapy but accepted and engaged in other (non-
psychological) therapies, such as physical or occupational therapies 
iii) were referred for psychology, accepted the offer and then engaged in 
therapy  
iv) those who accepted the offer of psychology, but later dropped out of therapy.  
 
Cases were classed as “engaged in therapy” or “completed therapy” based on 
the reports of their respective therapists. Cases were counted as “dropped out” 
if clients did not attend at least three consecutive sessions, or if they let the 
therapist know they do not wish to continue. The drop out cases were then 
further examined in terms of whether they a) either completely disengaged with 
the service (e.g. not engaged with any of the other therapies offered by SHARP) 
or b) engaged in other (non psychological) interventions (physical therapy or 




Information was collected from six Clinical Psychologists and one CBT therapist 
providing individual or group therapy (Hearing Voices Group) for psychosis as 
well as from the Occupational Therapists and Physical Therapists at SHARP in 
Lambeth. Six staff were from a white ethnic background (three male; three 
female) and one member of staff (female) was from a mixed White/Black British 
background.  The data collected from them will be presented according to the 
total numbers of referrals, and by ethnicity and gender. 
 
3. 3. Part Three: Qualitative Data 
Qualitative data was gathered by means of brief telephone interviews. We 
aimed to gather information from clients from a range of ethnic backgrounds 
(e.g. BME and white) who were referred for psychology.  This included clients 
who subsequently dropped out of psychological therapy (both those who have 
remained engaged with another intervention at SHARP, as well as those who 
completely disengaged from the team) and a smaller number of clients who 
engaged with psychology for comparison. A total of 21 clients were contacted 
and invited to take part in the brief feedback interview; 13 of these were clients 
who had dropped out of therapy, five of which declined the interview; eight were 
clients who has engaged with psychology and all agreed to take part in the 
interview.  The data presented is from eight clients who dropped out of therapy 
and eight clients who engaged with therapy. The answers to the questions were 
written down verbatim. Then the data was explored for themes on all 
participants, as well more specifically according to the participants’ different 
ethnic backgrounds and gender. Summaries of the main themes are presented 
in the results section. 
 
3. 3. 1. Interview Schedule: 
The interview schedule was developed in conjunction with the team. The main 
themes were loosely based on areas of interest, given previous literature in this 
area and the findings from the previous audit.  The interview focused on several 
key areas (please refer to Appendix II for the complete interview script), which 




Theme Example Question Hypothesis 
Referral 
understanding 
Why do you think you were referred? Low insight into their 





How did you find the initial sessions? 
Did you have any concerns? 
Were there any other things going on in 
your life at the time? 
Was it anything to do with the service? 
Did you have previous experience with 
psychology? 
Did the sessions seem to fit with your 
cultural or spiritual needs? 
Did you feel your background and 
culture were adequately attended to? 
Did you feel your spiritual needs were 
taken seriously? 
Do you think something else would have 
been better suited for your needs? 
If clients had specific 
concerns about therapy (e.g. 
effectiveness) which were not 
addressed in the initial 
session it may have affected 
subsequent engagement. 
If sessions did not fit with the 
client's cultural and spiritual 
needs they would be more 
likely to drop out. 
Social support 
network and its 
influence on 
engagement 
What do your friends or relatives think 
about someone seeing a psychologist? 
Where would you usually go for help? 
Social stigma around being 
engaged with mental health 
services may have hindered 
engagement. 
Table 1: Key areas within the interview schedule. 
 
First, the clients were asked about their understanding of their referral to 
psychology. It was hypothesised that the client's motivation to engage may 
have been linked in some way to their insight into their condition as well as their 
understanding of our services. 
 
Then the clients were asked whether they were able to attend any sessions. 
The clients who attended at least one session were asked about their 
impression of the initial sessions. All clients (whether they attended any session 
or not) were asked about the reasons that made it hard to attend. Given that the 
previous literature has suggested a multitude of reasons why service users from 
a BME background’ may not attend, such as perceptions of disadvantage and 
inferiority (Reininghaus et al. 2010), cognitive difficulties (Garety et al, 2001; 
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Kirkbride et al, 2008) or perceived cultural and spiritual differences (e.g. Rathod 
et al, 2010, 2013), and some of the interview questions were aimed at these 
themes. However more open questions were also included, such as "Were 
there any other things going on in your life at the time?" or "Did you have any 
concerns?", which were intended to give the clients space to express themes 
we did not anticipate. 
 
Finally, there were also questions targeted at the clients' wider support group 
(such as family or friends) and their understanding of psychology and 
psychotherapy. There is ample evidence in the literature suggesting that 
Service users from a BME background (especially from migrant backgrounds) 
are exposed to discrimination and social isolation (e.g. Selten and Cantor-
Graae, 2005; Cantor-Graae, 2007, Selten, et al., 2013). Therefore the purpose 
of those questions was not only to get an idea about the client's social support 
network, but also to find out whether peer pressure or stigma associated with 
attendance to mental health services may be reinforced or attenuated by this 
social network. 
 
3. 4. Ethical considerations 
 
In line with the audit approval granted for this project and under the Data 
Protection Act all data files (Microsoft Excel or any other format) were password 
protected and sent via email on the SLaM Email system. No information was 
transferred outside of this system. The final database produced as part of this 
audit did not contain names or any other personal identifier information, only 







4. 1. Part One: Data on Referrals to the SHARP team 
A total of 272 (144 females, 128 males) referrals were recorded between 
01/01/12 and 01/07/2013. Figure 1 shows the distribution of referrals within 






Total Referrals at SHARP - all 
interventions 
N=272 
Referred for Psychology 
(CBT, HVG, FT)  
N=60 





Engaged initially but 
then dropped Out 
N=16 (31%OPT) 




psychology, but engaged 





Engaged in OT 
N=4 (7%PR) 
Engaged in PT 
N=2 (3%PR) 
Unable to contact  
N=3 (5%PR) 
Figure 1: Referrals to SHARP over 18 months: from 01/01/2012 to 01/07/2013. 
OPT Represents percentage of clients who were offered psychological therapy 
PR   Represents percentage of clients out of total psychology referrals 
 
    
     
 
       
       
       





Total SHARP Referrals by Ethnicity: When comparing the referral rates by 
ethnicity with the overall Lambeth demographic data (taken from the 2011 
census) the pattern of referral seems to indicate that comparatively higher 
numbers of service users from a BME background were referred to SHARP 
than clients belonging to the White or other ethnicities (see Figure 2). This is 
consistent with previous prevalence studies which reported higher rates of 
psychosis in clients from BME backgrounds in comparison with clients from 
White and other ethnic backgrounds (e.g. Morgan, Dazzan and Morgan, 2006; 
Keating, 2007; Kirkbridge,Barker, Cowden, Stamps, Yang, Jones and Coid, 
2008, Fung, Bhugra & Jones, 2009). 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of referrals in comparison to population distribution in 
Lambeth. 
 
Total SHARP Referrals by Gender and Ethnicity: When looking at 
gender, there were no notable differences in referral rates, with approximately 
































4. 2. Part Two:  Data on Psychological Therapy 
 
As displayed in Table 1, 60 clients (35 females, 25 males) were referred for 
psychological therapy (CBTp, Hearing Voices Group and Family Therapy) 
within the audit time period. 
 
Total Psychology Referrals by Ethnicity: Almost half of referrals (48%) being 
service users from a BME background, with others from a white background 
(52%).  
 
Total Psychology Referrals by Gender and Ethnicity: There seemed to be 
slightly more females (58%) referred for psychology than males (42%) within 
the timeframe of this audit. This pattern was similar across all ethnic 
backgrounds (see Table 2). 
 
  Male Female Total (%) 
White 7 10 17 (28%) 
Black 12 17 29 (48%) 
Other 6 8 14 (24%) 
Total (%) 25 (42%) 35 (58%) 60 (100%) 
Table 2: Overall referrals to psychology by ethnicity and gender. 
 
As displayed in Figure 1, of the 60 clients referred for psychology, 51 were 
classed as taking up the offer of psychological therapy, whereas 9 declined 
the offer, following an initial team assessment.  Of the 51 who accepted the 
offer, 35 people went on to complete a course of psychological therapy, and 
16 started therapy but were classed as subsequently dropping out.  
 
Analysis of clients who declined the offer of psychological therapy (n=9): 
There were nine clients (4 Black females, 3 Black males, 2 White males) who, 
after assessment declined psychological therapy, but were interested in other 
therapies (see Table 3). Four clients (3 Black females and 1 White male) 
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engaged in occupational therapy and two clients (1 Black male and 1 White 
male) in physical therapy. The remaining three (1 Black female and 2 Black 
male) clients were not in contact with SHARP at the time of the audit and 
could not be contacted throughout the time this audit was conducted. It was 








White 1 (11%) 1 0 
Black 3 (34%) 0 3 
Other 0 (0%) 0 0 




White 1 (11%) 1 0 
Black 1 (11%) 1 0 
Other 0 (0%) 0 0 




White 0 (0%) 0 0 
Black 3 (34%) 2 1 
Other 0 (0%) 0 0 
Total 3 (5%*) 2 (22%) 1 (11%) 
Table 3: Distribution of clients who refused psychology based on gender and 





Analysis of clients who accepted the offer of psychological therapy (n=51): 
The data on those who accepted the offer of psychological therapy are 




Ethnicity Total (%) Male Female 
Offered 
Psychology 
White 13 (25%) 5 8 
Black 33 (61%) 9 22 
Other 7 (14%) 2 5 




White 10 (29%) 4 6 
Black 19 (54%) 7 12 
Other 6 (17%) 2 4 
Total 35 (69%**) 13 (37%) 22 (63%) 
Dropped Out 
White 3 (19%) 1 2 
Black 12 (75%) 2 10 
Other 1 (6%) 0 1 
Total 16 (31%**) 3 (19%) 13 (81%) 
Table 4: Overall engagement with psychology by ethnicity and gender. 
(* represents percentage of total referrals to psychology; ** represents 
percentage of clients who were offered psychological therapy) 
 
Table 4 shows that the majority of clients referred to psychology were offered 
psychological treatment and accepted it (85% of total referrals to psychology). 
Out of the clients who were offered psychology, the majority (69%) engaged in 
the treatment. When looking at engagement data by ethnic group, 77% of 
White clients who were offered psychological therapy engaged in it (10 clients 
out of 13). A similarly high level of engagement (86%) was observed for 
clients belonging to the "Other" group whereas for clients belonging to the 
Black group, engagement was somewhat more reduced (58%), but still 
representing more than half of the clients offered psychological interventions. 
As it can be seen in Figure 3, there were more females in our data than 




Figure 3: Engagement with Psychology by ethnic group and gender 
 
Analysis of clients who were offered psychological therapy but dropped out 
(n=7): Out of the clients who dropped out (31% the psychology referrals), 7 
clients disengaged completely from all SHARP services, but nine engaged in 
other interventions (e.g. 6 in OT and 1 in PT, 2 in both OT and PT). The data 




Ethnicity Total (%) Male Female 
Completely 
disengaged 
White 2 (29%) 1 1 
Black 5 (71%) 0 5 
Other 0 (0%) 0 0 




White 1 (11%) 0 1 
Black 7 (78%) 2 5 
Other 1 (11%) 0 1 
Total 9 (17%*) 2 (22%) 7 (78%) 
Table 5: Distribution of “drop out” clients based on gender and ethnicity. 



























Psychology Referrals, according to ethnic background: When examining 
the ethnic distribution of engagement with Psychology services it can be noted 
that higher percentages of clients belonging to the Black group dropped out of 
therapy (approx 24% combining total disengagement and engagement with 
other services only) in comparison to White (approx 6%) and 'other' ethnic 
groups (2%). However, this result should be interpreted with caution, taking 
into account the fact that 48% of referrals to psychology were of service users 
from a Black background’ and also that 61% of clients who were offered 
psychological therapy were from Black backgrounds. Therefore, considering 
that the three ethnic groups are unequal in numbers, the data was looked at in 




Figure 4: Ethnic distribution (%) of engagement data with Psychology 
services at SHARP. The data represents the proportion of 
engagement/disengagement within each ethnic client group. 
 
 As it can be seen in Figure 4, some clients from a Black ethnic background 
disengaged fully with the team (approx 23%), whereas others continued 
treatment using a different type of intervention (approx 16%). These 
percentages are broadly similar with the ones observed in the White service 






















Black background Other 
background 
Completely disengaged 
Disengaged with Psycholgy but 
engaged with other services at 
SHARP 
Engaged with Psychology 
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was based on a very small number of referrals (7 clients in total). These 
quantitative data, however, do not shed any light on the reasons why clients 
disengaged with psychology 
 
4. 3. Part Three: Qualitative data - Exploring reasons for engagement, 
non-engagement and drop-out from psychological therapy. 
 
A total of 16 telephone interviews were conducted with clients who had 
agreed to a psychology referral: 8 were clients who dropped out (7 from Black 
backgrounds and 1 from White group) and 8 clients who engaged with 
psychology, in order to provide a comparison (6 Black and 2 White), from both 
White and Black backgrounds. Unfortunately despite several attempts we 
were unable to contact any of the nine clients who declined the offer of 
psychological therapy. 
 
Given the limited amount of data, a formal thematic analysis was not possible. 
Nevertheless, a summary of the data is provided below. 
 
4. 3. 1. Understanding of the referral  
 
Therapy Drop-Out Clients: Almost all clients who dropped out (regardless of 
ethnic group) were not able to explain their referral (e.g. "I don't know", 
"Because the doctor said so") or gave brief answers to this question, finding it 
difficult to elaborate (e.g. "Because I'm ill and I need help"). Only one client 
(who was from a Black background) was able explain in more detail: 
"Because I hear these voices and no one has been able to help me. I mean 
the nurses and all the people at the hospital. I was referred to psychology so I 
can talk to someone about all the things I could not say to other people... like 




The majority of the clients who did not engage seemed to have a limited 
understanding of their referral as well as the role of psychology. Given the 
small numbers, it is not possible to comment on differences across ethnicities, 
but from the limited data we collected, the one white client showed similar 
responses to the service users from a Black background. 
 
Engaged Clients: In contrast, all clients who engaged with psychology were 
able to discuss their referral, albeit with variable amounts of detail. These 
clients spoke about their difficulties with psychotic symptoms, and most 
importantly showed a greater understanding of the role psychology in helping 
them cope with their difficulties. An illustrative example is taken from the 
transcript of one client, from a Black background: "I was referred because my 
life was in tatters and I really needed help. I used to live in fear of my voices 
day and night... I feared people ... bad people would come after me. It was 
really bad. I think the worst part was that I thought I was the only one in the 
world who felt like that, and I could not tell anyone. My understanding of my 
referral was that the psychologist was the person I could talk to about all these 
things ... and they would listen to me ... and try to help me, not think I'm 
barking mad and need to be locked away. It's hard when you have no one you 
trust". 
 
4. 3. 2. Reasons for drop-out 
 
The main theme that emerged from this section of the interview was related to 
"other things going on in your life" (Question 4, 2nd prompt).  
 
Therapy Drop-Out Clients: Clients who did not engage reported significant 
events happening in their life at the time when they were offered psychological 
therapy or when they had already started the therapy (1 or 2 sessions). Most 
of them (6 clients from Black ethnic backgrounds) stated that they had 
significant family problems (e.g. bereavement, separation, issues regarding 
immigration status of close relatives). The remaining 2 clients (1 from Black, 1 
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from White ethnic background) also reported they had multiple significant 
events in their life but they were not specifically related to the family.  
 
Another interesting theme emerging from this section of the interview was 
around the concerns clients had. Most clients (4 from Black, 1 from White 
ethnic backgrounds) reported no concerns. However, one client from Black 
ethnic background reported a fear of "being locked up again", whereas 
another client (also from a Black ethnic background) expressed doubts about 
their cognitive abilities, which they perceived as inadequate for successfully 
engaging in psychological therapy: "I'm just not smart enough for this sort of 
thing...". Finally, another client from a Black ethnic background who engaged 
in other therapies at SHARP after disengaging with psychology, reported 
concerns regarding the effectiveness of talking therapies "I won't get better by 
talking". Interestingly, no client from the "drop out" group reported any prior 
contact with psychology before being referred to SHARP. 
 
Engaged Clients:  Notably, only 50% of the clients who engaged with the 
service reported significant events in their lives at the time of the referral (2 
from Black and 1 from White ethnic background). Also, all these clients 
(regardless of ethnic backgrounds) reported no current concerns, although 
one client (Black ethnic background) spontaneously recalled they had "some 
doubts" regarding talking therapies prior to meeting their therapist. This may 
simply indicate elevated levels of hope in this group in comparison to drop out 
clients. It may also be possible that clients who engaged might have had 
similar concerns before experiencing psychological therapy but changed their 
mind in the light of their experiences. Two clients from the "engaged" group 
reported prior contact with psychology, but they were actually referring to the 
mindfulness or ACT groups at SHARP. 
 
All Clients:  Importantly all clients interviewed (from both drop out and 
engaged groups) reported that their spiritual or cultural beliefs were 
adequately attended to. Also, it is worth noting that none of the clients 




4. 3. 3. Social support network and its influence on the decision to attend 
psychotherapy 
 
All Clients:  Interestingly, all interviewed clients (engaged or dropped out) 
reported that they usually ask family or close friends for help with their mental 
health problems.  
 
Therapy Drop-Out Clients:  Most clients who did not engage reported elevated 
levels of social isolation; most clients reported that they only have a few 
friends, others reported being far away from their families and in sporadic 
contact with them. Some clients (2 from Black, 1 from White ethnic 
backgrounds) also reported that their friends or relatives would have a 
negative opinion of someone who is in contact with psychology (e.g. "They'd 
think you're barking mad", "...you're barmy", "...you've got to be mad"). The 
other clients in the "drop-out" group refused to answer this question.  
 
Engaged Clients:  In contrast, the majority of the clients who engaged with 
psychology reported that their social support groups have either positive 
opinions about seeing a psychologist (e.g. "It's like going to the GP, it’s great if 
you can see a psychologist") or simply said that they are not discussing their 




The findings indicate that there are differences in referral rates and the take 
up of therapy according to ethnicity. Although Black and Ethnic minorities 
make up 30% of Lambeth's population, 48% of clients referred to psychology 
were from Black backgrounds. The referral and uptake patterns suggest that 
access to psychological therapy for service users from Black backgrounds is 





Although it is not possible to draw definitive conclusions from the results 
presented here, given the small numbers in some data categories, the results 
indicate that there may be some discrepancy in terms of referral and 
engagement with psychological therapy for some service users from a Black 
background. This finding is in line with previous research showing a high 
incidence of psychosis in BME groups. 
 
The fact that only 61% of service users from a Black background offered 
psychological therapy engaged in it, compared with 77% of White clients 
should be interpreted with caution. A previous audit conducted in Croydon 
(McGourty, 2011) found that 14% fewer black clients completed therapy than 
White clients. The present study suggested that 19% fewer Black clients were 
engaged with psychology at the time of the audit. Thus, on one hand, these 
results support McGourty's findings, suggesting that service users from a 
Black background are more likely to drop out of therapy. On the other hand, 
there were considerably more referrals and uptake of clients from Black 
backgrounds than White or other backgrounds. That made it comparatively 
more likely to encounter drop outs from this group rather than the other two 
(White and other backgrounds) which were under-represented in this sample. 
For example, the same case can be made by comparing clients from a White 
background with clients from Asian, mixed Asian background, Middle Eastern, 
etc. (collapsed under "other" category). 86% of these clients engaged in 
psychology, which is markedly better than 77% White clients. However, there 
were only 7 clients in this group in comparison to almost double (13 clients) in 
the White ethnic group. It is also worth noting that the drop out rates for clients 
from a Black ethnic background presented here (29%) are lower than 
previously reported in some published studies (e.g. 48% Sparks, Daniels & 
Johnson, 2003). These lower drop out rates may be a direct consequence of 
SHARP's recovery oriented approach to managing mental health. Within the 
wider service, psychology aims to support the clients by helping them to build 
and maintain a self-determined, meaningful and satisfying life, regardless of 
whether or not they still experience symptoms of mental illness. However, due 




Although the data are limited and the conclusions should be interpreted with 
caution, it the findings from this audit suggest that once psychological therapy 
is offered, discrepancies in terms of experience start to emerge. One potential 
hypothesis explored in this study was that a client's motivation to engage may 
have been linked in some way to the insight into their condition as well as their 
understanding of psychological services. The finding that all clients who 
engaged with psychology, regardless of their ethnic background were able to 
discuss their referral in more detail and had more insight into their condition is 
an interesting finding. If the experience of psychological assessment and the 
explanation of therapy did not fit with the perceived needs of some service 
users from BME ethnic backgrounds it might explain the higher rate of therapy 
being abandoned.  However, it is unclear whether this greater understanding 
came as a result of their engagement or was there prior to starting 
psychological therapy and facilitated engagement. It is also possible that 
clients who did not engage had a similar understanding of their referral, but 
were reluctant to discuss it over the telephone with someone they had never 
met. Further studies could address this limitation by enlisting the help of the 
client's therapist in collecting these data. 
 
Previous research has suggested that psychological therapy can be 
successfully adapted to ethnic minorities and it has a beneficial effects not 
only on clinical outcomes but also on client satisfaction and engagement (e.g. 
Rathod, Kingdon, Phiri and Gobbi &, 2010; Rathod et. al., 2013). Presumably 
adapting assessment and psychoeducation in a similar way could also have 
beneficial effects in terms of instilling hope and motivating clients to engage in 
subsequent sessions. At this stage it is unclear what information about 
psychological services clients found particularly difficult to understand. 
Therefore more data needs to be gathered about clients' preconceived ideas 
regarding psychological therapies before an intervention can be devised. This 
could be done via qualitative methods (e.g. focus groups may be particularly 
beneficial as they may stimulate discussions and enable clients with cognitive 
difficulties to express and elaborate in their ideas) or quantitative (e.g. 




Another aim of our study was to investigate the possible reasons for clients 
abandoning therapy at a later stage. Our data suggests that unforeseen 
events in the clients' lives, such as bereavement, separation, issues regarding 
immigration status may have overwhelmed them and some of them decided to 
dedicate their limited resources to dealing with these problems rather than to 
attend therapy. Most of the clients reporting these problems were from Black 
ethnic backgrounds, but not exclusively. This finding is in line with previous 
suggestions in the literature (e.g. social defeat hypothesis, Selten & Cantor-
Graae, 2005; Selten et al., 2013). It is also possible that some of the clients 
(especially the ones who dropped out) felt these problems could not be 
addressed in therapy, or may be beside the point of therapy (which was aimed 
mainly at managing psychotic symptoms).  
 
Interestingly, it also emerged that clients who expressed doubts about their 
cognitive abilities (which they perceived as inadequate for psychological 
therapy) were more likely to drop out. Although the clients who expressed this 
view were from a Black ethnic background, given the small sample size it 
cannot be concluded that these clients were systematically dropping out 
because they doubted their cognitive abilities. However, this is an important 
point to be further investigated in future studies, since previous research 
reported low self esteem in BME populations (e.g. Selten and Cantor-Graae, 
2005). It is unclear whether the clients who engaged were more confident in 
their cognitive abilities, or simply they realised their abilities were adequate 
after experiencing a few sessions of psychological therapy. Importantly, all of 
the interviewed clients (drop out and engaged groups) reported that their 
spiritual or cultural beliefs were adequately attended to, which seem to 
suggest that their doubts about psychology are not culturally related (although 
we suspect some preconceived negative beliefs about psychology might have 
been influenced by the wider culture, perhaps through media).  
 
Finally, our data has shown important differences in the impact of the clients' 
social support network. In line with previous research (e.g. Selten and Cantor-
Graae, 2005; Reininghaus et. al., 2010, Selten, et al., 2013), our data has 
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shown that clients who dropped out report higher rates of social isolation. 
However even clients who reported having stable and reliable social group, 
but whose members held negative beliefs about mental health services, 
showed higher dropped out rates than clients whose social support network 
was highly supportive of their engagement with the services. Thus the service 
should be aware of the fact that social support networks may need to be 
brought on board with the scope and methods our services in order to help 
them develop protective views (e.g. support for attendance, social inclusion, 
hope). 
 
Although we aimed to identify the factors that may affect engagement or 
disengagement differentially across ethnic groups, it is important to note that 
most factors discussed above impacted clients from all cultural backgrounds. 
This suggests that any interventions to increase engagement would be 
beneficial across all ethnic groups. While some previous research has shown 
marked differences in engagement across ethnic groups, this research has 
demonstrated similar reasons for disengagement across all client groups. 
However, it must be acknowledged that our sample size is relatively small and 
therefore these results should be interpreted with caution. 
 
6. Limitations 
In addition to limitations described so far it is important to state that this audit 
did not investigate the views of clients who did not accept the offer of therapy. 
Their views may add valuable information to why some clients do not engage 
with psychology. Also it is not clear what role language preferences and ability 
play between clients who engage and complete therapy compared with those 
who decline therapy or drop out. Is this a perceived level of ability (similar to 
the general point of cognitive abilities discussed above) of an actual level of 
ability that is seen as an obstacle?  
 
Similarly, our drop out rates are calculated by ethnicity and gender, but they 
do not take into account overall levels of deprivation. This is an important 
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uncontrolled variable (in our study) which may explain why some clients from 
a BME background’ engaged whereas others did not. In other words, is 
disengagement simply determined by ethnicity or are we dealing with a far 
more complex picture where overall levels of deprivation are affecting 
engagement in psychological therapy. This would be congruent with previous 
research such as the "social defeat hypothesis" (e.g. Selten et al. 2007). It is 
likely that this complex picture also includes factors such as: perceived 
language and cognitive abilities, preconceived ideas and concepts about 
psychological therapy, social factors, stigma about mental health conditions, 
cultural factors, band probably many more (as suggested by Cantor-Graae, 
2007).  
 
There are a number of other factors that were not taken into account during 
this audit, as data was unavailable, such as therapist variables (age, gender, 
ethnicity and experience), length of wait between initial referral and starting 
therapy, and distance between clients' homes and treatment centre. It is 
unclear whether these factors had impact on engagement and drop-out rates 
and more importantly, if they had, what was their relative impact on 




• Finding out more about the client's preconceived ideas about 
psychology. 
• In the light of previous point create psychoeducation materials that the 
clients can take home and study at their leisure. This should also 
attempt to dispel some of the myths about psychological therapy (such 
as how "smart" someone needs to be in order to benefit from therapy) 
• Offer social inclusion therapy to clients from Black ethnic backgrounds 
who are socially isolated as this may act as protective factor for 
engagement. 
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9. Appendix I: Audit & service evaluation project 
proposal form 
 
Appendix 4: Project Proposal Form (PPF) for Clinical Audit, Service 
Evaluation and other Quality Improvement Projects 
Should you require any assistance with completing this proforma, please 
contact your Local Clinical Audit Project Officer or, for Trustwide audits, the 
Clinical Audit & Effectiveness Team (details are available on the SLaM 
Clinical Audit & Effectiveness Internet Site).  For local team-based or CAG-
wide projects please send your completed PPF to your local Audit Project 
Manager/Officer, for ethical approval. For Trustwide projects please send your 
completed PPF to the Corporate Audit Dept. All relevant contact details are on 
the SLaM Clinical Audit & Effectiveness Team Intranet site.  
1(a)  Project lead details: 
Name: Dr. Matei Vladeanu 
Job title: Clinical Psychologist in 
Training 
Work Address: SHARP, 308-312 Brixton Road, London, SW9 6AA 
Telephone:  07872160262 E-mail: matei.vladeanu@slam.nhs.uk 
1(b) Project Title: A review of demographic differences in engagement with 
Psychology services at SHARP (Social Inclusion, Hope and Recovery Project). 




1(c) Please tick  one box: Is this project a: 
Clinical Audit   
(i.e. measures a 
standard) 
Service Evaluation  
(e.g. patient survey)                                   
Other Quality             
Improvement Project 
(please specify) _______ 
1(d) Which CQC Standards does this audit relate to: Please tick  relevant 
boxes: 
Involvement and Information  Personalised Care, Treatment and Support    
Safeguarding and Safety  Suitability of Staffing                                          
 
Quality Management     Suitability of Management                                 
 
2 (a) Overall project aim or purpose of the audit 
This project aims to evaluate access to and drop-outs from psychological therapies 
across different ethnic groups.  In particular we wish to look at whether there are 
differences in engagement and drop-out rates in people from Black and Minority 
Ethnic (BME) groups, and explore the possible reasons for these differences in order 
to inform potential improvements. 
The specific aims of the project are to evaluate: 
a) proportions of referrals to therapies within the SHARP service (psychosis CAG), 
according to ethnic group;  
b) the distribution of non-engagement and dropouts from therapies within the SHARP 
service, based primarily on ethnicity and gender; 
c) the possible reasons for non-engagement and drop-out from psychological 
therapy, in comparison to other treatments on offer at the team, particularly in service 
users from BME groups.  
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2(b) Specific objectives. What are the audit standards or criteria?    
The definition of a clinical audit is that it compares practice to agreed standards such 
as those defined in NICE guidelines and clinical policies, protocols and procedures.  
Please also state the source of your standards or criteria (for non-audit projects, 
clarify and contextualise aim). 
The NICE guidelines for Schizophrenia (2009) highlight the importance of monitoring 
and reviewing ‘access to engagement with psychological interventions’, including 
‘equality of access across different ethnic groups’. 
This project aims to monitor and review referrals and engagement/drop-out rates for 
service users referred to the SHARP service (psychosis CAG) for psychological 
therapy, according to ethnicity.  Where there is non-engagement or drop-outs we 
wish to look at the possible reasons for this, particularly in BME groups in order to 
inform future developments to help to ensure ‘equality of access’. 
2 (c)  Does the project relate to an area of Trust Policy?  Please check the Policy 
site on SLaM Intranet. 
Yes   No   
If Yes, please state which policy________________________________ 
2 (d) If the project relates to an area of Trust policy, please confirm that the 
standards and criteria in the clinical audit have been drawn from standards 
within the Trust policy? 
Yes   No   
Comments: __N/A_____________________________________________ 
2 (e) Have you submitted your proposed audit data collection tool or 
questionnaire along with this Project Proposal for approval? 




2 (f)  Does the data collection tool or questionnaire clearly and accurately 
monitor the standards outlined above?  
Yes   No   
Comments: _________________________________________________ 
2 (g) In which ways do you think the project will improve patient care / 
outcomes? 
We aim to use the quantitative data to evaluate the numbers of recent referrals to 
therapies at the SHARP team, in terms of ethnicity, and particularly in terms of 
engagement and drop-out rates from psychological therapies to establish whether 
there is any difference in rates according to ethnicity.  For the second part of the 
evaluation, we wish to interview a number of clients, particularly from BME 
backgrounds, who have disengaged with psychological therapy (but may have 
continued to engage with other interventions on offer at SHARP).  The interview will 
aim to gather information on potential reasons for drop-out, particularly those which 
might be specific to cultural or spiritual needs, with the purpose of informing 
recommendations towards improving engagement with psychology in particular. 
 
 
3 (a) Type of project     Please Tick   where appropriate – more than one might 
apply 
(A) National  Re-audit  High risk  




 High volume  
(C) Directorate/CAG   Multidisciplinary  





(D) Team based  Uni-disciplinary  
Wide variation in 
practice 
 
Other (please state): 
 
3 (b) Does your project criteria apply to any of the following?  If so Please Tick  




Risk Register (high 
risk) 
 Complaints  
Trust Policy  CQC   Patient Survey  









Issue of local 
concern   
 
Any Other (please state) 
4(a) Who will be on the audit steering group?  
 Matei Vladeanu, Helen Waller, Tom Ward, Adrian Webster 
4(b) What consideration has been given to the involvement of patients, carers 
or the public? 
 Full user involvement at all stages of the audit   
 Partial user involvement : please state what stages __Data Collection__________ 
 No user involvement (please state why not) ______________________________ 
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5. Information Governance Requirements:   When planning an audit, each project 
should be evaluated with regard to whether Personal Identifiable Information(PII) 
needs to be used. Unless there is genuine justification, all PII should be taken out to 
effectively anonymise the data for audit and research purposes. If you are unsure or 
need guidance and advice, please contact:  dataprotectionoffice@slam.nhs.uk 
Personal identifiable information (PII) is any piece of information which can 
potentially be used to uniquely identify, contact, or locate an individual including 
name, address, full post code, date of birth, gender, ethnicity, NHS number, 
photographs, videos, audio-tapes etc. 
5(a) Source 
of data 
 Patient    
 Staff 
Other (please specify) 
5(b) Method 
of collection 
 Direct from 
subjects (interview 
or questionnaire) 




 Other (please specify) 
SHARP team referrals 
database 
5(c) Will the 
data be fully 
anonymised? 
 Yes   No  
If yes, how: No personal 
identifiers will be used.  
 
 
If no, why not: 
If no, which personal identifiers will 
be used 
If no, have you made arrangements 
to gain consent from data subjects?        
 Yes          No 
5(d) Where 
will the data 
be recorded? 
 Manual forms                            
 Electronic forms  
 Electronic spreadsheet       




 Electronic database                     
5(e) Where 
will it be 
stored? 
 In a locked cabinet 
 In a locked office 
 On shared folder on SLaM 
network 
 On secure network outside 
SLaM 






 Password protected 
 Encrypted 
 Login required 
 Other (please specify) 




 Yes, in an anonymised format                     No  
 Yes, with identifiers   You must contact 
dataprotectionoffice@slam.nhs.uk to register any transfer of 
personal identifiable information in advance. 
If yes, how  
 Physically in person                                             Physically 
using a       
 secure courier                                                                          
 Physically using registered mail services            
Electronically using nhs.net  e-mail 
 Electronically using encrypted portable media    Other 
(please specify) 
5(h) Will the 
data leave the 
EU? 










Name: Dr. Matei Vladeanu 
Job title: Clinical Psychologist in Training 
CAG: Psychosis CAG 
Organisation: SLaM 
 
6) Data Collection (please answer ALL of the following questions) 
6(a) Where from?  Audit data can be 
collected from many sources including:  
medical records/ePJS, nursing records, 
patients, clinicians, and other staff. 
SHARP referrals database;  ePJS; 
directly from patient interviews. 
6(b) How? The data source will 
obviously influence the method used to 
collect data.  E.g. If data is to be 
collected from patients the most 
appropriate method might be a survey 
or interview.  If data is to be collected 
from medical records, it will be 
necessary to design a data collection 
proforma. Questionnaires, one-to-one 
interview, focus groups.   
Data will be gathered from all SHARP 
referrals over the past 1 year. 
Clients from BME backgrounds will be 
invited to take part in a short interview 
survey, by letter or through other 
health professionals they are currently 
working with. A semi-structured 
interview will be carried out (see 
questions and prompts attached). 
6 (c) How much?  As a guide, a sample 
should include a minimum of 30 cases 
and perhaps as many as 100.  If the 
initial sample proves to be too small to 
provide data necessary, it can be added 
later. 
For the first part of the evaluation all 
referrals to the team over the last year 
will be included (approximately 200).  
For the interviews, we hope to speak 
with approximately 20 clients, mostly 
from BME backgrounds. 
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6 (d) Who?  Who will be responsible for 
collecting the data? Ensure the person 
identified understands their role. 
Dr. MateiVladeanu, Clinical 
Psychologist in Training. 
6(e) Timescale?  Over what period is 
the data to be collected? 
August – December 2013. 
6 (f) Pilot Audit? Y/N In most cases it 
will be advisable to carry out a pilot to 
check quality of questionnaire, length of 
interview, etc.  In light of the pilot audit 
findings, modifications to any of the 
above may need to be made. 
Yes. 
7(a) Who will be affected by the outcomes of this project? 
The SHARP Service, where the audit is being carried out (Psychology in 
particular).  However, the outcomes and recommendations are likely to apply 
to psychology services in general across SLaM. 
7(b) With whom and where will the final report be shared? i.e. Local Clinical 
Governance  Committees, CAEC? 
SHARP Team; Access to Psychological Therapies in Psychosis (ATPT) 
committee. 
7(c) Who will take responsibility for disseminating the results of the project 
and following through recommendations and actions? And how and when will 
the recommendations and actions be evaluated, monitored and reviewed? 
MateiVladeanu will be responsible for the write up of the project, including 
presentation of the results and recommendations at a team meeting and at the 
larger APTP committee meeting. 
All completed projects must be followed up with a completed audit 
recommendations monitoring form, available on the SLaM Clinical Audit & 




8) Project Approval 
8(a) Information Governance 
Approval: 
  IG Audit approval given by: 
______________________________ 
Date Audit IG 
approved:_____________________ 
 
8(b) Project Ethical approval given by: 
Clinical Audit Ethical approval given by: 
__________________________________ 
Date of Clinical Audit Committee 
approval:___________________________ 
 Quality Governance Committee 
 Drugs and Therapeutics Committee 








10. Appendix II: Structured Interview 
 
Interview Script/Data Collection Sheet 
 
Patient: _______________________________________________    
Date:_____/____/____ 
 
Hello, my name is Matei Vladeanu, and I’m a Trainee Clinical Psychologist. 
I’m calling from the SHARP team where you’ve been seen a while ago. We’re 
trying to get feedback from people who have used the service, to hopefully 
lead to improvements in the future. I was wondering if you’d be ok chatting for 
a few minutes with me about your experience there. Is this ok? 
If no: 
- is this not a good time? Would you like me to call later? Apptx:  
If yes: 
Thanks, that’s great! I am calling you because we are trying to improve our 
service and we’re really interested to hear how you found our service. There 
are no right or wrong answers, and everything we talk today is confidential.  
I’m independent from the team, so you can be as open and honest with me as 
you like. Your information is also anonymous. So, I’d really like to hear your 
opinions. Is that ok? 
Data: 
We’re particularly interested in people’s experiences of psychological therapy. 
I understand you were originally referred to SHARP for psychological therapy. 
1. What was your understanding of your referral for psychological 





2. Were you able to attend any sessions? 
a. Yes: How many? 
A:____________________________________________________ 




3. How did you find the initial sessions? 







4. We’re interested in finding out more about the types of things that 
made it hard for you to attend. 
Did you have any concerns?  
A: _________________________________________________________ 
Were there any other things going on in your life at the time? 
A: _________________________________________________________ 
Was it anything to do with the service? 
A: _________________________________________________________ 




Did the sessions seem to fit with your cultural or spiritual needs? 
A: _________________________________________________________ 
Did you feel your background and culture were adequately attended to?  
A: _________________________________________________________ 
Did you feel your spiritual needs were taken seriously? 
A: _________________________________________________________ 
 














8. Where would you usually go for help? 
A:_________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________ 
Prompt: Is anything different about [other therapy] which has meant that 
you have found it easier to continue? 
A: _________________________________________________________ 
